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FOREWORD
This report summarizes a study of Advanced Extravehicular
Protective Systems (AEPS) for future missions beyond Skylab in earth orbit,
on the lunar surface, and on the Martian surface. The study concentrated on
the origination of regenerable life support concepts for use in portable
extravehicular protective systems, and included evaluation and comparison
with expendable systems, and selection of life support subsystems. This
study was performed by the Vought Missiles and Space Company (VMSC) of
LTV Aerospace Corporation during the period of July 1970 through March 1972 for
the Environmental Control Branch of the Bio-Technology Division of NASA-Ames
Research Center (ARC) under Contract NAS2-6022 supported by NASA-Headquarters
Office of Manned Spaceflight (OMSF), Bioenvironmental System Division RTOP
No. 970-22-30.
The study was conducted in two phases. In the first phase,
subsystem concepts for performing life support functions in AEPS which are
regenerable or partially regenerable were originated, and in addition, ex-
pendable subsystems were considered. Parametric data for each subsystem
concept were evolved including subsystem weight and volume, power requirement,
thermal control requirement; base regeneration equipment weight and volume,
and expendable requirement. The most favorable subsystem concepts for each
life support functional requirement were selected for more detailed study.
These candidate concepts were subjected to a preliminary design analysis
which refined the parametric data. In addition, system integration factors
were considered for the candidate subsystems. Optimum subsystem concepts
were selected for each mission, as were optimum total AEPS concepts. The
results of this phase of the study were reported in an interim report,
NASA CR-114321. The second phase of the study involved an evaluation of the
impact of safety considerations involving redundant and/or backup systems
on the selection of the regenerable life support subsystems. In addition, the
impact of the space shuttle program on regenerable life support subsystem
development was investigated. This report incorporates the earlier interim
report, and gives a summary of the entire study.
Dr. Alan Chambers of NASA-ARC was the NASA Technical Monitor for
this study. Mr. William Smith of the Bioenvironmental System Division of
OMSF maintained cognizance of the study for NASA-Headquarters. The study was
conducted by the authors of this report.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Space missions undertaken in the late 1970's and 1980's time frame
may involve more ambitious Extravehicular Activity (EVA) than has been attempted
on space missions through the Apollo Program. EVA's may be increased in sortie
duration, sortie frequency, numbers of personnel involved, and scope. Current
EVA equipment performs life support functions through the use of expendable
fluids and materials. The Apollo Portable Life Support System (PLSS) is an
example of this type of equipment. On some of these future missions, the use
of expendables will be prohibitive due to the large mass required. Life
support equipment which is regenerable in some measure will be required to
make these missions viable.
This study was divided into two phases. The purpose of the first phase
was to investigate possible means of accomplishing advanced EVA. Advanced
Extravehicular Protective Systems (AEPS) for use in earth orbit, on the lunar
surface, and on the Mars surface were considered. The complete range of
possible subsystems for performing life support functions was considered,
including expendable, partially regenerable, and regenerable techniques. Con-
cepts which had previously been considered or used were included, and new
concepts were evolved. The primary emphasis was placed in the areas which
require the largest quantity of expendable material in current systems; that
is, the thermal control subsystem, and the carbon dioxide control subsystem.
Considerable attention was also given to the atmosphere supply subsystem,
which may be integrated with the carbon dioxide control subsystem in some
instances.
The second phase of the study involved an assessment of the impact of
the consideration of emergency requirements for redundant subsystem design
or for a complete backup system, on the selection of regenerable life support
subsystems. Also, the impact of the space shuttle orbiter, with its short
duration missions and possible excess water availability was evaluated. The
first phase of the program was documented in an interim report, NASA CR 114321
(Reference [1]); this report is a extension of Reference [1] to include the
results of the second phase of the study.
The conclusions reached in this study are:
(1) Regenerable Portable Life Support Systems for use in EVA are
feasible
(2) The most promising approach to regenerable portable life support
subsystems involves regeneration at the primary base or shelter.
(3) Regenerable portable life support subsystem concepts offer large
total launch weight savings at the expense of EVA weight and
volume.
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(4) Inclusion of an emergency back-up system in the AEPS has only
a minimal impact on regenerable life support subsystems, and
does not alter any of the subsystem selections.
(5) There is likely to be no advantage for a regenerable carbon
dioxide control subsystem for EVA from the space shuttle;
there may be an advantage for a fusible heat sink thermal
control subsystem, based on fluid dumping restrictions rather
than on weight savings considerations.
Specific recommendations made as a result of this study are:
(1) Develop a fusible heat sink, using water as the working fluid,
with an evaporative mode capability. This device will reduce total
system weight on missions involving a cumulative total of more
than 40 hours of EVA time.
(2) Develop a thermally regenerable metallic oxide/hydroxide carbon
dioxide control subsystem. This device will be beneficial on
missions involving a cumulative total of more than 400 hours
of EVA time.
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2.0 STUDY OBJECTIVES AND APPROACH
2.1 STUDY OBJECTIVES
The future of manned exploration of space and the planetary bodies
will be strongly influenced by the availability of effective and efficient
portable life support equipment for use in extravehicular activity (EVA).
The development of regenerable or partially regenerable systems for performing
life support functions is central to the development of efficient Advanced
Extravehicular Protective Systems (AEPS).
The specific objectives of the study were to:
(1) Identify new concepts for providing life support functions
in AEPS.
(2) Make a realistic appraisal of regenerable and partially
regenerable life support system concepts which are feasible
for use in AEPS.
(3) Identify the most promising life support functional concepts
and techniques for AEPS, and make recommendations on the
priority which should be assigned in the development of
these components and techniques.
(4) Assess the impact of the development of the space shuttle,
which will significantly reduce the cost of launching a
payload into earth orbit, on the selection of regenerable
or expendable EVA life support equipment.
(5) Assess the impact of reliability and emergency requirements
for either redundant subsystems, or a reduced capacity back-
up system on the selection of regenerable life support sub-
systems.
(6) Evaluate potential space shuttle-based EVA operations, and
select life support subsystems for use in this application.
2.2 STUDY APPROACH
The approach taken to accomplish the study objectives was to:
(1) Establish a set of ground rules and contraints which pro-
vide a framework which is flexible enough to consider the
widest range of potential concepts, but which is specific
enough to insure that all selected concepts are practical.
There are currently no specific plans for space missions of
extended duration beyond the 56 days of Skylab. Therefore,
it was necessary to establish guidelines in a somewhat
3
arbitrary fashion; using prior studies of advanced space
missions as a baseline. The design and performance re-
quirements from the AEPS RFP are shown in Table 1. The
guidelines and constraints for space shuttle based EVA's
can be more firmly established using data from NASA and the
shuttle prime contractors.
(2) Review the literature to identify techniques for accomplish-
ing life support functions which have been used previously
not only in the space program, but also in commercial and in-
dustrial applications.
(3) Review the physical properties and equations governing the
fundamental processes involved in heat rejection and carbon
dioxide control in order to identify concepts not previously
considered.
(4) Perform a preliminary screening process to eliminate those
concepts which appear less suitable.
(5) Perform detailed consumables analysis on the candidate concepts.
Also perform a preliminary design of the candidate concepts
to establish component size and weight, support equipment
requirements, and to identify potential operational difficul-
ties.
(6) Select the most promising concepts for each life support
function for each specific type of mission considered, in-
cluding shuttle based operations, and for use on all missions.
Also select the most promising concepts considering reliability
requirements for redundant subsystems or a backup system.
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TABLE 1 DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
EVA DURATION (AT AVERAGE 8 + HOURS
METABOLIC RATE)
FREQUENCY OF MISSIONS 1 PER DAY
MOBILITY AEPS SHALL PROVIDE MINIMUM ENCUMBRANCE
TO THE CREWMAN IN PERFORMANCE OF MISSION
TASKS.
CENTER OF GRAVITY CG OF THE EVA SUIT AND LIFE SUPPORT ELEMENTS
ATTACHED TO OR INTEGRATED WITH THE SUIT
SHALL NOT SHIFT MORE THAN ±3 INCHES FROM
THE CG OF THE NUDE CREWMAN.
SUIT GAS COMPOSITION 5 - 7.5 PSIA PURE OXYGEN
HUMIDITY CONTROL
A. NOMINAL SUIT INLET DEW POINT 45°F
B. MAXIMAL SUIT INLET DEW POINT 60°F
VENTILATION (MINIMAL)
A. INLET FLOW RATE 9 ACFM
B. INLET GAS TEMPERATURE 50 -70°F
CONTAMINATION CONTROL
A. NOMINAL INLET CO2 LEVEL 4 MM Hg
B. MAXIMAL INLET CO2 LEVEL 7.5 MM Hg
C. ODOR LEVEL MUST NOT ADVERSELY
AFFECT CREWMAN PERFORMANCE
METABOLIC PROFILE
A. AVERAGE 1600 BTU/HR
B. PEAK (SUSTAINED) 3500 BTU/HR
C. MINIMUM 250 BTU/HR
LIQUID TRANSPORT LOOP FLOW 240 LB/HR
LIQUID INLET TEMPERATURE TO SUIT 40°F
USE WITH VEHICLE OR SHELTER HAVING: (a) 5 - 14.7 PSIA CABIN PRESSURE
(b) 3.5 PSIA OXYGEN WITH DILUENT NITROGEN
(c) RELATIVE HUMIDITY 55 + 5%
(d) 65 - 75°F TEMPERATURE
SAFETY THE SYSTEM SHALL PRECLUDE INJURY TO
CREWMAN, SERVICE PERSONNEL, ETC., BECAUSE
OF FIRE, EXPLOSION, TOXICITY, CONTAMINATION,
AND BURNS OR SHOCK.
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS ZERO g, 1/6 g, AND 1 g
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3.0 GUIDELINES AND CONSTRAINTS
Studies to establish the configuration of future equipment are
profoundly affected by the selection of guidelines and constraints. Very
frequently this selection will be the dominant factor in the success with
which the study results stand the test of time. However, it is necessary
to postulate the missions and mission sequencing which will be undertaken
by the United States, so that guidelines and constraints which affect
significant trade factors such as power penalty, crew size, mission duration,
etc., can be assessed in a reasonable manner. This section discusses the
development of guidelines and constraints for use in this study.
3.1 FUTURE SPACE MISSIONS
Several studies have been conducted which indicate the type of
missions which might be undertaken in the next two decades. The most com-
prehensive of these are the NASA report on "America's Next Decades in Space"
(Reference [2]) prepared for the Space Task Group and the Bell Comm report
on "An Integrated Program of Space Utilization and Exporation for the Decade
1970 to 1980" (Reference 13]). Figure 1 shows a plan for the U. S. Space
Program for the 1970-1990 period (Reference 13]). These studies were
summarized in a speech (Reference 14]) from which the main thrust of future
plans seems to be:
(1) Development of a low cost transportation system
(2) Exploitation of near earth orbit opportunities
(3) Further exploration of the moon
(4) Exploration of Mars
The rate at which this program is conducted is dependent on funding levels
granted by Congress; however, the entire program (with the possible exception
of the Exploration of Mars) will probably be undertaken withi-n the next two
decades. The low cost transportation system seems to be the keystone for all
of the other steps, (Reference [4]), and it quite logically seems to have the
highest development priority at this time (References [5] and [6]). The low
cost transportation system includes a reuseable booster, a reuseable orbiter,
and a nuclear-powered tug. The booster and orbiter are used to put payloads
into low (up to 260 nm) earth orbit, while the tug is used to transfer payloads
to geosynchronous orbit, or to lunar orbit. The space shuttle orbiter will
apparently be the first of the vehicles to reach an operational status, and
will be developed in two phases, designated Mark I and Mark II, and it will
probably be launched initially by a conventional booster (Reference [7]).
The exploitation of near-space will probably be undertaken concurrently with
the development of the space shuttle booster, to be followed by the develop-
ment of the nuclear-powered tug, which could ultimately be used as the pro-
6
o0
z
0I-
U)
ica
U)
0w0 O_
D
W!U,)
*0
: 3
'uf3
tL
V)
-D
,=
I <
I--
wmO0
cc
z
.J
cc
I-
LIJ
z
-J0L
A
Wu ZI.UE Lw
[ n-i
o I.M
_ I.
o _U-
z O
0 
,n, I(J 
t O
E3 C,
D 0)
ccc er-
.
i <
J ccLI
1) 0
[30w 
I.-
C,
Z
I.-
Z
z
.t
I-
U)
CC U)2z2
--I--'
I--
O) Z u
zl O- co
CC U t
Ul
ICLU.
7
pulsive stage for advanced lunar and Martian exploration expeditions.
All of the basic elements of the low-cost transportation system are to be
reuseable, including the nuclear-powered tug.
The first manned orbital flight (MOF) for the Mark I shuttle is
projected for 1978, and 13 to 15 flights per year are postulated out until
1985 (Reference [8]). The first MOF for the Mark II orbiter is baselined
for 1985-1986. These plans are undergoing continual reassessment as the
Phase B Shuttle Studies continue. The shuttle is currently planned to
be used by both NASA and DOD, with DOD accounting for 36% of the payloads
for Mark I (Reference [8]). The DOD applications color the design of the
shuttle in many respects, particularly with regard to the cargo bay dimensions,
and the ground support requirements.
Numerous studies have been and are now being conducted on the
applications and use of the shuttle. Some of the more significant NASA studies
include: Shuttle Orbital Applications Requirements (SOAR) and Modular Space
Stations by McDonnell-Douglas Corporation; Research and Applications Modules
(RAM) and the NASA Blue Book Experiments by General Dynamics - Convair, Inc.;
Modular Space Stations, the Payload Sortie System (PSS), and Orbital
Operations by North American Rockwell, rnc.; and the Integrated Fleet Study
by Aerospace Corporation. There are also studies underway on DOD applications
of the Shuttle by Itek Corporation; General Electric Company, TRW Systems,
Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, and McDonnell-Douglas Corporation. Based
on these studies, and a NASA budget relatively constant at today's level over
the next several years, it seems reasonable to expect that the initial
shuttle operations will be primarily devoted to earth orbital "sortie"
flights (in which an experiment is carried aloft, performed, and returned
to earth in the shuttle cargo bay), and in satellite transport, deployment,
and servicing. The full spectrum of anticipated shuttle missions is depicted
in Figure 2 and includes:
(1) Short Duration Orbital Missions ("sortie" flights, and
deployment of free-flying "RAM's")
(2) Placement and Retrieval of Satellites
(3) Service and Maintenance of Satellites
(4) Delivery of Propulsive Stages and Payload (propulsive stages
are used to put the payload into higher orbits than the
shuttle can achieve)
(5) Space Station buildup and logistics support
(6) Delivery of Propellants (fuel for a conventionally-powered
tug for placing payload in different orbit's than that of the
shuttle
8
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(7) Space Rescue (the rapid response capability of the shuttle
for ground-based rescue missions is identified by Myers
(Reference 19]) in the classification of basic shuttle
operations)
There are a very large number of experiments which are candidates
for use with the shuttle, some of which are more likely to involve EVA than
others. There are also many experiments which could involve Intravehicular
Activity (IVA) in unpressurized portions of the vehicle, where a life support
system including a pressure suit would be required. (The suit would not
necessarily require meteroid protection or thermal protection such as are
required for EVA suits.) The NASA Blue Book (Reference [10]) lists many of
the potential experiments. (NASA is not committed to actually perform the
experiments given in Reference [10]; these are presented as typical examples
of experiments that might be performed for use in vehicle design). Numerous
studies are being conducted on the experiment module, which is typically re-
ferred to as the Research and Application Module CRAM). There are several
basic RAM configurations under study, each of which is suitable for a specific
class of experiments identified in the Blue Book (References 11], 112], and
[13]).
The general plans for the future in space involve a substantial
number of EVA events, although the Blue Book gives a general recommendation
to avoid EVA where possible (Reference [10], p. 3-13). The Blue Book does
include experiments with an Astronaut Maneuvering Unit (AMU) and with a
Maneuvering Work Platform (MWP}. There are 24 EVA experiments on a 60-day
flight (Reference [10], p. 3-19). The purposes of the experiments are to:
(1) Demonstrate navigation, docking/anchoring, cargo transfer,
astronaut rescue, space structure assembly, maintenance and
repair.
(2) Observe and evaluate the maneuverability, stability, control
and performance of the maneuvering device.
(3) Evaluate crew physiological factors, personnel equipment
limitations, crew hazards, supplementary equipment requirements,
mobility and dexterity limitations, and training requirements.
In addition to the EVA experiments, the first 10 shuttle missions
involve a considerable amount of EVA and IVA (Reference [14]). Most of these
EVA events involve deployment of the "Telefactor", a remote maneuvering
vehicle which has manipulator arms. The telefactor contains a television
camera which relays pictures to the operator inside the shuttle. The tele-
factor is unstowed and inspected by an EVA crewman prior to use, and is
stowed by an EVA crewman subsequent to use. Cargo in the cargo bay of the
shuttle, which is unpressurized, is secured by an EVA crewman prior to any
maneuvers which include significant acceleration, such as orbit change or reentry.
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The full extent of EVA on future space missions, and particularly
on the space shuttle orbiter, is difficult to assess at this time. There is
considerable interest in replacing man in EVA with "teleoperators", such as
described in Reference [5], or in augmenting man with an Independent Manned
Manipulator" (References [5] and [6]). There are also significant efforts
being conducted on the performance of man in zero-gravity in EVA or IVA, such
as discussed in References [7] and [18]. In the final analysis the choice
of man or machine for performance of work external to spacecraft will be
decided by experience and actual on-site evaluation and comparison of EVA
systems using man, man combined with machines, and teleoperators. Although
there may be doubt that man will be the optimum system for effecting crew
transfer, cargo transfer, inspection, assembly, etc., there is no doubt
that suitable crew equipment will be required for men participating in the
evaluation and comparison with other potential systems.
Because of the considerable uncertainty in the direction and sequencing
of the space program in the future, an attempt was made to establish guide-
lines and constraints which cover a broad spectrum of potential programs.
There is better definition of the space shuttle program than of potential
future programs involving planetary expeditions, but even in the case of the
shuttle, there is considerable uncertainty in the amount and nature of EVA
which may be employed. For the planetary portions of the study, an ambitious
program involving substantial amounts of EVA (compared to the 73-1/2 EVA
hours spent on the lunar surface through Apollo 151 has been assumed as the
upper extreme because, if the manned space program is to continue, man must
be capable of performing useful work in space and on planetary bodies, and
undoubtedly, much of that work must be performed outside of the primary
vehicle or shelter (Reference [19]).
3.2 AEPS SPECIFICATIONS
The specification used in this study is taken, in part, from the
NASA-Ames Research Center Statement of Work (SOtW for AEPS (Table 11 (Reference
[20]), and is presented in Table 2. This specification was not regarded as being
inviolable, but was considered to be a guideline for use except where it was
possible to demonstrate that a significant advantage could be gained by
modifying it. The specifications for parameters such as metabolic load are
deliberately chosen to be conservative. The intent was to overdesign the
AEPS equipment so that the equipment would not limit the man's performance
under any reasonable circumstances.
Based on the foregoing discussion of the shuttle program and a
review of pertinent documents given in the Bibliography, the following set
of basic requirements for shuttle EVA equipment has evolved (it should be noted
that the same set of equipment might not satisfy all requirements):
(1) The donning and doffing time for the EVA equipment should be
minimal.
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TABLE 2 GENERAL AEPS SPECIFICATION
EVA DURATION (AT AVERAGE SPACE SHUTTLE - UP TO 4 HOURS
METABOLIC RATE) OTHER AEPS MISSIONS - UP TO 8 HOURS
FREQUENCY OF MISSIONS 1 PER DAY (MAXIMUM OF 3 - 2 MAN EVA'S IN 24 HOURS)
MOBILITY AEPS SHALL PROVIDE MINIMUM ENCUMBRANCE TO THE
CREW MAN IN PERFORMANCE OF MISSION TASKS, CAPABLE
OF NON-UMBILICAL OPERATION WHEN REQUIRED.
CENTER OF GRAVITY CG OF THE EVA SUIT AND LIFE SUPPORT ELEMENTS
ATTACHED TO OR INTEGRATED WITH THE SUIT SHALL NOT
SHIFT MORE THAN ±+ 3 INCHES FROM THE CG OF THE NUDE
CREWMAN.
SUIT GAS COMPOSITION 3.7 - 8.0 PSIA PURE OXYGEN OR 02 -N 2 MIXTURE
HUMIDITY CONTROL
a. NOMINAL SUIT INLET
DEW POINT 45°F
b. MAXIMAL SUIT INLET
DEW POINT 60°F
VENTILATION (MINIMAL)
a. INLET FLOW RATE 9 ACFM
b. INLET GAS TEMPERATURE 50- 70°F
c. SUIT LEAKAGE 180 SCCM
CONTAMINATION CONTROL
a. NOMINAL INLET TO SUIT 4 MM Hg (NO MIXING IN FACE REGION)
CO2 LEVEL
b. MAXIMUM INLET CO2 7.5 MM Hg
LEVEL
c. EMERGENCY MAXIMUM 15 MM Hg
d. ODOR LEVEL MUST NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT CREWMAN PERFORMANCE
METABOLIC PROFILE
a. AVERAGE PER SORTIE 1600 BTU/HR
b. PEAK (SUSTAINED) 3500 BTU/HR
c. MINIMUM 250 BTU/HR
d. AVERAGE OVER ALL 1200 BTU/HR - PLANETARY EVA'S
SORTIES 1500 BTU/HR - SHUTTLE EVA'S
e. AVERAGE DURING 1500 BTU/HR
EMERGENCY
f. PEAK DURING EMERGENCY 2000 BTU/HR
LIQUID TRANSPORT LOOP FLOW 4 LB/MIN.
THERMAL STORAGE IN BODY
a. NOMINAL NONE
b. EMERGENCY 400 - 750 BTU
LIQUID INLET TEMPERATURE 40° MINIMUM
TO SUIT 60°F MAXIMUM
USE WITH VEHICLE OR SHELTER (a) 10- 14.7 PSIA CABIN PRESSURE
HAVING: (b)2.7 PSIA OXYGEN WITH DILUENT NITROGEN
(c) RELATIVE HUMIDITY 55 + 5%
(d)65 - 75°F TEMPERATURE
SAFETY (a)THE SYSTEM SHALL PRECLUDE INJURY TO CREWMAN,
SERVICE PERSONNEL, ETC., BECAUSE OF FIRE, EXPLOSION,
." TOXICITY, CONTAMINATION, AND BURNS OR SHOCK.
(b)FAIL-SAFE AS MINIMUM CAPABILITY
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS ZERO g, 1/6 g, 0.37 g AND 1 g
DONNING, DOFFING AND MINIMIZE
CHECK-OUT TIME
EMERGENCY DURATION
a. SHUTTLE 1/2 HOUR
b. SPACE STATION 1 HOUR
c. LUNAR AND MARS BASE 2 HOURS
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(2) Pre-oxygenation for removal of nitrogen from the body
prior to EVA should be avoided if possible because of the
amount of time required; crew time is expensive, and it
may not be available in emergency situations.
(3) Overboard venting of gases and vapors should be minimized for
EVA in the vicinity of experiments involving astronomy and
earth observations.
(4) All systems should be operable in a pressurized environment
to simplify pre-EVA checkout.
(5) The EVA life support equipment should be compatible with a
separate self maneuvering unit. (This is necessary for
personnel rescue and transfer operations).
(6) The EVA equipment should be easily and quickly recharged and
serviced.
(7) The EVA equipment should be reusable on many shuttle flights.
(8) Complete reliance on umbilicals should be avoided, particularly
for equipment which may be used in emergency situations.
(9) Checkout time for the EVA equipment should be minimal.
(10) Water for use in EVA heat rejection equipment is abundant at
little or no penalty.
The missions included in this study involved EVA operations from a
space shuttle, a space station in earth orbit, on the lunar surface, and on
Mars. With the exception of the shuttle, the primary vehicle life support systems
for these missions are not well defined at this time, however, the parameters
given in Table 3 were adopted as a guideline. Except for shuttle-based EVA's,
it was assumed that a minimum of two men would participate in each sortie ,
and the number of EVA sorties on a mission was taken to be a study variable
with an upper limit as given in Table 3. The specification calls for one
sortie per day, so the study baselines the support equipment to meet this
requirement; however, less frequent EVA events are also considered. This is
significant to the heat rejection system, which is sensitive to the external
thermal environment, which varies considerably on the lunar surface and also
influences the base penalties required for power, heating, cooling, etc.
The baseline primary vehicle life support systems are also shown
in Table 3. The shuttle uses expendables for life support due to the short
duration missions. For the other AEPS missions, it was assumed that the primary
vehicle or shelter contains a closed life support system. Except for the
shuttle, the exact nature of the carbon dioxide collection and reduction
equipment was not specified; however, it was assumed that this equipment was
sized large enough to accommodate the carbon dioxide which might be released
during regeneration of the carbon dioxide sorbent used in the AEPS. It was
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TABLE 3 PRIMARY VEHICLE BASELINE LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM AND
ENERGY PENALTIES
SPACE
SHUTTLE
SPACE
STATION
LUNAR
BASE
MARS
BASE
NUMBER OF CREWMEN 4 6 TO 50 6 TO 12 6 TO 12
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF 30 500 500 500
EVA'S (2 MEN PER EVA)
MAXIMUM MISSION 30 365 365 550
DURATION (DAYS)
RESUPPLY INTERVAL (MO) NONE 6 12 NONE
POWER PENALTY 325 + 500 500 500
(LBM/KW) 1.275 LBM/KWH (1)
PROCESS HEAT UP TO 100 (3) 100 100 100
300°F (LBM/KW) (2)
PROCESS COOLING 100 50 50 50
DOWN TO 40°F
(LBM/KW) (2)
BASE EQUIPMENT (FT 3/LBM) 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025
VOLUME PENALTY (FT3 KW) 125 125 125 125
CABIN PRESSURE (PSIA) 10 - 14.7 14.7 14.7 14.7
DILUENT GAS N2 N2 N2 N2
OXYGEN PARTIAL 3.0 - 3.35 3.25 3.25 3.25
PRESSURE (PSIA)
CO2 PARTIAL 5.0 < 5.0 < 5.0 < 5.0
PRESSURE (MM HgA)
CO2 CONCENTRATOR LiOH REGENERABLE REGENERABLE REGENERABLE
C02 REDUCTION - NONE REGENERABLE REGENERABLE REGENERABLE
02 PRODUCTION
WATER AVAILAB I LITY EXCESS WATER LIMITED LI M ITED LI M ITED
MAY BE AVAILABLE
(1) FUELCELLPOWER
(2) SPECIALIZED AEPS EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR INCREASED TEMPERATURE RANGE
EVALUATED INDIVIDUALLY
(3) WASTE HEAT LESS THAN 150°F AVAILABLE AT NO PENALTY
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assumed that this capability was provided in the primary vehicle or shelter.
The capacity of this base 02 reclamation system may have to be increased
because the average metabolic rate of a crewman may be greater during an EVA
than it is at the base. Therefore, the crewman may generate more CO2 during
the 8 hours of EVA than he would if he remained at the base.
The atmosphere in the primary vehicle or shelter was assumed to be
comprised of the proper proportions of oxygen and nitrogen at a pressure of
10 psia to 14.7 psia, as required in the specification. It was assumed that
the AEPS uses a pure oxygen atmosphere, after preliminary evaluation of a two-
gas system. It was found that a two gas suit would require N to be made up
during the EVA since leakage would result in a gradual decrease in the residual
N left in the suit from the cabin atmosphere. The only advantage of a high
pressure, two gas suit is the elimination of possible difficulty with the
"bends" (see Section 4.7) that might be encountered when transitioning from
a 14.7 psia, O -N2 cabin atmosphere to a low pressure suit. However, available
physiological data indicates that pure 02 suit pressures up to about 8 psia can
be used for EVA equipment with no oxygen toxicity problems. This atmosphere
would remove the nitrogen from the crewman's body during the course of the
EVA so that the "bends" would not result following an emergency suit decom-
pression. The crewman can thus go directly from a 14.7 psia, 0 -N atmosphere
to an 8 psia, 0, suit with no pre-conditioning time or equipment required
for removal of dissolved N from his body. This requires an improvement in
suit technology but high pressure suits have been demonstrated (Reference 23)
and no technological breakthroughs are required. More detailed physiological
data are required to determine the upper and lower limits of suit 02 pressure
that can be used without requiring prebreathing for N2 removal.
It was assumed that electrical power, process heat, and process cooling
were available for use in regeneration of AEPS components. The penalties
(References [21] and [22]) assumed for these services are given in Table 3.
With the exception of the shuttle, the same penalty factors are used
for all missions, although it is recognized that the exact penalty would
depend on the nature of the mission, and the time frame in which it is carried
out. The penalties are considered to be representative nominal values, and
to be realistic for use in a study such as this.
3.3 ASTRONAUT LOCOMOTION AND MOBILITY
As astronaut requires some means of locomotion in order to function
effectively during EVA. In an orbital environment some provisions must be
made to enhance mobility. In most instances the distances which must be
traversed are small. The means available are:
(1) Handholds on the vehicle (probably with a tether)
(2) Astronaut maneuvering unit (with or without a tether)
(3) Maneuvering Work Platform or Space Taxi (a small one-man
vehicle)
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Any one or all of these techniques could eventually be used in space. For
this study the first two possibilities are considered. The third alterna-
tive could support activity of the first two types, and might well include
a closed cabin and sophisticated life support system; for this reason it is
not considered in this study.
On planetary surfaces the locomotion techniques available to the
crewman are:
(1) Walk
(2) Walk supported by an equipment transporter similar to the
Modular Equipment Transporter(MET)
(3) Ride a small powered vehicle such as the Lunar Rover on
Apollo 15.
The crewman can walk about freely, as was witnessed on the Apollo
flights; however, the range which can be covered by a man walking in a space
suit over rugged terrain, with no paths or trails, is very limited. For this
reason, it was assumed that the astronaut would not operate at a distance of
more than a one-hour walk from a support vehicle of some sort. The support
vehicle might take the form of a cart, such as the Modular Equipment Trans-
porter (MET) used on the Apollo 14 mission, or it might be a powered vehicle,
such as the lunar rover. Support might also be provided by a larger powered
vehicle which could contain a relatively sophisticated life support system.
There are two fundamentally different methods of carrying out life
support functions with the aid of a supporting vehicle. They are to connect
the crewman to the vehicle by means of a part or full-time umbilical, or to
carry replaceable modules that can be used during the EVA. The simplest
form of umbilical is one that supplies electric power only. A liquid
cooling umbilical would be slightly larger and more restrictive, while a gas
umbilical is the largest and most difficult to use. Both the umbilical and
modular methods were considered and it was found that the choice of which is
superior can only be made at the detailed mission planning stage.
The umbilical restricts the EVA mobility for some operations, but
this may not be a handicap for activities such as driving a rover, etc.
However, it was decided that any umbilical system must retain the capability
to operate without the umbilical, since this may be required for emergencies
or for some missions. The optimum systems used for non-umbilical operation
might use expendables, since proper EVA planning would minimize the time
they would be used.
The modular approach does not impose a mobility restriction during
normal operation. It is assumed that the crewman can return to his support
cart at convenient intervals (every 1-2 hours) and replace spent modules
with fresh ones. This would allow concepts such as fusible heat sinks,
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which might be too large to carry conveniently, to be split into more
easily manageable segments. However, this approach does consume EVA time
for replacement of the modules and there is a potential reliability problem
in the replacement mechanism. It was assumed that any modular system must
also retain the capability to operate without the support modules for missions
where this may be required. This operation can be done with a penalty in
expendables. The modular approach has the advantage that the EVA weight can
be optimized for different duration EVA's, by only carrying a sufficient
number of modules to satisfy the desired EVA duration.
For purposes of this study, the AEPS life support system supporting
equipment is assumed to be limited to that which could be carried on the
MET and powered "rover" type of vehicles. The larger powered vehicle life
support system is not considered in this study.
The mobility of the astronaut is primarily governed by the local
gravitational force, the suit mobility, and the mass, volume and center of
gravity (c.g.) of the equipment carried by the man. No control can be
exercised over the local gravitational force, and the specification
establishes the space suit mobility as being similar to the Apollo A7L
suit so that weight, volume and c.g. of the portable equipment are the only
mobility parameters over which this study has any influence. The specifi-
cations limits c.g. shift of the crewman to less than + 3 inches. This
requirement is difficult to apply to a study of subsystem operational
concepts; however, an attempt was made to insure that concepts considered
could reasonably be expected to result in a final hardware configuration that
would satisfy this constraint. The mass and volume limitations assumed for
the life support system by the crewman or on the support equipment are
given in Table 4.
TABLE 4 MAXIMUM MASS AND VOLUME REQUIREMENTS
MASS VOLUME
TRANSPORT TECHNIQUE LB. IN3
BACKPACK AND OR CHEST PACK* 200 8,600
"MET" TYPE TRANSPORTER 200 8,600
"ROVER" TYPE POWERED VEHICLE 1000 40,000
*BASED ON THE LTV AEROSPACE/USAF ASTRONAUT MANEUVERING UNIT (AMU)
The assumed maximum allowable mass and volume to be carried by the crewman
were deliberately chosen on the high side, to reduce the likelihood that
an otherwise attractive subsystem concept would be eliminated from consider-
ation because of excessive mass or volume requirements. The assumption was
made that detailed integration of an AEPS could be arranged in such a way
as to accommodate attractive subsystems, through reduction in mission
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capability, selection of other subsystems, and/or improved packaging
techniques.
3.4 DESIGN ENVIRONMENTS
The design environments for AEPS are given in Table 5.
TABLE 5 AEPS DESIGN ENVIRONMENTS
EARTH ORBIT *LUNAR SURFACE **MARS SURFACE
SOLAR FLUX (BTU/HR FT2 ) 442 442 164TO 240
ALBEDO 0.35 0.07 0.17
EQUIV. SURFACE TEMP (OR) - 170-760 POLE: 140-470
EQUATOR: 310-590
MEAN GRAV. CONSTANT (g) - 0.17 0.38
ROTATIONAL PERIOD (H RS) - 655 24.61
ATMOS. PRESSURE (MB) 0 0 6
*REFERENCE (41)
**REFERENCES (24) AND (25)
In this study it was assumed that the AEPS design could be optimized for
each individual operating environment if this was found to be advantageous.
This is a departure from the philosophy which guided the Apollo PLSS, which
required the unit to be operational in either an orbital (zero-g) environ-
ment, or a lunar surface environment.
A brief study of the thermal environments for AEPS was made so that
the heat leak into the AEPS from the external environment could be assessed.
For earth orbit and on the lunar surface it was assumed that the AEPS space
suit was similar to the Apollo A7L suit. The influence of system heat leak
on the capacity of the heat rejection system was considered.
The Mars surface has a significant atmospheric pressure (References
[24] and [25]) and has high velocity winds at times so that the convective
heat transfer produced by these winds must be considered. The atmospheric
pressure on Mars is large enough to greatly increase the thermal conductivity
across an Apollo type suit, and thus to increase the heat transfer through
the suit. The environment on Mars is relatively low in temperature, so
this increased conductivity is primarily manifested in an increase in heat
loss from the suit. Increasing the heat loss from the suit is beneficial
since it reduces the heat load on the primary heat rejection system. The
heat loss or gain through the AEPS space suit and support equipment used
in the study is given on Figure 3. The values for lunar operation are
variable with sun angle; however, for earth orbit and the Mars surface
average values have been used for simplicity. There are potential thermal
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problems with hot and/or cold spots inside the suit; however, these problems
were not considered in this study.
The design conditions used for radiator surfaces were as follows: for
earth orbit, earth emission, earth albedo, and direct solar radiation were
considered; for the lunar surface and for the Mars surface the most severe
radiation environment was considered to be the planetary equator. It was
found that optical solar reflector (OSR) radiator coatings (cx = 0.1, c = 0.9)
would be required for lunar operation of a simple, upward facing radiator.
Directional, shielded radiators that would minimize environmental heating
were also considered but the size was found to be prohibitive for a portable
system. A Mars radiator system could use conventional (cx = 0.3) coatings
due to the lower sink temperature. No attempt was made to assess the impact
of planetary dust on the radiator coating optical properties, although this
is recognized as a potential problem area.
3.5 HEAT LOAD
The sources of heat load on the AEPS are:
(1) Crewman metabolic heat
(2) Reactions in the life support system
19
(3) Suit Heat Leak
(4) Electronic equipment
The crewman is the largest source of heat in the AEPS; the crewman
generated heat can range from a basic metabolism rate of around 250 BTU/hr up
to the range of 40,000 BTU/hr for short periods (Reference [26]), such as
for a man running 100 yards in 10 seconds. The highest measured daily
(24 hour) average is about 1300 BTU/hr (Reference L26]). Table 6 presents
a summary of the metabolic loads observed to date during the Apollo EVA's.
TABLE 6 APOLLO EVA METABOLIC RATE SUMMARY
EVAI EVA I EVA III O VA
CDR LMP CDR LMP CDR LMP CDR LMP CMP
AVERAGE (BTU/HR) 800 1100 - - - - - -
APOLLO 11
PEAK (BTU/HR) 1450 1950 - - - - - - -
AVERAGE (BTU/HR) 975 1036 672 1042 - - - - -
APOLLO 12
PEAK (BTU/HR) 1680 1380 1710 1510 - - - - -
AVERAGE (BTU/HR) 815 900 907 1070 - - - - -
APOLLO 14
PEAK (BTU/HR) 1175 1560 2490 1885 - - - - -
AVERAGE (BTU/HR) 1097 976 1002 808 1031 810 464 834 940*
APOLLO 15
PEAK (BTU/HR) 2200 1700 1200 1500 1900 1700 - - 2000*
*NOTE CMP PERFORMED ACTUAL EVA, METABOLIC RATE BASED ON HEART RATE ONLY
The AEPS specification calls for a minimum of 250 BTU/hr, an average per
sortie of 1600 BTU/hr, and a short-term peak of 3500 BTU/hr.
The crewman performs useful work during EVA; however, a large part
of his effort is expended in bending the space suit. Only a fraction of the
energy expended by the crewman results in work performed on exterior bodies.
For this study, it has been assumed that the crewman performs at an average
efficiency of 8% on the basis of work done external to the control volume
comprised of the crewman, his suit, and his life support equipment. Typical
overall efficiences range from 5 to 35% (Reference F26]). That portion of
the crewman's effort which does not go into work outside the suit, is assumed
to be converted into frictional heat inside of the control volume. The
metabolic heat release inside the control volume is then 92% of the metabolic
rate.
Most of the
duce heat as the CO
released in the AEPS
CO2 control processes which could be used in AEPS pro-
is removed from the suit atmosphere. This heat is
control volume. For the evaluation of AEPS heat re-
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jection systems, the LiOH heat of reaction in removing CO2 has been assumed.
The equation for this reaction is
2 LiOH + CO2 * Li2CO3 + H20(v) + 875 BTU/lb CO2
The water vapor released by this reaction (0.409 lb/lb of CO ) must be re-
moved in the humidity control system (which requires 438 BTUilb of CO2, for
simple condensation) so the total heat release is 1313 BTU/lb of CO. The
CO2 removal rate can be related to the metabolic rate as follows: For a
respiratory quotient of 0.82, the metabolic rate is 4.825 KCal per liter of
oxygen consumed (Reference [26]). This is a production of 6081.6 BTU per
lb of O0 consumed, or for a respiratory quotient of 0.82; 5393.7 BTU per lb
of CO produced. Thus the ratio of heat release in CO2 removal to metabolic
heat ?s
Ratio 1313 BTU/lb of CO2 reacted 0.2434
aio 5393.7 BTU/lb of CO2 produced 
For this study, then, the baseline used to evaluate heat rejection systems
assumes that an additional amount of energy equal to 24% of the metabolic
rate is released in the AEPS carbon dioxide control system.
The heat lost or gained through the suit and the AEPS equipment is
given on Figure 3, as discussed previously.
Electrical and electronic equipment heat release was baselined as
50 BTU/hr, a figure similar to that experienced with the Apollo PLSS. This
includes the communications equipment, the battery losses, the line losses,
the liquid-cooled garment (LCG) pump, and the ventilation fan.
The equation for AEPS heat load is then:
Heat Load = Metabolic Rate (MR) - Useful Work + CO reaction heat
release + suit heat leak + electrical equipment heat release
= MR - 0.08 MR + 0.24 MD + Heat Leak
(from Figure 3) + 50 BTU/hr
= 1.16 MR + Heat Leak ( Figure 3 ) + 50 BTU/hr
This equation has been plotted parametrically on Figure 4, so that the AEPS
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heat load can be read directly from metabolic rate and suit heat leak. The
heat rejection system is required to maintain the atmosphere temperature
at 60 to 75°F and at a dew point of 45 to 60°F at the inlet to the suit.
The specification also requires that the LCG inlet water temperature be as
low as 40°F; however, in this study it has been assumed that an improved
LCG can be utilized which will allow an inlet temperature of 70°F at the
maximum sustained metabolic rate. This assumption allows consideration of
some heat rejection techniques which would be impractical if the LCG inlet
temperature always had to be 40°F.
3.6 AEPS CONTAMINANTS
The contaminants that must be removed by the AEPS system are primarily
products of the crewman's biological processes. The primary contaminants
are CO2, water vapor, and trace gases. All of these substances are produced
at sufficiently high rates that they must be removed from the AEPS volume
during the course of an EVA. The AEPS subsystems required to maintain these
substances within the specifications detailed in Table 1 will be discussed in
Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.5.
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4.0 SUBSYSTEM CONCEPT GENERATION AND ANALYSIS
The life support function subsystems required in an AEPS are
shown in the generalized schematic on Figure 5. This section discusses the
generation of concepts for the subsystems, and the analysis of those sub-
systems to establish reasonable weights, volumes, operating characteristics,
etc., for use in overall system evaluation. The subsystems considered are:
(1) Atmosphere supply
(2) Carbon dioxide control
(3) Trace contaminant control
(4) Thermal control
(5) Humidity control
(6) Power supply
It is possible that a food and drink supply subsystem and some type of waste
management subsystem will be required for a man in an AEPS with an 8-hour sortie
duration; however, these subsystems were not considered in this study. New con-
cepts for components such as fans, pumps, valves, etc. were not investigated
because the likelihood of substantial improvement in these components is
remote. The power supply is included in the study because of the possibility
of integration of the power supply with other subsystems, and because there is
a high probability that a significant improvement in power supplies can be
made in the next decade.
4.1 ATMOSPHERE SUPPLY SUBSYSTEM
The atmosphere for AEPS was specified as pure oxygen at a pressure
of 3.7 to 8 psia. The use of a high pressure one or two-gas atmosphere
system would reduce the preparation time for EVA, since an oxygen preconditioning
period to reduce the nitrogen content in the crewman's body, would not be
required. This would also simplify the design and reduce the weight of the
parent vehicle or shelter since the oxygen preconditioning equipment would
be eliminated. However, the two-gas atmosphere requires higher suit pressures,
and greatly increases the risk associated with rapid decompression in the
event of a suit gas leak. Some investigation was made into the use of
two-gas suits; however, most of the effort concerned only the pure oxygen
suit atmosphere. This topic is discussed in more detail in Section 4.7 on
emergency backup equipment.
4.1.1 Candidate Subsystem Concepts
In selection of the atmosphere supply subsystem for AEPS it was
assumed that a closed circulation system would prove to be most desirable,
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that is, that the atmosphere supply subsystem must only makeup suit leakage
and metabolic oxygen consumption. Open loop systems, which depend on an
umbilical to the primary vehicle, were considered at the total system level
(Section 5.0). The various methods of providing the atmosphere for AEPS
which were considered in this study are listed in Table 7. The basic tech-
niques considered included elemental oxygen storage, chemical storage, and
regeneration of oxygen from carbon dioxide. Table 7 shows the results of
the preliminary analyses on oxygen supply systems. The regeneration of oxygen
from carbon dioxide interfaces with the carbon dioxide control subsystem
which is discussed in Section 4.2. However, a carbon dioxide concentrator
is required in addition to the oxygen generation device, except for the fused
salt technique. All of these CO2 reduction/02 generation systems are large
in weight, have large power requirements, and are relatively complex. These
factors, coupled with the availability of more suitable approaches, makes the
EVA regeneration of oxygen from carbon dioxide in an AEPS an unrealistic
approach.
There are some chemical systems which react with carbon dioxide
to form oxygen: however, there is a problem in regulation of the'oxygen
production to match metabolic demand in a space suit. This imposes a requirement
for an accumulator, a supplemental oxygen supply or both; the supplemental
supply is particularly important if emergency conditions are considered.
The primary vehicle or shelter oxygen supply system has some
impact on the AEPS; and it should not be selected without consideration of
this interface. The use of high pressure gas storage in AEPS may create a
requirement for an oxygen compressor in the primary vehicle or shelter. This
approach is compatible with any probable primary vehicle or shelter oxygen
supply system. In many possible AEPS designs, the requirement for EVA oxygen
will exceed the primary vehicle or shelter make-up oxygen requirement, and
the addition of the EVA oxygen to the make-up oxygen supply may have a
significant influence on the selection of the primary vehicle or shelter
oxygen storage technique.
In addition to the usual methods of storing oxygen, which were
discussed in the preceeding paragraphs, there are two additional oxygen
supply sources which will have to be considered for the primary vehicle or
shelter. These are:
(1) If frozen food is used extensively on future missions, in
lieu of freeze-dried foods, then a considerable amount of
water will be available from the waste water recovery system
after the food is consumed and digested by the crew (Reference
[22]). This water can be electrolyzed to generate oxygen.
(2) Studies have shown that oxygen can be generated from the lunar
soil ( and probably from Martian soil, see References [27] through
[30]). The most likely reason for establishing such a process
plant would be for production of oxygen for use in propulsion
systems. These requirements would be much greater than those
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TABLE 7 COMPARISONS OF CANDIDATE OXYGEN SUPPLY TECHNIQUES
AVAILABLE 02 SYSTEM HEAT OF
STORAGE (THEORETICAL), AVAILABLE DENSITY, REACTION, 02 DENSITY,
METHOD WEIGHT % PURITY 02, LB/LB LB/CU IN. BTU/LB( 2 ) LB/CU IN.
KO2 33.8 - 0.32 0.0237 415(3) 0.0076
NaO2 43.6 0.90 0.392 - 635(4) (0.009)
Li2 02 34.8 (1) 0.375 0.0074 - 363(5) 0.029
TO
0.006
NaO 3 56.3 - - - + 1515 -
LiNO3 23.2 1.00 0.232 0.0861 - 488 0.020
LiClO4 60.1 1.00 0.601 0.0878 - 596 0.053
NaCIO3 45.1 - 0.40 0.0815 + 422 0.032
H2 0 88.8 0.99+ 0.89 0.0361 (8) 0.032
90% H202 47.1 0.90 0.423 0.0502 + 1106 0.021
98% H2 0 2 47.1 0.98 0.461 0.0515 1214 0.026
GASEOUS 95 + 0.99+ 0.50(6)(9) (3000 PSIA) - 0.0115 ( 7 )
0.0105
SUPER-CRITICAL 95 + 0.99+ 0.76(6)(9) 0.021 - 0.035(7)
SUB-CRITICAL 95 + 0.99+ 0.84(6)(9) 0.022 - 92 0.041 ( 7 )
(1) 10 PERCENT Li2 04
(2) + INDICATES EXOTHERMIC REACTION; - INDICATES ENDOTHERMIC REACTION
(3) 2 KO2 + 1.23 CO2 + 0.23 H2 0 = 0.77 K2 CO3 + 0.45 KHCO 3 + 1.5 02
(4) 2 NaO2 + 1.23 CO2 + 0.23 H2 0 = 0.77 NaO2 CO3 + 0.46 NaHCO 3 + 1.5 02
(5) Li 2 02 = Li2O + 1/2 02
(6) INCLUDING STORAGE TANK
(7) EXCLUDING STORAGE OR CONTAINING VESSEL
(8) POWER REQUIRED FOR ELECTROLYSIS
(9) BASED ON A SPHERICAL TANK AND 2 LBS OF DELIVERABLE 02
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for metabolic oxygen supply, and so should make EVA oxygen
relatively inexpensive.
If either of the above systems were selected for use in a future
mission, it might reduce the cost of oxygen (that is, greatly increase the
availability), and this could have an impact on subsystem selection for AEPS.
4.1.2 Recommended Subsystem Concept
It was concluded that for the EVA pack, high pressure (3000 - 6000 psia)
gaseous oxygen storage is the optimum method for AEPS regardless of the nature
of the primary vehicle. This method combines low EVA weight and volume with
maximum reliability and ease of integration with base systems; and it offers
advantages in emergency situations. It is compatible with any base system since
a compressor can be used to fill the EVA tanks directly from the base atmosphere
if desired. The construction of such a tank, pressure regulator, and compressor,
is well within present technology and improvements in materials, etc., will
further reduce the tank weight and volume.
A detailed sizing analysis was performed for a 5000 psia oxygen supply
tank. The tank is assumed to be spherical, to be constructed of stainless steel,
and ot have a service life of several hundred cycles spread over a number of
years. For an 8-hour EVA it contains 2.76 lbm of useable oxygen, weighs 10.5 lbm
including mounts, etc., and occupies 213 cu.in. Stainless steel construction
at low stress levels was chosen over more exotic techniques because the tank
must have a long cycle life, and is in a service where exacting cleanliness
procedures cannot be carefully observed. This suggests a design approach such
as that described in Reference [40]. The tank also includes an inner shell that
functions as a regenerative heat exchanger which insures heat transfer from the
tank to the oxygen during rapid gas expulsion in a zero-gravity environment.
This regenerator will not be required for many possible system designs. The
design approach coupled with the regenerative heat exchanaer result in a heavier
oxygen supply system than is indicated in Table 7.
For an AEPS used with a long duration primary base which includes a
C02 reduction facility, the only oxygen expended for most AEPS systems is that
due to leakage. This quantity of gas is included in the C02 subsystem analysis
below. In the case of the space shuttle, the oxygen, which is converted to
CO2 during an EVA, must be considered to be an expendable. Fiqure 6Ca) shows
the expendable weight for different storage pressures and oxygen supDly sources
as a function of EVA time. It should be noted that the mass shown in this figure
for supply systems which utilize a compressor to charge EVA tanks from the basic
shuttle metabolic oxygen source, is not entirely chargeable to the EVA system
since this gas would have been used by the crewman whether he Derformed an EVA
event or not. Figure 6(b) shows a comparison of the mass and volume of oxygen
required for open-loop operation, in which C02 control is achieved by ventinq
oxygen overboard, and for systems which have a C02 absorption subsystem.
4.2 CARBON DIOXIDE CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
As previously mentioned in Section 4.1, the assumption was made
that AEPS would have a closed atmosphere in most cases, and thus that carbon
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dioxide must be removed from the system at a rate proportional to the meta-
bolic rate (since the system volume is too small to provide a significant
accumulator or "damping" effect). The alternative to this, which may be
attractive for some missions, is an open atmospheric system in which carbon
dioxide control is achieved by venting a substantial amount of the atmospheric
gas overboard; this system has been used in EVA equipment such as the Astronaut
Maneuvering Unit where about 1/4 of the total system flow rate was vented
overboard (Reference [31]).. This required about 20 times as much oxygen as
the basic suit leakage and metabolic requirements. A more recent open system
has been developed (Reference [32]), which uses a breathing vest with a face
mask device, and delivers oxygen at the rate it is drawn into the lungs;
(approximately 1.8 lb/hr for a metabolic rate of 1600 BTU/hr and a suit
pressure of 5 psia).
In this study, as previously noted, it has been assumed that
large quantities of oxygen are not readily available, and thus that an open-
loop system is undesirable except for very short duration EVA's, or for
missions involving few EVA events.
Three levels of regeneration were considered in addition to the
expendable system.
(1) A completely EVA regenerable system in which the carbon
dioxide is separated from the AEPS atmosphere, and is reduced
to generate oxygen by the EVA equipment.
(2) A partially regenerable system in which the carbon dioxide
sorbent is regenerated, and the carbon dioxide is vented over-
board (the oxygen chemically combined with carbon is thus lost.)
(3) A completely regenerable system in which the carbon dioxide sor-
bent is regenerated at the parent vehicle or shelter where the
carbon dioxide is recovered and is reduced in the parent vehicle
life support equipment.
4.2.1 Carbon Dioxide Levels
One of the most significant factors in designing a carbon dioxide
control system for a space suit application is the allowable carbon dioxide
partial pressure. Early suit designs set the nominal level at 7.5 mm Hg in
the oronasal area. This oronasal carbon dioxide partial pressure level is in-
fluenced by the helmet design (which influences the removal of the expired
gas from the oronasal region), and by the inlet gas carbon dioxide partial
pressure which was 4 mm Hg in the early suit designs. Because of controversy
surrounding the maximum allowable long term carbon dioxide pressure
level, an inlet partial pressure of 2 mm Hg has been used for subsystem
sizing when the technique being considered could provide it, without significant
penalty. It should be noted that this has some impact on subsystem size in
all cases.
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The metabolic rate is very significant in sizing the carbon dioxide
control system, both from the standpoint of average metabolic rate and maximum
metabolic rate, since the rate of CO2 production is proportional to the
metabolic rate and the respiratory quotient.
The respiratory quotient, R.Q., (i.e., volume of C02 exhaled/volume
of 02 inhaled) is an indicator of the efficiency of the respiratory
and other metabolic processes. Thus, it varies both between individuals and
within a given individual as a function of diet and general health. An R.Q.
of 0.875 has been recommended for astronauts (Reference [26]), but values
ranging from 0.7 to 1.0 have been determined experimentally for a wide range
of subjects. A value of 0.97 was assumed for AEPS C02 calculations to insure
a conservative subsystem design in all cases. The CO2 production rate is then
found to be 0.752 lbm/hr (Reference [26]) at a metabolic rate of 3500 BTU/hr
and 0.35 lbm/hr at 1600BTU/hr. At the total mission average metabolic rate
of 1200 BTU/hr, 0.26 lbmCO2/hr are produced. Since the volume of the soace
suit is relatively small (on the order of 1 cu.ft., or enough volume to
contain only 0.0003 lb of C02 at a partial pressure of 4 mm Hg), no significant
dilution occurs and thus the C02 control subsystem must be sized to remove
CO2 at the maximum instantaneous production rate.
The penalty for the oxygen required for an EVA is assigned to the
C02 control system since, with the assumption of a closed gas circulation
system, the bulk of the oxygen required is converted to C02. For those systems
that collect the C02 during the EVA and return it to the base in any chemical
form (i.e., carbonates, etc.), a base penalty was assigned for conversion of
the C02 to the uncombined state.
4.2.2 Gas Separation Ratio
In order to separate two gases, such as oxygen and carbon dioxide,
some difference in the physical and/or chemical properties of the two gases
must be used to advantage. For the AEPS application the carbon dioxide partial
pressure must be reduced to 2 mm Hg while the total pressure is 5-8 psia.
The partial pressure ratio of the two gases is then (for the 5 psia case):
CO2 = 2mm H = 1
P0 5 psia 130
2
The partial pressure ratio represents the mass ratio of the gases; thus the
separation potential applied to the system must affect the carbon dioxide by
at least a factor of 130 more than it affects oxygen, otherwise as much oxygen
as carbon dioxide will be separated out. This is the case with the overboard
vent approach.
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4.2.3 Recommended Subsystem Concepts
Table 8 shows the most promising CO control methods that were
considered for AEPS, along with other concepts which were considered and rejected
as being impractical for AEPS. A preliminary screening was used to reduce
the number of concepts which were compared by detailed analysis. Concepts
discarded at this stage have excessive size or prohibitive regeneration
penalties, or no potential for improvement over existing systems. Detailed
analysis further reduced these candidates to the following promising candidate
subsystems:
LiOH (expendable)
Solid Amines (Partially regenerable, i.e., the CO2 is lost)
KOH, ZnO, Mg(OH)2 (regenerable at the base)
LiOH is extremely reactive with CO and the LiOH system is the
lightest weight and most compact CO2 contro? system available. LiOH is
thus very satisfactory for missions where a relatively small number of
EVA events are required. No other expendable CO control method was found
that would be competitive with LiOH from a weight and volume standpoint. It is
possible to reverse the CO2 absorption reaction and recover LiOH from the
lithium carbonate (Li2 CO ) produced during the EVA. However, considerable
amounts of energy are required because Li CO is relatively insoluble in water,
making simple water electrolysis impractical, thermal regeneration is impractical
because of the high temperature required. LiOH would absorb 0.92 lb CO per
lb if all of the hydroxide could be converted to carbonate. The actual degree
ofmcompletion of the reaction is a function of time and other parameters.
Approximately 35% completion is typical for a 4 hour Apollo PLSS LiOH canister.
The degree of completion can be increased to 50% at 8 hours and 68% after 12
hours. The efficiency consistent with design mission length was used for
sizing LiOH canisters.
It was assumed that all of the LiOH required for a given sortie was
contained in a single canister which is discarded after the EVA. The utiliza-
tion efficiency could be increased if the EVA mass were divided into two or
three separately replaceable segments. At least one fresh LiOH segment would
be installed at the start of each EVA, but each segment would be used for two
or more EVA's. This approach could increase the utilization efficiency and
thus decrease the LiOH expendable mass by 30 to 40% over a number of EVA's.
Solid amine systems are being researched extensively for use as C02 concen-
trators in primary base life support systems. The most promising solid amine
concept for AEPS incorporates a vacuum-vent mode of operation. This concept
uses two beds in a cyclic fashion with one bed absorbing C02 from the gas stream
while the other bed is desorbed to space. The concept is classed as partially
expendable because the C02 sorbent is reused but the C02, along with the water
vapor and oxygen contained in the amine bed free volume, is vented to space.
Solid amine C02 sorbents have a low capacity for C02 on a lbm of CO2 per lbm
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TABLE 8 CANDIDATE CO2 CONTROL METHODS
METHOD DETAILED PRELIMINARY COMMENTS
ANALYSIS ANALYSISONLY
CHEMICAL EXPENDABLE
* LiOH
* KO2 ,NaO 2
* Li 2 O2
CHEMICAL, REGENERABLE
* LiOH
* KOH
* ZnO
* K0 2 , NaO 2 , Li 2 O2
* KO3
* Mg (OH) 2
* Ca (OH)2
* Ag20
ADSORPTION
* DEAD END MOLE-SIEVES
(ZEOLITE)
* VACUUM DESORBED MOLE
SIEVES (ZEOLITE)
* VACUUM DESORBED ZEOLITE
WITH LiOH "TOP-OFF"
* NON-WATER SENSITIVE
MOLE-SIEVES
ABSORPTION
* BATCH VACUUM DESORBED
SOLID AMINES
* LIQUID WATER SOLUTION
OF AMINES VACUUM
DESORBED
* LIQUID WATER SOLUTION
OF CARBONATES WITH
VACUUM DESORPTION
a. LIQUID LOOPS
b. MEMBRANES
* DEAD END WATER SOLUTION
OF CARBONATES
VACUUM VENT
* SIMPLE SYSTEM, NO
UMBILICAL
* UMBILICAL TO PRIMARY
BASE WITH CAPABILITY FOR
ONE HR OPERATION OFF
OF UMBILICAL
OTHER
* CONVERSION OF CO2 TO WATER
BY A BOSCH REACTOR FOR
RECOVERY OF 02 AT BASE
* H2 -DEPOLARIZED CARBONATION
CELL, VACUUM VENT
* VACUUM VENTED SINGLE
STAGE CARBONATION CELL
* Cu/02 FUEL CELL CO2 SORBER
* ANY SYSTEM CONCENTRATING
C0 2 & THEN RECOVERING 02
DURING THE EVA
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
GOOD FOR LIMITED NUMBER OF SORTIES
NO ADVANTAGE OVER LiOH
NO ADVANTAGE OVER LiOH
HIGH REGENERATION PENALTY
MODERATE POWER FOR BASE REGENERATION
LARGE EVA MASS. LOW REGEN. PENALTY
EXCESSIVE POWER FOR BASE REGENERATION
EXCESSIVE POWER FOR BASE REGENERATION
MODERATE TEMPERATURE FOR REGENERATION
EXCESSIVELY HIGH REGENERATION TEMPERATURE
LOW CONVERSION EFFICIENCY
EXCESSIVE EVA MASS AND VOLUME
GOOD FOR MODERATE NUMBER OF EVA'S, BUT
HAS LARGE EVA MASS AND VOLUME
EXCESSIVELY LARGE EVA MASS WITHOUT ANY
SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN EXPENDABLES
NO ADVANTAGE OVER ZEOLITES
LARGE EVA MASS; SUITABLE FOR LIMITED
NUMBER OF EVA'S
EXCESSIVE WATER LOSS DURING EVA
EXCESSIVE WATER LOSS
EXCESSIVE EVA SIZE
EXCESSIVE EVA MASS AND EXPENDABLES
SHOWS SOME PROMISE WHEN THE EVA MISSION
DOES NOT REQUIRE LONG DURATIONS AT
DISTANCES FROM THE SPACE BASE
VERY HIGH EVA MASS
LARGE SYSTEM SIZE, HIGH EXPENDABLES
HIGH EVA SYSTEM MASS AND POWER, HIGH
EXPENDABLES
LOW CONVERSION EFFICIENCY TO CARBONATE
EXTRAORDINARILY HIGH EVA MASS VOLUMES
AND POWER PENALTIES
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sorbent basis when compared to chemicals such as LiOH, and they have a
lower reaction rate. Thus, the required amine bed size is much larger than
a LiOH bed. The amine bed acts as a desiccant so that a separate humidity
control system is not required. However, the CO absorption capacity of the
bed is critically dependent on the bed's moisture content so that precise
control of the bed water content is required for efficient utilization. An
operational vacuum desorbed amine unit has not been demonstrated and it is
anticipated that bed water management for this type of operation would be
difficult. The cyclic operation also requires relatively complex hardware
with associated reliability problems. There is no base equipment required
for this system since the CO2 sorbent is regenerated by vacuum venting
during the EVA. One potential advantage of this concept is in the adaptation
of technology developed for space station applications (which is a steam de-
sorbed rather than a vacuum desorbed system) to reduce development costs.
Therefore this concept was retained for consideration at the total, inte-
grated system level. A C02 capacity of 0.01 lbm C02 per lbm amine was assumed
for system sizing calculations, with a delivery C02 partial pressure of 4 mm Hg.
The literature survey previously cited provided evidence of some
preliminary investigations into the use of other alkaline-earth hydroxides,
besides LiOH, as a CO2 sorbent. All of these materials are very basic and
the reaction with the acid gas, CO2, is basically an acid-base neutralization
reaction, with the resulting formation of a carbonate salt and water. These
hydroxides all have fairly high CO2 capacity so that the bed size is com-
paratively small. LiOH is preferred when the application requires an expendable
sorbent because of its low molecular weight and high CO2 capacity. However,
as previously discussed, the chemical properties of the lithium carbonate
formed during the EVA reaction are such that regeneration is impractical.
It was found that magnesium carbonate (MgCO3) and zinc carbonate
(ZnCO3) are relatively unstable at moderately elevated temperature so that
thermal regeneration is possible. The relatively high solubility of potassium
carbonate (K2CO3) in water suggested the possibility of regeneration by
electrolysis of a water solution.
Magnesium and zinc carbonates dissociate into the oxides MgO and
ZnO plus CO at elevated temperatures. Thus, if they were used in solid
form as a CO2 sorbent during the EVA, in the same manner that LiOH is
presently used, regeneration may be accomplished by simply heating the reacted
canisters. The CO2 will be driven off leaving the metallic oxide, which can
then be hydrated to the metallic hydroxide form by circulating wet steam through
the bed.
A workable system for the Mg(OH)2 concept is shown in Figure 7.
The reactant canister is placed in a heated pressure vessel at the conclusion
of the EVA. The system shown uses steam to heat the canister to the required
dissociation temperature; however, other types of heat sources could be used.
A compressor is used to remove the evolved CO2 for processing by the base CO2
reduction system. After all the CO2 has been driven off, wet steam is in-
troduced into the chamber to hydrate the oxide. The canister can then be
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EVA REACTION
Mg (OH) 2 + C0 2 -..Mg CO3 + H20 + 789 BTU C 2LBm C02
STEAM JACKET REGENERATION REACTIONS
Mg CO3 + HEAT -.. Mg O + CO2
O Mg O + H2 0 -. Mg (OH) 2
FIGURE 7 MAGNESIUM HYDROXIDE REGENERATION FACILITY
removed and reused. A Mg(OH) concept similar to this has been demonstrated
(Reference [33]). However, the lifetime of the absorbent pellets after
repeated cycling has not been investigated in depth. The pellets may "cake"
or disintegrate to powder after a few cycles. Data are needed to determine
whether the pellets need to be reformed after each regeneration cycle and to
define the conversion efficiency attainable with regeneration within a practical
amount of time. A conversion efficiency of 20% was assumed for AEPS sizing
calculations. The actual hardware weight required for regeneration of Mg(OH)2
is projected to be about 230 lb for a two-man system. The total base penalty
calculated for the system is 40 lb per two men with the additional weight
attributed to energy penalties. Thus, the base weight of the system is strongly
dependent on the energy penalties assumed in Table 3.
ZnO is also a candidate for the CO2 absorbent in this system. Less
complete data are available on ZnO than for Mg(OH)2. It appears that active
cooling of the ZnO absorbent canister would be required in order to maintain
an outlet CO partial pressure of 4 mm Hg (Reference [34]). Thus the EVA weight
of the ZnO absorbent may be significantly greater than for the Mg(OH)2 system.
However, the low regeneration temperature of ZnO will result in much lower base
penalties. For vehicles with waste heat available at 150°F, there may be a
minimal penalty for regeneration energy.
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During the course of this study, VMSC concieved a different type of
metallic hydroxide subsystem which was suggested by a theoretical analysis
of energy requirements for regenerable CO2 absorbents. Figure 8 shows a
schematic of this approach, which uses a circulating liquid solution of KOH
rather than a solid particle bed.
IPRIMARY BASE |
WATER
MAKE-UP
IEVA PACK I
CONTROL VALVE
PUMP
LIQUID/GAS
SEPARATORS
t
02, CO2H2 , CO2
LIQUID
II GASI 
QUICK I REACTOR ANT
DISCONNECT I STORAGE
FITTINGS IF~~~~ I IT I I | 
1 4 4
I EVA EVA
I GAS COOLING
L FLOW
FIGURE 8 LIQUID KOH CO2 SORBENT REGENERATION FACILITY
This approach overcomes one of the fundamental limitations to efficient
utilization of a pelletized sorbent bed, which is the low mass transfer rate
of reacted carbonate and unreacted hydroxide inside the pellet.
The circulating liquid approach eliminate this problems since the
reacted carbonate is continuously removed from the reaction site by the flowing
solvent (water). In operation, the liquid loop is initially filled with a
strong solution of KOH in water. The gas, containing C02, flows through the
gas reactor where it is exposed to the circulating KOH solution. Part of the
KOH is reacted to form potassium carbonate (K2C03), which remains in liquid
solution, and is circulated to the reactant storage container. There the
solution is cooled, decreasing the solubility of the K2CO3, so that part of
the carbonate is precipitated and can then be filtered out of the solution.
The weakened KOH solution is circulated back to the gas reactor. During the EVA
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EVA REACTION
2 KOH + CO2 - K2 CO3 + H2 0 + 1350 BTULBm CO2
REGENERATION REACTION
K2 CO3 + H2 0+POWER-. 2KOH
+ CO 2 f
the solution strength of the KOH is continually reduced as K+ ions are removed
as K2C03 is precipitated out. The concentration of K CO3 in the solution
is determined by the solution temperature at the outlet of the reactant
storage container and by the efficiency of the filtration process.
Base regeneration, which is also shown in Figure 8, is accomplished
by re-dissolving the precipitated carbonate and electrolyzing the resulting
solution. The C02 is removed in the electrolysis cell and the concentrated
solution of KOH is restored; the unit is then ready for reuse.
VMSC has demonstrated the feasibility of this concept by means of
a simple experiment. It was found it was not possible to evolve CO2 at a
significant rate without also electrolyzing water. This is not a severe
penalty since most advanced base life support systems include a water
electrolysis unit for the production of oxygen (Reference [22]). Therefore,
a partial credit can be taken for the oxygen produced by this method.
Sizing analyses indicate that the size and weight of the EVA subsystem
are comparatively small; however, this is based on very little and incomplete
data. There are several significant developmental problems with this concept
most notable is the interface between the process gas stream and the KOH solution.
The projected total system size for the KOH concept, including all penalties,
is comparable to the Mg(OH)2 system previously discussed. Therefore, in order
to simplify the discussion at the total system level, these systems were
considered to have the same weight and volume. The potential for EVA system
size advantage of the KOH system over other regenerable concepts is sufficient
to warrant its further investigation.
Figures 9 and 10 show the total launch weight and volume as a function
of EVA time for the most promising C02 control subsystems. Figure 9 shows
that expendable LiOH is the lightest subsystem for less than about 150 EVA hours.
The regenerable metallic oxide/hydroxide concepts provide the lightest total
systems for more than 150 EVA hours; but as Figure 11 shows, this is accom-
plished at the expense of the EVA weight. However, this sacrifice is be-
lieved to be worthwhile since the regenerable concepts save more than 650
lbm per man over LiOH at 1000 EVA hours. Figure 10 shows total launch weight
and volume curves for a primary vehicle with a non-regenerable Atmosphere
Revitilization System (ARS), e.g., the space shuttle. It is assumed that the
oxygen used during the EVA is an expendable for all systems and this mass and
volume are not included in these results. This figure shows that LiOH is the
lightest subsystem if less than 35 EVA hours are required on a single flight.
For more than approximately 35 hours, the ZnO and solid amine systems, which
are regenerable at relatively low temperature, are the lightest. Mg(OH)2,
which has a higher regeneration energy penalty, is shown to be somewhat
heavier than the other regenerable concepts; this is offset by an advantage
in EVA weight as shown in Figure 11. The results presented in these figures
were used to prepare similar curves for the total AEPS systems as discussed
in Section 5.0.
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TRACE CONTAMINANT CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
In any inhabited small, closed volume there is a potential problem
with odors and toxic gases, and possibly with biological contaminants. The
AEPS trace contaminant control system must be designed to eliminate any
odors, toxic gases, or biological contaminants which may be generated within
the AEPS atmosphere. Considerable investigation has been conducted in this
area (References [35] and [37]), and a significant amount of space flight ex-
perience has been gained with the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo spacecraft,
and with the Apollo Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU). Most of the work
done in this field has been directed toward contamination control for long-
term occupancy of spacecraft cabins. The AEPS contaminant control problem
is similar to the EMU, which is simpler than for the primary base, because
of a relatively high leakage rate compared to the suit volume, and a rela-
tively short exposure time. However, the AEPS will be used repeatedly on
long duration missions.
There are four primary sources of trace contaminants in a closed
life support system:
(1) Volatile materials
(2) Electrical equipment
(3) Chemical processes
(4) Astronaut biological processes
It is assumed that the first two sources can be controlled without an
active control system. Careful materials selection will minimize the introduction
of odors and toxic vapors into the AEPS environment, and active electrical
equipment can be shielded from the pressurized AEPS volume so as to minimize
the introduction of ozone and lubricant vapors.
Chemical reactions or processes which may be used to accomplish
AEPS functions may also introduce contaminants into the system. For example,
chlorate and perchlorate candles, which may be used to supply oxygen, contain
fuel (to sustain continuous decomposition), catalysts and binder materials
(such as fiberglass). In the relatively simple lithium hydroxide carbon
dioxide control system, it is necessary to filter small LiOH particles out of
the circulating oxygen. A failure in the gas reactor required for the KOH
system could introduce toxic KOH liquid or vapor into the gas stream. These
special requirements for trace contaminant control imposed by the life support
subsystems will not be considered here; it is assumed that these requirements
will be accounted for in the individual component development.
The crewman is the source of a wide variety of noxious and toxic
gases; and in addition may be host to a wide variety of micro-organisms.
Although these gases are produced by, and the micro-organisms are present
in most healthy individuals, they pose a potential hazard in an AEPS. The
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4.3
noxious and toxic gases are treated in this work. The micro-organisms
and other bacteriological growths, which may be sustained in the AEPS equip-
ment, particularly in porous plates, filters, and wicks, are not considered
in detail. In particular, no attention is given to the possibility of
mutation of non-virulent and slightly virulent forms of micro-organisms
into species which are much more virulent. It is assumed that in all cases
a replaceable biological filter will be used in the circulating oxygen flow;
this is the only consideration given to micro-organisms. Biological growths
in equipment must be considered on the total AEPS system level. Other problems
such as suit and umbilical drying and cleaning are also not considered, although
they represent potential problem areas.
A last problem which may be encountered involves cleaning equipment
used on planetary surfaces. Dust is known to pose a serious problem on the
lunar surface, based on flight experience, and it is difficult to remove
from garments and equipment. The full extent and implications of these
problems on system design are not known at present; and this was not considered
in detail in this study.
The emphasis in this study was placed on the control of trace con-
taminants generated by the crewman himself, while it is realized that other
sources may be present.
4.3.1 Biological Contaminants
Major substances given off by normal human biological processes are
presented in Table 9. The most significant of these substances are shown
TABLE 9 TYPICAL BIOLOGICAL CONTAMINANTS
GENERATION ALLOWABLE TOXIC PRINCIPAL
CONTAMINANT RATE (LB/HR) CONC. (P. P. M.) EFFECT SOURCES
AMMONIA 4.15 X 10-5 10 IRRITANT FECES, FLATUS,
SWEAT
CARBON MONOXIDE 1.15 X 10-6 20 BLOOD POISON EXPIRED BREATH
HYDROGEN 8.20 X 10-6 41,000 ASPHYXIANT FECES, FLATUS
HYDROGEN SULFIDE 1.79 X 10-8 2 IRRITANT FECES, FLATUS
METHANE 7.20 X 10-4 200 - 50,000 ASPHYXIANT FECES, FLATUS
METHANOL 4.15 X 10-6 40 NARCOTIC IRRITANT EXPIRED BREATH
SULFUR DIOXIDE 4.15 X 10-7 1 IRRITANT URINE
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along with the generation rate (Reference [35]), the allowable concentration
in the AEPS atmosphere, and the probable toxic effect of the contaminant on
the human body.
4.3.2 Trace Contaminant Control Techniques
Contaminant control systems for space flight use have been exten-
sively investigated and, for large closed volumes, a system employing a
biological filter, charcoal absorbent cartridge and a catalytic burner
will maintain all contaminant levels below the recommended maximums. The
following control techniques, in order of increasing complexity and size,
were considered for the AEPS application:
(1) No active control-leakage only
(2) Periodic suit purge
(3) Biological filter, activated charcoal
(4) Filter, charcoal, and catalytic burner
(5) Chemical control systems
Leakage of the atmosphere out of the spacesuit can be used to control
toxic gas concentration, particularly if the generation rate is low. For high
generation it may not be feasible to have sufficiently high leakage rates;
however, there is preferential leakage for low molecular weight gases.
Contamination control can be achieved in a spacesuit by passive
means in some instances. The EVA mission is short, and the generation rate
for some toxic gases may be insufficient to raise the toxic gas concentration
in the spacesuit free volume above the allowable level. In addition, the normal
suit leakage will continually carry some of the toxic gases overboard, so a
maximum concentration will be established; for low generation rates this
maximum may be below the allowable level. There is also preferential leakage
of low molecular weight compounds.
The leakage rate specified for AEPS is 180 sccm which is equivalent
to 0.0322 lb /hr. This same leakage rate was specified for the Apollo A7L
suit. FigurT 12 shows the concentration of the various contaminants at the
end of 8 hours as a function of active contaminant control system removal
efficiency (i.e., removal rate divided by contaminant flowrate; this is 0
for a system based on leakage alone).
These results indicate that methane and ammonia are the only con-
taminants that may require active control. The other contaminants have
sufficiently low generation rates relative to allowable concentrations so
that suit leakage only, with about 5% removal efficiency, is adequate to
keep the concentrations within allowable limits.
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This result is somewhat misleading since the calculation was
made assuming a constant generation rate over the entire EVA. Thus, while
substances such as H2S require little control if only the total mission is
considered, the short term odor effects require control consideration.
Therefore, suit leakage alone is not sufficient to provide complete control
for an AEPS system.
The AEPS space suit could be periodically purged to effectively
increase the leakage rate, and thus leakage could provide control for
methane and ammonia. However, the required quantity of make-up atmosphere
is excessive and safety considerations associated with venting the suit
make the purge approach undesirable.
Activated charcoal is widely used for odor removal, and this is
very desirable in AEPS. However, charcoal will not effectively adsorb low
molecular weight gases such as methane and ammonia. The addition of
phosphoric acid (H2 PO) to activated charcoal increases the ammonia adsorption
capacity, and the addition of potassium hydroxide (KOH) increases the
capacity for acid contaminants. Thus, this system is adequate for all con-
taminants. No other system offers any advantage over this approach and
the others were not considered further.
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4.3.3 Recommended Concept
A trace contaminant control cartridge containing activated charcoal
and biological filters was selected for the AEPS system. The charcoal bed
is divided in half with 50% of the charcoal impregnated with a solution of
KOH and the remainder with phosphoric acid. The addition of these chemicals
improves the adsorption efficiency of acidic and basic contaminants. The
cartridge should be located upstream of the humidity control system, since
the presence of moisture further improves the adsorption efficiency of the
chemically impregnated beds.
The biological filter and the charcoal can be regenerated, however,
the expendable weight is only about 0.1 lb per man EVA so that regeneration
will not be profitable for AEPS unless a g'eat many sorties are undertaken
on a mission.
4.4 THERMAL CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
The purpose of the AEPS thermal control subsystem is to maintain
the crewman at a comfortable temperature level under all conditions. In
addition, other AEPS systems, notably the CO and humidity control systems,
may require cooling. The system heat loads were discussed in Sections 3.4
and 3.5.
Gemini experience has shown that gaseous convective cooling of a
suited crewman is inadequate when the crewman is working at the high
metabolic rates expected during orbital or surface EVA operations. Therefore
the AEPS study baselined a circulating water cooling system similar to the
Apollo Liquid Cooled Garment (LCG). It has a network of flexible tubes that
are held in close contact with the astronaut's skin. Chilled water is
circulated through the tubes and heat is removed from the astronaut by
conduction from the skin into the tubes. The water is then circulated
through a sublimator in the backpack. The low heat exchanger effectiveness
of the current LCG requires an inlet temperature of about 40°F in order to
remove the maximum metabolic load. This low temperature in close contact
with the skin can create physiological and comfort problems for the crewman.
A brief investigation showed the feasibility of producing a more effective
heat transfer between the heat sink and an LCG that operates with
inlet temperatures in the range of 60 to 70°F at the maximum metabolic load.
This higher temperature level is beneficial to some heat rejection concepts
so that an advanced LCG was assumed to be available for the AEPS thermal
control subsystem.
A PLSS-type sublimator heat rejection subsystem expends water at an
average rate of 1-2 lb per EVA manhour. The water required for heat rejection
represents about 3/4 oy the total PLSS expendable requirement. Therefore, a
fully or partially closed heat rejection system offers a tremendous oppor-
tunity to reduce the total launch weight required to support multiple EVA
operations.
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The AEPS heat rejection systems must be designed to operate without
crewman discomfort at the minimum heat load, to have the capacity to reject
the nominal heat load as an average over an 8-hour sortie, and to have heat
rejection rate capacity sufficient to accommodate the maximum heat load.
The average heat load of 1200 BTU/hr is that which the system must be capable
of rejecting over all sorties on a mission.
4.4.1 AEPS Heat Loads
The design heat loads for the AEPS were discussed in Section 3.5, and
the technique used in this study for calculating the heat load was described.
The heat load is a function of the local thermal environment and varies
considerably from one mission to another. Table 10 gives the minimum, average,
nominal and maximum expected total heat loads for the design missions.
TABLE 10 AEPS DESIGN HEAT LOADS
MISSION MINIMUM AVERAGE NOMINAL MAXIMUM
SPACE STATION
EARTH ORBIT { 525 1330 1800 3950
SPACE SHUTTLE
LUNAR SURFACE 350 1460 1925 4400
MARSSURFACE 350 1160 1650 3825
4.4.2 Definition of Rate Limited and Capacity Limited Systems
Table 10 indicates that while there are significant differences
in the heat load on different missions, the variance in heat load on a
given sortie may be much greater. The wide variance in heat loads on a
given sortie has a significant impact on the selection of the heat rejection
system. The systems which might be used for AEPS heat rejection fall into
one of two categories; either they are heat transfer rate limited or they
are total capacity limited. These characteristics of systems are diametrically
opposite, and systems tend to be dominated by one characteristic or the other.
For example, a water evaporation system can be designed to operate at the
maximum heat load rather than the average heat load with only a slight size
and weight increase: the system is primarily limited by the large quantities
of water which must be carried to enable the system to reject the total heat
load over a sortie. Thus, the evaporation system is said to be capacity
limited. A radiator system, on the other hand, grows in size approximately
in a linear fashion with the maximum heat load which must be rejected; it is
only slightly influenced by the integrated total heat load which must be
rejected over a sortie. Thus the radiator system is said to be rate limited.
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4.4.3 Top-Off Systems
The expected short transient duration of the peak heat load makes
the use of a "top-off" system a potentially attractive concept for AEPS.
This would involve the use of a regenerable system to reject some fixed
portion of the heat load (probably the nominal or the average) with a separate
expendable system to reject any excess heat load when it occurs. This approach
may produce the optimum size and weight heat rejection system, and it has
some other advantages, namely,
(1) The "top-off" system may also serve as a back-up or emergency
system, and
(2) Control problems associated with wide heat load range radiators
are circumvented, since the radiator heat load range is reduced.
4.4.4 Candidate Heat Transport Processes
Heat transport processes which were considered for AEPS thermal
control are shown in Table 11.
TABLE 11 POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO HEAT REMOVAL FROM AEPS
NC
SYSTEMS SELECTED FOR FINAL SYSTEM INTEGRATION
* SPACE RADIATOR
* SUBLIMATOR
* AHS (WATER SELECTED AS FUSIBLE MATERIAL}
* REFRIGERATOR
AHS SYSTEM USES REPLACEABLE MODULES TO REDUCE PACK WEIGHT
SPACE RADIATOR AND REFRIGERATION SYSTEM USES PART-TIME (70%) UMBILICAL WITH
AHS "TOP-O F F"
OTE: TS = SINK TEMPERATURE
TL = SYSTEM HEAT REJECTION TEMPERATURE 40OF
qL = SYSTEM HEAT LOAD
K = THERMAL CONDUCTIVITY
A = AREA
X = LENGTH
h = HEAT TRANSFER COEFFICIENT
0 = STEFAN:BOLTZMAN CONSTANT
e = EMITTANCE
1 = MASS TRANSFER RATE
= PHASE CHANGE HEAT RELEASE
w = WORK
Aho = ENTHALPY CHANGE
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MASS & HEAT TRANSFER PHASE CHANGE
MECHANISM CRYSTALLINE WORK CHEMICAL
CONDUCTION CONVECTION RADIATION EVAPORATION FUSION STRUCTURE CHANGE REACTION
TLGOVERNING EQUATION KL-(A-(T-Ts4} q L =' ~ mLATSTGOVERNING TI  = -(T qL = hA (TL-TS) qL = oA (TL 4 Ts 4 L = qL = qL= = mho
LIMITING FACTOR RATE RATE RATE CAPACITY CAPACITY CAPACITY RATE CAPACITY
TYPICAL SUB-SURFACE MARS SPACE SUBLIMATOR ASTRONAUT HEATSINK VAPOR HEAT SINK
CANDIDATE HEAT SINK HEAT RADIATOR HEAT DEVICE COMPRESSION DEVICE
SYSTEMS EXCHANGER SINK (AHS)I REFRIGERA-
TOR
EXPENDABLE - _ NONE LARGE NONE NONE NONE NONE
REQUIREMENTS
EVA
SYSTEM 
_ - LARGE SMALL LARGE LARGE MEDIUM LARGESIZE AREA
' AS DEFINED ON PAGE 50
These processes are discussed below:
Conduction heat transfer into the planetary surface is impractical
because of the AEPS mobility requirement. The storage of heat in the
planetary surface could be used in the appropriate cases, but a considerable
amount of site preparation is required to make this approach operable, and
maneuverability would be restricted.
Convection heat transfer is one of the prime mechanisms used for
cooling the crewman, by airflow and by coolant flow in the LCG; however,
convection is limited as the ultimate heat removal technique in a space
application because of the lack of an adequate heat sink. In the Mars
application there is sufficient atmosphere (the pressure is about 0.088 psia;
90% C02) so that convection is a factor which must be considered; however,
it is not adequate to be the primary heat sink at high metabolic rates. A
blow-down type of oxygen supply system could marginally provide cooling to
the crewman by convection (and the attendant mass transfer associated with
sweat evaporation from the crewman's skin); however, this would probably
be best applied as a relatively short duration back-up system because of the
large expendable atmosphere requirement.
Radiation offers considerable promise as the heat transfer mechanism
from an AEPS because it is not dependent on any medium being in contact with
the AEPS exterior. There is, of course, a requirement that a line-of-sight
relationship with a low-temperature heat sink be maintained. Removal of the
maximum allowable heat rate generated by an AEPS system by radiation, without
the use qf extended area is not physically possible (based on a crewman area
of 20 ft and a skin temperature of 800F). The radiation heat removal rate
is reduced in actual practice because of radiation between external suit
and equipment surfaces and because the space suit must be insulated to
accommodate cold conditions (when the crewman has a low metabolic rate) and
extreme hot conditions (when the crewman is in the vicinity of hot objects
such as daytime lunar and vehicle surface). This means that, while the space
suit surface can be used to reject a portion of the heat load, it cannot reject
the maximum heat load, so an alternate means of heat rejection is required.
This could be extended radiation area, in the form of a space radiator, or some
other suitable heat rejection device. A deployed radiator obviously creates
a maneuverability constraint, and there may be difficulty in maintaining proper
radiator-orientation in some instances.
Degradation of radiator surface properties due to ultra-violet radiation
and high energy particle impingement may pose a significant problem,
particularly on the lunar surface where the use of a radiator may be marginal
in many locales. Contamination of radiator surfaces by dust may also pose
a significant problem on planetary surfaces. Despite these problems, radiation
is a promising means for providing the ultimate heat sinks for an AEPS.
Refrigeration systems are widely used in terrestial applications.
The function of these systems is to raise the temperature at which the
ultimate heat rejection is accomplished, thus reducing the size of the
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equipment that rejects the heat to the ultimate heat sink. In terrestial
applications, the ultimate heat rejection is usually to the atmosphere via a
convection process, with evaporation process (cooling towers) also being in
wide use. FQr a space application, the ultimate heat rejection would probably
be accomplished by radiation. Work-driven refrigeration systems may be divided
into two classifications; vapor cycles and gas cycles. Vapor cycle refrigeration
systems are the most widely used in terrestial applications; both shaft-
work driven and heat-driven systems enjoy commercial success. Gas cycles
are used in turbine-powered aircraft in an open-cycle fashion with the
air being supplied in the form of bleed-air from the jet-engine compressor.
Heat driven refrigeration systems, including systems where the refrigerant is
absorbed in a chemical bed which is regenerated at the base, were considered
and found to require much larger weight and volume than mechanically driven
systems. The vapor compression cycle is the most probable candidate of
refrigeration system for an AEPS application because the system is lighter
and more compact than other refrigeration systems, and the driving energy
can be conveniently supplied by a battery of reasonable size. Refrigeration
is potentially attractive for an AEPS because
(1) The radiation sink temperature for much of the lunar surface is
above the desired AEPS metabolic heat sink temperature, and
(2) There is generally an advantage in reducing the required radiator
area (which can be accomplished by raising the radiator temperature).
Phase change materials offer considerable promise for the AEPS heat
rejection system. Evaporation has been used extensively as a heat sink
in space-applications; it provides a small, light weight system for
relatively short duration EVA sorties. The expendables required over a long
mission involving many sorties become prohibitively large, however. Evaporation
is very attractive as a top-off system because of the light weight. However,
the water vapor vented from an evaporation device may pose a problem in the
form of contamination of experiments and sensors that may be serviced by EVA.
This contamination can occur both by collection of a contaminant film on a
sensor surface and by the tenuous vapor cloud surrounding the EVA crewman.
Water vapor poses a particularly difficult problem because it is a strong
absorber in several infrared bands and many vehicle surfaces may be cold
enough that condensation and freezing can occur on them.
Fusible materials have also been used extensively in space appli-
cations, usually to dampen or smooth out temperature excursions where the
external environment is cyclic, or where operation (and thus internal heat
generation) is intermittent. The capacity of fusible materials is usually
inadequate to provide the entire heat sink requirement, except in the case
of short duration missions. However, the identification of a fusible
material with superior thermal properties, or the potential for marriage of
the fusible approach to some other heat rejection technique make the fusible
heat sink a strong candidate. Crystalline structure change materials are
very similar to fusible heat sink materials, except that the phase change
involved is from one solid state to another solid state with a different
crystalline structure. This obviously offers a distinct advantage in con-
tainer and extended heat transfer surface design over fusible materials which
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go from a solid to a liquid state, with the associated volume change.
The primary problem in solid-to-solid phase change systems is the same as
for fusible heat sink systems; namely, finding a material with a very high
heat of transition and a suitable transition temperature (of approximately
0°F to 50°F). No suitable solid-to-solid phase change materials were found.
Endothermic chemical reactions, which absorb heat, could be used
to accommodate AEPS heat rejection. This would be particularly valuable
if it could be combined with a chemical reaction already required by the
AEPS system such as C02 control, humidity control, or power production.
No chemical reactions were found that combined the required high heat of
reaction in the required temperature range, with non-toxic reactants and
products, to allow the construction of a safe, reliable system. Therefore,
this approach was not considered further.
4.4.5 Selection of Heat Rejection Subsystem
The primary criteria used for selecting the AEPS heat rejection
subsystems were minimum EVA size, mobility restriction, and expendables,
combined with reliability and safety for the astronaut in case of failure.
As discussed earlier, it was found that the objectives of minimizing EVA
size and expendables were contradictory, so that a relatively large EVA
system is required for a closed heat rejection system. The most promising
candidates are shown in Table 12 below.
TABLE 12 FINAL CANDIDATE HEAT REJECTION SUBSYSTEMS
CONCEPT SELECTED SYSTEM
1. EXPENDABLE HEAT SINK SUBLIMATOR, FLASH EVAPORATOR
2. FUSIBLE HEAT SINK FUSIBLE WATER ASTRONAUT HEAT SINK (AHS
3. REFRIGERATION MACHINE VAPOR COMPRESSION CYCLE
4. RADIATOR PORTABLE RADIATOR PACKAGE
5. COOLANT UMBILICAL UMBILICAL TO BASE
It was found that no heat rejection system which could operate for
8 hours without expendables was small enough to be integrated entirely into
a backpack system. Therefore, some type of a support system, separate from
the backpack, is required. This support system could be mounted on a "MET-
type" transporter or it could be installed on a powered vehicle.
There are two functionally different methods of supporting the AEPS
backpack from a separate system. The AEPS and the support system can be con-
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nected by an umbilical or the support system can carry cooling modules
which are installed into the AEPS as required. VMSC evaluated both
approaches and found that it was not possible to prove one method superior
to the other based on the general AEPS guidelines. It was arbitrarily assumed
that planetary surface umbilical systems must have the capability to operate
without the umbilical for 30% of the EVA duration, in order to allow excursions
from the support equipment. Therefore, the radiator and refrigerator systems,
which have the capability to operate as completely closed systems, are
considered to be supplemented by expendables, since expendables may be
used during the non-umbilical portion of the EVA. The coolant umbilical to the
base is intended primarily for orbital use.
The expendable heat sink concept has the lowest EVA weight and volume
but the highest total weight for a large number of EVA's. However, the space
shuttle, which utilizes fuel cells for power production, may generate more
water than is needed by the crew and for other purposes on some missions. The
fuel cells produce about 0.85 lb of water per Kilowatt-hour (KWH) of electricity.
Projected shuttle power profilesm(Reference [38]) indicate a maximum electrical
requirement of approximately 500 KWH yielding 425 lbm of water generated.
The maximum production rate is on the order of 10 lb /hr. This water is
budgeted for functions such as crew metabolic and wash water, and payload
cooling and thus it is not all available to the EVA system without penalty.
The actual amount of water available depends on the particular shuttle mission.
The sublimator system, as used in the Apollo PLSS, is a compact, re-
liable system that is ideally suited to missions where only a few EVA's are
required. However, it is not suitable for use as an expendable, "Top-Off",
system due to its relatively poor response characteristics from start-up and
waste of water during the "dry-out" phase. The flash evaporator is an ex-
pendable system being developed by VMSC, under contract to NASA-MSC, for a
potential shuttle application. As applied to AEPS, it would offer no expendables
advantage over the sublimator when used as the primary cooling system. However,
its response to varying heat loads make it ideally suited for use as an
expendable "top-off" system. The flash evaporator also has inherent control
advantages over conventional devices such as the Apollo Command Module water
boiler.
The use of a fusible material allows a completely closed heat rejection
system. Water was selected as the fusible material due to its high heat of
fusion and the fact that it is completely non-toxic in all forms. In addition,
the solid-to-liquid phase change occurs at a temperature and pressure that
minimizes hardware design problems. The use of fusible water also allows the
system to incorporate a back-up evaporative mode with proper hardware design.
The heat of fusion of ice is roughly 15% of the heat of vapori-
zation so that 6 to 7 times as much water must be transported for use in
the fusible as compared to the expendable mode. Approximately 100 lb of ice
may be required per man, to reject the specified AEPS heat load; this is too
heavy and bulky to be carried conveniently in a backpack. In order to minimize
mobility constraints, the ice may be modularized into smaller, more manageable
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portions, with frozen modules carried in an insulated container. The melted
ice modules are replaced with frozen ones as required, which will be every
1-2 hours depending on the heat load and the size of the module. However, if
for some reason it is not possible to change modules when required, the
astronaut could switch to the evaporative mode and continue the full EVA with
no restrictions except for the water expended. The ice modules are refrozen
at the base between EVA's. This system concept has been designated the
Astronaut Heat Sink (AHS) and it is felt to offer considerable promise in
reducing the expendables required for EVA heat rejection.
The modular AHS concept is extremely simple. An aluminum pack con-
taining 15 lb of ice is mechanically clamped between two heat exchanger
modules and hAat is rejected by melting the ice. This mechanical interface
between the heat sink and the LCG fluid has a reliability advantage since
the LCG loop is not broken during routine module replacement. The total
subsystem mass is too large to be included in a backpack so the ice is
divided into modules with frozen modules carried in an insulated container.
A spent (melted) module is replaced with a frozen one from the storage
container as required. The AHS is carried in a chest pack to facilitate
AHS module replacement.
The heat capacity of each AHS can be increased by sub-cooling the
ice during the regeneration mode and heating the melted water above 32°F
during use. A total heat sink of 175-200 BTU/lb ice can be achieved with
only a moderate amount of sub-cooling. Moderate sub-cooling was assumed,
since cooling to very low temperatures increases the regeneration penalty
and also complicates the subsystem design since freezing of the LCG water
must be prevented.
The AHS has a unique contingency mode of operation which is possible
because water is used as the heat sink material. At any time when it is not
convenient to change AHS modules the AHS in use can be converted to an
evaporator simply by opening the manual vent valves. The 15 lb of water can
then be expended by controlled evaporation. This extends the capability of
the AHS system to allow a complete 8-hour EVA without the support modules
but with a penalty in water expended. This contingency mode adds considerable
flexibility to the AHS concept.
The AHS packs are regenerated at the base simply by refreezing the
ice. In some environments, such as the lunar night, the AHS packs can be
regenerated without any special equipment by exposing them to the exterior
environment. However, the total system weight calculated for the AHS system
includes a base freezer system with all associated penalties.
For shorter duration EVA's up to 4 hours, such as may be desirable
in earth orbital operations, the entire AHS could be conveniently integrated
into the AEPS backpack. This would be desirable in orbital operations because
of the difficulty in maintaining a convenient supply of modules, and the
potential difficulty in replacing modules in a low gravity environment.
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A fusible AHS type heat sink is assumed to be integrated into the
backpack for use as the "top-off" system required for the radiator refrigera-
tion systems. This allows 1-2 hours of non-umbilical operation without ex-
pending any water and a further 5-6 hours is available by using the ex-
pendable mode.
Another approach to using the heat of fusion of ice is to connect
the backpack to a large AHS by means of an umbilical. This large AHS could
be conveniently mounted on a powered or a " MET-type" transporter. It would
provide all AEPS heat rejection when the umbilical could be used but a secondary
system would be required in the backpack to allow operation without the um-
bilical. This system eliminates the requirement for changing modules during
the EVA but the umbilical does restrict mobility to some extent. A heat
exchanger is included in the backpack to allow a fluid loop separate from
the LCG to be circulated through the umbilical.
All of the AHS systems have a relatively large EVA weight per man
but they are compact for this weight. This minimizes the transportation
difficulty, however, some sort of small transporter is required for an 8 hour
system.
Both the simple radiator and the refrigeration systems are rate
limited and it was found that they were prohibitively large when designed
to reject the maximum heat load. However, this maximum heat load is expected
to occur infrequently and for short durations so that a more practical approach
is to design the primary system to reject the average heat load with a secondary
"top-off" system to accommodate the transient peaks. It was found that for
an average metabolic load of 1600 BTU/hr the total system heat load, including
equipment cooling and a nominal environmental heat leak, is about 2000 BTU/hr.
Therefore, this value was taken as the baseline heat load for the design of
the primary system.
A simple radiator system was found to be the lightest weight, closed
heat rejection concept available. However, this system suffers several
disadvantages that limit its applicability. A large radiator area is required
since the radiating temperature is limited to the temperature available from
the LCG and will therefore be less than about 70°F. This limits the heat
rejection from the radiator to a maximum of 140 BTU/hr ft2 so that the minimum
possible radiator area is about 14 ftL for 2000 BTU/hr. The actual area will
be considerably greater due to limitations imposed by radiator fin effectiveness,
surface optical properties, and the influence of the thermal environment. If
a secondary radiator loop is used to avoid circulating the LCG fluid directly
through the radiator, the temperature drop across the required heat exchanger
will further reduce the radiating temperature. Any thermal radiation incident
on the radiator surface will decrease the radiator's net heat rejection per
unit area. In some daytime thermal environments, such as inside a lunar
crater or near mountains, the infrared radiation from topographical features
can render a simple radiator completely useless. The radiator can be shielded
or positioned by an orientation system to minimize the incident radiation, but
these additions increase the weight and volume of the system so that it is not
competitive with several other concepts. However, a radiator would be a very
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attractive system for a Martian EVA since the thermal environment is much less
severe than on the moon.
The problems encountered with the simple radiator can be overcome by
using a refrigeration cycle to increase the radiator temperature. A vapor
compression refrigeration cycle was selected due to its high coefficient of
performance (COP) and compact size. The energy required to drive the system
is supplied by a lithium-halide battery.
A conceptual design for an AEPS vapor compression refrigerator was
created to allow weight, volume, power, and expendables estimates to be made.
It was found that, using conservative estimates for motor and compressor
efficiency, a COP of 2.9 could be achieved with an evaporator temperature of
40°F and a condenser temperature of 130°F. The total EVA weight of the
system, including power supply and radiator, was found to be about 70 lb for
a 2000 BTU/hr system. This system employs a 25 foot umbilical with the m
evaporator built into the AEPS pack. Thus, any failure in the umbilical system
would not cause a loss of LCG fluid, since the evaporator acts as a heat ex-
changer between the LCG loop and the refrigerant. A "top-off" system is also
included in the backpack, bringing the total heat rejection system weight to
about 95 lbm . The "top-off" system provides cooling for non-umbilical
operations, accommodates transient peak heat loads, and provides a back-up
in the event of refrigeration system failure. The only base requirement for this
system is recharge of the EVA battery.
The modular and umbilical approaches to AEPS thermal control are
illustrated in Figure 13. It shows an AHS chest pack with the insulated
storage container integrated into a small "MET-type" equipment transporter.
The umbilical refrigeration system is shown mounted on a small, powered
transporter. This system could also be mounted on a man-powered equipment
transporter or detached from the transporter for use at a work station. Both
of these approaches have considerable promise for a wide range of AEPS missions.
The weights and volumes of these promising systems are shown in Figure 14.
The figure shows that the expendable weight of the sublimator imposes an
extremely large penalty for any mission requiring numerous EVA's. The weight
and volume of the AHS/refrigerator system increases with the number of EVA
hours, because of the assumption that 30% of the EVA duration is spent off the
umbilical, thus requiring the system to expend some water on each EVA. If
it were assumed that the umbilical could be used 80% of the time, no water
would be expended on a nominal EVA and the AHS/refrigerator would become the
lightest weight thermal control system. The simple cooling umbilical to base
is shown to be light in weight, but its application is limited to specific
missions. No expendable penalty was assigned to the AHS system. Figure 15,
which shows weight as a function of individual EVA duration, indicates that the
rate-limited refrigeration system size does not change with increased EVA
duration while the size of the capacity limited systems increases.
4.4.6 Thermal Control Subsystem Recommendations
On a weight and volume basis, the two most promising regenerable
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heat rejection subsystems for missions requiring more than 50 EVA hours are
the modular AHS system and the refrigerator with AHS "Top-Off". Both systems
offer closed heat rejection at a penalty in EVA weight. A fundamental
difference between the two is the module vs umbilical approach. The choice
of which regenerable approach is optimum for a particular mission can best
be made at the detailed mission planning stage. A water sublimator or
evaporation system is attractive for short duration missions on which con-
siderable excess water is already available, such as shuttle orbiter missions.
In addition to these primary heat rejection systems, several concepts
were identified that would either reduce the AEPS heat load, or improve the
primary system performance.
(1) The first is the advanced LCG mentioned in Section 4.4 (page 43).
A preliminary analysis indicates that a more comfortable LCG which is a more
effective heat exchanger can be produced with a modest development effort.
The advantages of this LCG are improved wearer comfort and increased tem-
perature potential for heat rejection.
(2) A second concept is the integration of a fusible material
directly into the suit for an orbital EVA. The thermal environment changes
rapidly in low earth orbit and a suit incorporating a "Quilt-Like" pattern of
paraffin material could be used. Materials are available that would change
phase at about 80°F and the use of this suit would tend to stabilize the suit
at the phase change temperature. This would increase the net heat leak from
the space suit in an orbital environment from about -150 BTU/hr to as much
as -1000 BTU/hr. This would significantly reduce the heat load on the primary
AEPS system without introducing the problems that accompany similar concepts
such as controllable heat pipe suits, etc.
(3) Similarly, for lunar surface EVA, the insulating overcoat principle
used for Gemini EVA's can be applied. This would consist of a basic, relatively
uninsulated EVA suit that could reject a large fraction of the metabolic heat
at night or at low sun angles. An insulating overcoat would cover this suit
to minimize the heat transfer into the system for daytime operation.
4.5 HUMIDITY CONTROL SUBSYSTEM
Humidity control is usually achieved with a condensing heat exchanger,
both in commercial and aerospace applications. In this technique, the air is
brought into contact with a cooling coil which is at or slightly below the
desired air dew point temperature. Sufficient moisture is condensed out
of the process air to reduce the dew point to the cooling apparatus temperature.
In spacecraft, the zero-gravity environment requires that a water separation
device be used to remove the water droplets from the air stream. A centrifugal
device such as an elbow is normally used for this purpose. A transport system,
such as a wick system, is required to remove the water from the separation
device to a storage container.
The above system may present two problems in an AEPS.
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(1) The wick provides an excellent medium for bacterial growth
(2) Some potential regenerable heat rejection systems may provide
a coolant temperature which is not low enough to yield the
required atmosphere dew point temperature.
In this latter case a desiccant system can be employed, the
most likely candidates being:
(1) Silica Gel
(2) Activated Alumina
(3) Lithium Chloride
(4) Molecular Sieve
The maximum amount of water which must be removed from the AEPS atmos-
phere is about 3.7 lbs per EVA. This amount is small enough so that regenera-
tion of the system during a mission would not be required, though regeneration
by vacuum venting of the dessicants is possible. Any of the systems can be
readily regenerated in the primary base or shelter, thus recovering the water.
In this study a condensing heat exchanger was assumed for humidity
control when the heat rejection system could supply 40°F cooling to the gas
stream, and a silica gel desiccant system was assumed for systems that
operate at a higher cooling temperature.
4.6 POWER SUPPLY
The AEPS life support system requires a power system to drive it;
in this study an investigation into power systems was accomplished to
identify power sources which might be available in the next decade.
4.6.1 AEPS Power Requirements
The anticipated minimum power demands on an AEPS are:
(1) Ventilation gas circulation 25 watts
(2) Liquid coolant circulation 10 watts
(3) Controls, instrumentation and 10 watts
communications
(4) Total 45 watts
The power requirement of 45 watts coupled with an 8-hour sortie gives a
minimum total energy requirement of 360 watt-hour. This is comparable to
the requirements for the current Apollo PLSS. Many potential life support
systems, such as a Bosch reactor or a vapor compression refrigeration system
have power requirements far in excess of the minimum values listed.
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Candidate Power Supply Subsystem
Potential power sources for AEPS can be divided into four functional
categories:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Battery Systems
Fuel Cells
Nuclear Systems
Solar Cells
Battery systems are usually classified as either primary or secondary;
the distinction being that primary batteries are not rechargeable.
Primary batteries provide a large power density for a short duration;
however, the nature of most AEPS missions makes the secondary, or rechargeable,
battery more promising.
Secondary batteries are regenerated by flowing electric current
into the battery to reverse the battery discharge reaction. Since the
reaction is not completely reversible, there is a maximum number of dis-
charge cycles before the maximum voltage which the battery can produce
falls below the minimum allowable value. In addition, the likelihood of
battery failure increases with the number of discharges. The depth of dis-
charge is the significant parameter in the recharge life of the battery;
usually sixty percent nominal depth of discharge is taken as a reasonable
compromise between battery reliability, and size and weight.
For an AEPS application the most significant battery
are the mass and volumetric power densities. Table 13 gives a
of these parameters plus cycle lifetime for several batteries,
the common automobile-type lead-acid battery.
parameters
comparison
including
TABLE 13 BATTERY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS
POWER ENERGY THEORETICAL VOLUMETRIC
DENSITY DENSITY ENERGY DENSITY ENERGY DENSITY LIFETIME
CELL WATT WATT-H R WATT-H R WATT-H R NO. CYCLES
TYPE LBM LBM LBM IN3 (60% DISCHARGE, 25°C)
LEAD-ACID 14 10-12 115 2 400
Ni-Fe 18 16 35 1.1 3000
Ni-Cd 20 18 107 1.0 2000
Ag-Zn 70 45 208 5 300
Ag-Cd 60 56 120 3.7 3000
Li-CuCI2 70 160 503 5 -
Li-CuF2 - 200 750 4 -
Li-Se - 164 575 3.5 -
Na-S 100 135 543 5.7 -
Na-Bi 36 18 132 1.3 500
Li-Te 127 82 490 5.9 -
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4.6.2
The silver-zinc (Ag-Zn) and Silver-Cadmium (Ag-Cd) batteries are commonly
used in aerospace applications. The advanced sodium and lithium batteries
are currently in development, and improvements in the performance of these
batteries should be anticipated.
Battery systems are well suited to the AEPS application since
they offer acceptable power levels with low weight and volume and they
can be regenerated.
Fuel cells are very similar to batteries in principle in that
electrical energy is produced by a chemical reaction. However, fuel cells
generally use externally stored reactants which produce a waste product,
so the cell will continue to operate as long as reactants are supplied.
The tanks, delivery lines, valves, etc. associated with the reactants tend
to make the fuel cell more complicated than a battery. The relative com-
plexity of the fuel cell system with the attendant loss of reliability
results in the fuel cell having no advantage over batteries for AEPS unless
significantly higher AEPS power requirements are defined.
Hybrid fuel cell systems which could be combined with life support
functions such as carbon dioxide control are possible, but were found to offer
little advantage for an AEPS.
Nuclear Power Systems use nuclear reactions as a heat source and
convert the thermal energy to electricity by various means, primarily:
(1) Thermoelectrics
(2) Thermionics
(3) Dynamic machines
The first two of these systems have characteristically low conversion ef-
ficiency, and the last involves a considerable amount of rotating machinery.
These factors tend to make nuclear systems non-competitive for an application
with low power and energy requirements such as AEPS.
Solar cells convert sunlight directly into electrical energy.
Usually some sort of power regulation equipment is required with a solar
cell system. If the system is shadowed part of the time, such as in earth
orbit, then a battery system is required for continual power delivery.
Improvements in solar ce2l design can be anticipated; and yields
of 40 watt/lb, and 8 to 17 watt/ft (at a distance of one astronomical unit
from the sun) for cadmium sulfide (CdS) thin film cells and silicon cells,
respectively, seem reasonable to expect. This assumes that the cell array
is aligned normal to the solar vector; off-alignment will require that the
cell array be larger. Efficiency of the cell array is strongly dependent on
temperature, and temperature control on the lunar surface, for instance, would
be difficult to achieve.
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The light weight and no expendable or recharge requirement
characteristics of the solar cell make it attractive; however, area and
alignment requirements of the cell array make solar cells impractical for
a system transported on a man's back. The solar cell is attractive for
vehicle power systems.
4.6.3 Power Supply Subsystem Recommendations
Batteries were selected as the power source for AEPS; this is
based on the premise that the total energy requirement is no more than 1
kw-hr for an 8-hour mission.
Lithium-halide batteries were selected as the power supply sub-
system for the total system weight evaluations: 200 watt-hr/lb and 4 watt-hr/in3
were assumed for these batteries.
Figure 16 shows the EVA weight and volume of the AEPS power system
as a function of power requirement, including the allowance for 60% depth
of discharge in a nominal mission. Figure 17 shows the total weight of
primary and secondary batteries as a function of total EVA hours. The weight
of the secondary batteries includes the recharge regulator and the base Dower
penalty. This figure shows that secondary batteries are desireable on any
AEPS mission provided that the recharge power requirement does not require
an increase in the capacity of the primary vehicle's power system.
4.7 EMERGENCY CONSIDERATIONS
The backup EVA life support systems used on Gemini and early Apollo
missions were designed to provide breathing gas and some measure of convective
cooling for a very short period. This was considered to be adequate since
the EVA's were conducted in the vicinity of the spacecraft and the crewman
was never far from shelter. However, on later Apollo flights and many
anticipated AEPS missions, the EVA's take the astronaut far from the primary
base and considerable time may be required to return in case of a failure.
Therefore, the AEPS system must provide all life support requirements for
the time required for the astronaut to return to the base in case of a failure
in the primary system. This section summarizes a more detailed discussion
of emergency considerations presented in Appendix B.
Primary spacecraft life support systems are generally designed to
a "fail operational - - fail safe" requirement. This means that the normal
mission can be continued with any single component failure, since the secondary
system will provide all required functions without any degradation of performance.
Thus, the system is said to have "failed operational". An emergency capability
is provided so that a second failure of the same subsystem would not be
catastrophic, but it would require termination of the mission. This is the
fail-safe condition. The AEPS primary life support subsystems will be assumed
to be designed "fail-safe" since including a "fail operational" capability
imposes a substantial penalty on a portable system. Therefore, the AEPS
life support system would be designed so that a single failure of any component
would not be catastrophic, but it would require activation of an emergency system
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and termination of the EVA.
It will be assumed that AEPS structural elements, gas storage bottles,
heat exchangers, and flow loop "hard" lines and fittings will be designed with
a sufficient safety margin that catastrophic failures will not occur. Dynamic
components such as pumps, fans, and valves; flexible seals between joints;
and all removeable components such as umbilicals, suit zippers and seals, etc.
are subject to failure. It is impossible to accurately, quantitatively assess
component reliability for systems in the advanced concept stage. However,
it is possible to qualitatively predict possible failure modes that must be
accommodated by the emergency system.
The allowable limits for parameters such as C02 and trace contaminant
partial pressures, total suit pressure, and crewman thermal comfort can be
quite different for the AEPS primary and emergency systems. In addition,
the time required for the crewman to reach a pressurized shelter following
an EVA emergency is expected to be short compared to the nominal EVA duration.
The basic physiological reactions of the crewman to variations in these
parameters were briefly investigated to attempt to determine reasonable
tolerance levels.
4.7.1 Physiological Effects
The physiological effects of most interest are: the effects of total
gas pressure and decompression rate in the case of a gas leak, effects of
C02 and contaminant level on crewman mental and physical performance, and the
effects of thermal stress due to cooling system failure.
If a puncture occurs suddenly in the AEPS pressure shell, pressure
will decay rapidly as the atmosphere exits through'the vent. The time required
for the pressure to decay depends on the initial pressure, the configuration
of the vent area, and to a lesser degree, on the atmosphere composition and
the initial atmosphere temperature. Table 14 shows the characteristic suit
volumes, leakage areas, and the volume to area ratio (V/A) for a variety of
possible suit failures. Available data (Reference 39) indicate that no lung
TABLE 14 CHARACTERISTICS OF EXPLOSIVE DECOMPRESSION
RESIDUALSUIT ORIFICE V/A
VOLUME AREA RATIO
SOFT SUITS (IN3 ) (IN 2 ) (METERS)
NECK SEAL (PLSS) 1585 26.. 0.88
WRIST SEAL (PLSS) 1710 9.3 4.67
CHAMBER UMBILICAL HOSE 1555 1.2 32.3
PLSS UMBILICAL HOSE 1710 0.4 100.
FINGERS (PLSS) 1710 0.2 233.
HARD SUITS
WAIST SEAL (PLSS) 2150 125. 0.435
NECK SEAL (PLSS) 4310 87. 1.25
THIGH (PLSS) 3910 27. 3.6
ANKLE (PLSS) 4580 26. 4.46
WRIST SEAL (PLSS) 4580 8.4 13.9
CHAMBER UMBILICAL HOSE 4330 1.2 89.8
PLSS UMBILICAL HOSE 4580 0.4 268.
FINGERS (PLSS) 4580 0.2 620.
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damage will result from decompressions when V/A > 15 meters while decom-
pressions with V/A < 3 meters result in fatal tissue damage.
Decompression also introduces the risk of the crewman suffering
from the bends. The "bends" may occur even when the decompression is slow
enough to prevent tissue damage. The severity of the bends depends, to some
degree, on the amount of de-nitrogenation which the crewman has undergone
prior to the decompression event; the risk is greater in a two-gas suit, or
in an 8 psia oxygen suit operation out of a vehicle with a two-gas atmosphere.
In any event, the time to the onset of bends symptoms is greater than the survival
time in a vacuum (Reference 39) so that the bends are not a dominant factor in
suit emergencies involving decompression.
Since the AEPS pressurized volume is small relative to the C02 pro-
duction rate of the man, the CO2 partial pressure will increase rapidly
following loss of CO2 removal capability. The CO2 partial pressure will increase
at a rate of approximately 40 mm Hg/min, resulting in unconsciousness within
3 to 5 minutes (Reference 26). The production rates of other contaminants
are low enough (Section 4.3) so that no ill effects will result from a failure
of the trace contaminant control subsystem.
In contrast to emergencies involving the gas circulation and suit
pressurization systems, the allowable time before crewman collapse and
unconsciousness following a cooling system failure is much greater.
Data presented in References 26 and 39 can be used to estimate the
crewman's useful survival time following such a failure. These data, which
were compiled from various sources, are in fairly good agreement although
it should be noted that individual tolerance to heat stress may vary widely.
Crewman incapacitation results from metabolic heat storage in the
body, which raises body core temperature producing the same basic effects
as a fever due to sickness. The data indicate that a maximum body core
temperature of about 105°F can be tolerated without permanent damage. This
implies a heat storage of about 750 to 1000 BTU depending on body weight.
This is in agreement with other data (Reference 39) indicating incipient
collapse after 30-40 minutes of exercise at 1500-2000 BTU/hr in an insulated
environment.
Thus it appears reasonable to assume a heat storage of 750 BTU
without significant performance degradation under emergency conditions.
This value can be used to determine the endurance time for a crewman when
his metabolic heat production exceeds the emergency cooling system capacity.
Environmental thermal exchange (Section 3.5) can prolong or shorten this time
depending on the average environmental sink temperature. Figure 18 shows the
expected useful crewman survival time following a cooling system failure for
different values of heat storage and emergency cooling. The time shown is
that during which the crewman's performance is relatively unimpaired and he
can perform useful action to return to shelter without assistance. The
emergency durations specified for the various AEPS missions (Table 1) are also
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FIGURE 18 AVERAGE UNIMPAIRED PERFORMANCE TIME FOR VARIOUS EVA
EMERGENCIES
shown along with the time to collapse following a gas circulation failure
and suit depressurization.
These data showing the expected crewman physiological response
to different types of emergencies were used along with data on expected
failures and failure rates to determine the required types of emergency
systems.
4.7.2 Potential Failure Modes
There are many possible equipment failures or accidents that
could endanger the life of an EVA crewman. The AEPS emergency system will
be designed to specifically accommodate the most credible failures and it
will be assumed that this will also be sufficient to handle other, less likely,
contingencies.
The most credible failure modes are shown in Table 15, along with
the emergency system requirements for each type of failure, and possible
approaches that would meet these requirements. The AEPS emergency system must
satisfy all of these failure modes for the duration of the EVA emergency.
Figure 19 presents data which are useful in determining the quantity
of gas required to maintain suit pressure for different leakage areas. It was
63
TABLE 15 EVA FAILURE MODES
FAILURE MODE EMERGENCY SYSTEM POSSIBLE FAILED
REQUIREMENT COMPONENTS
GAS CIRCULATION AND MAINTAIN SUIT PRESSURE 1. SUIT LEAK
PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM AND PROVIDE FRESH 2. GAS UMBILICAL FAILURE
BREATHING GAS 3. FAILED GAS REGULATOR
4. FAILED FAN
5. LOSS OF POWER
6. CO2 CANISTER FAILURE
7. FAILED PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES
8. FAILED HUMIDITY CONTROL SYSTEM
AEPS THERMAL CONTROL MAINTAIN CREWMAN 1. COOLANT UMBILICAL FAILURES
SYSTEM THERMAL CONFORT WITHIN 2. PUMP FAILURE
ACCEPTABLE LIMITS 3. LOSS OF POWER
4. FAILED TEMPERATURE CONTROL
VALVE
5. FAILED LCG
DEPLETED EVA PROVIDE RESERVE UNEXPECTEDLY HIGH EXPENDABLE
EXPENDABLES CAPACITY USE RATE
found that the gas flow rate required to maintain suit pressure in case of
a leak, is the determining factor for sizing the emergency gas supply system.
PRESSURE
VENT AREA
PRODUCT
IPSIA) (IN 2 )
TIME IN MINUTES
FIGURE 19 EFFECTS OF LEAKAGE AREA AND SUIT PRESSURE ON EMERGENCY
GAS REQUIREMENTS
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A gas supply system sized to meet credible leakage requirements, will also
be capable of supplying gas at the flow rates required for functions such
as CO2 control.
4.7.3 Impact of Emergency Requirements on Primary Systems
It is expected that the AEPS emergency system will only be operated
occasionally so that the criteria for system suitability are different than
those used to select the AEPS primary subsystems. This infrequent operation
allows the use of a completely expendable system since the number of expected
uses, even on long duration missions, is insufficient to justify a regen-
erable capability. The most important factors are long shelf-life with
no service required and minimum weight and volume. The emergency system must
be capable of being carried on many EVA's involving rugged duty with no
service required between EVA's and still be ready for use when required. Since
an emergency may occur when the crewman is alone and at a distance from a
pressurized shelter, it is necessary to carry an emergency system at all times
and, therefore, the weight and volume must be as small as possible.
It was found that high pressure gaseous storage of oxygen is the
most practical method of storing elemental oxygen for the primary EVA system
because of system simplicity and the fact that other methods such as cryogenic
storage have difficulty supplying gas at high flow rates. Since a high flow
rate is specified for the emergency system, this is also the only practical
elemental 02 storage method for the back-up 02 supply. Chemical 02 storage
methods such as potassium superoxide can provide simultaneous CO2 control and
oxygen supply and these would at first appear to be attractive for an emergency
system. However, these were found to have no weight or volume advantage over
gaseous oxygen storage combined with a separate CO2 control system. In addition,
they cannot easily supply oxygen at the high flow rate required for an
emergency repressurization system so that a high pressure 02 bottle would still
be required. A simple high pressure bottle is the only practical method of
supplying gas for breathing and suit pressurization for both primary and
emergency systems.
CO2 control subsystems generally fall into one of two categories:
passive chemical sorbent beds through which the ventilation gas is con-
tinuously circulated or systems such as molecular sieves or solid amine beds
where dynamic components are required. The dynamic systems have an obvious
reliability problem when compared to passive systems, but it might be possible
to include a redundant capability in a primary dynamic system, such as including
a third amine bed in a solid amine system. However, this approach is deemed
unattractive since the diverter valves and timers in this system are probably
more prone to fail than the bed itself. In addition, the weight and volume
of a two bed solid amine system are sufficiently large that the addition of
redundant components is impractical. The reliability of any dynamic C02
subsystem can be increased by including redundancy for critical components,
but the overall reliability of the AEPS is increased more by providing a
completely separate emergency CO2 control method. This can be provided by an
open-loop system where exhaled C02 is vented overboard or by an expendable LiOH
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cartridge since LiOH was shown to be the most compact CO2 control method
available. If gas umbilicals that link two EVA crewman following a gas system
failure, are used, then the CO2 capacity of the primary system may require
an increase to handle the CO2 produced by two men during such an emergency.
Figure 20 shows the influence of employing a buddy gas umbilical on the weight
of the AEPS CO2 control systems. The weight and volume of the regenerable ZnO
LiOH
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TOTAL EVA TIME (HRS/MAN)
EMERGENCY GAS UMBILICAL ON CO2 CONTROL
and Mg(OH)2 systems increases slightly due to the additional penalty required
to regenerate the enlarged bed. The LiOH system suffers the largest penalty
since the additional mass of the enlarged bed is expended even though no
emergency occurs. The solid amine system does not change because the assumed
combined emergency metabolic load for two men is lower than the 3500 BTU/hr
peak load for which the system was sized.
The fusible Astronaut Heat Sink (AHS) concept discussed earlier
has an evaporative contingency mode which enhances the applicability of the
concept. No other candidate thermal control system has any inherent advantage
when emergency requirements are considered. A failure of the primary AHS
could still leave the crewman without cooling so that a secondary cooling
method must be provided in case of failure during installation of an AHS or
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to provide cooling in case of failure of any type of primary heat sink
(cracked sublimator plates, refrigerator failure, etc.). Water evaporation
devices were shown to be the lightest weight heat sinks available and therfore,
they are attractive as an emergency system. Convective cooling by a gas blow-
down system could also be used but this method is not capable of removing the
required maximum heat load in a practical suit and is therefore not suitable
for cooling in an extended emergency situation.
The optimum AEPS power supply was shown to be a secondary (re-
chargeable) battery. However, as previously stated, there is no requirement
that the emergency system be regenerable and therefore, a primary (non-recharge-
able) battery will be assumed for a redundant AEPS power supply since non-
rechargeable batteries have an advantage in power density.
4.7.4 Emergency Subsystem Approaches
Table 16 shows some of the emergency systems or emergency provisions
that have been included in EVA life support systems used, or designed for use,
in the past along with the concepts considered in this study. These systems
are discussed in more detail in Appendix B. In general, it appears that in
the past most systems were designed without the benefit of a careful study of
the actual emergency situations and the response of the human body to emergency
conditions. The fundamental requirement for the emergency system is to
guarantee the survival of the crewman for the specified emergency duration.
Crewman comfort is a secondary consideration provided that any discomfort
does not interfere with the crewman's performance.
4.7.5 Emergency Subsystem Comparison and Conclusions
Conceptual designs were created for each of the emergency subsystem
approaches shown in Table 16 to allow an estimation of required weight and
volume. Figure 21 shows the results of these calculations. All of the systems
shown on the figure are designed to meet all the emergency requirements shown
in Table 15. All systems also include an oxygen blowdown system containing
a minimum of 3-3/4 lb of oxygen to meet the emergency suit pressurization
requirement. The length of time which this will maintain suit pressure for
different leakage areas can be determined from Figure 19.
Figure 21 shows that a blowdown gas system with a breathing bag to
reduce the gas flow required for CO2 control and a buddy cooling umbilical
is the smallest volume and lightest weight AEPS emergency system. The other
approaches, such as providing a completely redundant, "SLSS-type" system or
including redundant components in the primary AEPS, are shown to be heavier
and they offer no advantages in additional capability.
Although a decompression of the AEPS pressurized volume is expected
to be an unlikely occurrence, it would almost certainly be fatal since no
practical system can supply the volumes of gas needed to maintain suit pressure
with a large leakage area. Two concepts were identified which would help
to increase the chance of survival with very little weight or volume penalty.
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The first of these is the collar and wrist seal concept shown in Figure 22.
These seals would allow gas flow under normal conditions but the gas flow
rate resulting from a large leak would cause the seal to extend and thus
greatly reduce the leakage area. The areas of the body downstream of the seal
would be exposed to a near vacuum, but preliminary physiological data
(Reference 39) indicate that a crewman might survive without suffering permanent
ill effects for some time if 1.5 to 2.0 psia 02 pressure could be maintained
in the helmet even though the rest of the body was exposed to vacuum.
Better data are needed to determine the physiological feasibility
of the concept. If shown to be practical, this concept would greatly extend
the crewman's survival time allowing him to return to the primary base or
to erect the portable shelter shown in Figure 23.
This concept simply consists of a cylindrical bag made of flexible
plastic with a zippered entrance. The crewman could zip the bag around
him following a large suit leak and the bag would be pressurized from the
leak. The crewman can continue to breath from his primary 02 supply and he
can either attempt to fix the leak or he could be carried home on a transporter.
The conclusions and recommendations resulting from the review of
emergency requirements for AEPS are summarized in Table 17.
TABLE 17 SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY SYSTEMS CONCLUSIONS
CONCEPT
BLOW-DOWN "OPS-TYPE" SYSTEM
BLOW-DOWN "OPS-TYPE" SYSTEM WITH
BREATHING BAG AND BUDDY COOLING
UMBILICALS
EMERGENCY GAS AND COOLING UMBILICALS
COMBINED WITH BLOW-DOWN SYSTEM
COMPLETELY REDUNDANT EMERGENCY
SECONDARY LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
AEPS INTEGRATED REDUNDANT
SYSTEM (AIRS)
COMPLETE SPARE AEPS PACK
COLLAR/WRIST SEAL
COMMENTS
INSUFFICIENT COOLING CAPACITY FOR SOME
EMERGENCY SITUATIONS, PROVIDES FOR ALL
CRITICAL FUNCTIONS
MEETS ALL REQUIREMENTS WITH MINIMUM
WEIGHT
SUITABLE FOR EVA'S CONDUCTED BY TWO OR
MORE MEN
EXCESS WEIGHT, VOLUME, AND RELIABILITY
SERVICING REQUIREMENTS
SUITABLE FOR ALL AEPS MISSIONS, MAY
PROVIDE MORE REDUNDANCY THAN ACTUALLY
NEEDED
EXCESS WEIGHT, VOLUME, AND RELIABILITY/
SERVICING REQUIREMENTS
EXTENDS SURVIVAL TIME IN CASE OF MASSIVE
SUIT LEAK
RECOMMENDED SYSTEM: BLOW-DOWN SYSTEM INCLUDING BREATHING BAG AND BUDDY COOLANT
UMBILICALS; COLLAR AND WRIST SEALS INTEGRAL WITH SUIT; PORTABLE
SHELTER FOR EACH PAIR OF EVA CREWMAN
70
44W 
I
-n
a Z
0 
-.1 N
9L 
W
tl
I
-J
it,(n
tn
LU
o
a-w
C) 
u~~~~~
z
0
0u
-J
w
-J 2~~~~~~~~~.
oi 2
w
U, cow
-1 w8
aR i
-Ja
IL o
II
u]~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ua-J
2w
sr~~~~---~ '" 
o
~~~~~~~
LU~~~~~~~~~~~~~~L
0 ° 2 m oE Z 
4'- - . WW. _
a C;~~~~~~~~~C
LU~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~L~
0~~~~0.
-J a >.
2 X N se o z~2 I
U, - 0 
IL u _
- u, 4 cc
CD O, .- ~ CD
7 1
-'-) I
5.0 SUBSYSTEM CONCEPT INTEGRATION
The most promising subsystems for performing the AEPS life support
functions can now be combined for consideration at the total system level.
The selections of activated charcoal for trace contaminant control, either
a desiccant or a condensing heat exchanger for humidity control (depending on
the selection of the heat rejection system), and a lithium-halide battery for
power supply were made as discussed previously in Sections 4.3, 4.5, and
4.6, respectively. The remaining candidate subsystems for oxygen supply,
C02 control, and thermal control are given, for each application, in Table 18.
TABLE 18 FINAL CANDIDATE SUBSYSTEMS
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MISSION OXYGEN SUPPLY CO2 CONTROL THERMAL CONTROL
ORBITAL EVA 0 HIGH PRESSURE GAS 0 LiOH 0 EVAPORATOR
* UMBILICAL TO BASE * VACUUM DESORBED 0 AHS WITH UMBILICAL
SOLID AMINE TO LARGE AHS
* Mg(OH) 2 0 UMBILICAL TO BASE
* ZnO
* KOH
* UMBILICAL TO BASE
LUNAR EVA * HIGH PRESSURE GAS 0 LiOH 0 EVAPORATOR
* VACUUM DESORBED 0 AHS
SOLID AMINE 0 AHS WITH UMBILICAL
· Mg(OH) 2 TO REFRIGERATOR
* ZnO
* KOH
MARS EVA * HIGH PRESSURE GAS * LiOH 0 EVAPORATOR
* Mg(OH) 2 0 AHS
* KOH 0 AHS WITH UMBILICAL
* ZnO TO RADIATOR
The suitability for each of the concepts to the various applications
was based on the following rationale:
(1) The umbilical to the base for oxygen supply was considered to
be applicable only to orbital operations. It could be used in
the planetary surface applications, but it would be limited to
use near the primary vehicle or base. Thus it would not be
capable of supporting long range excursions which will almost
certainly be required.
(2) The vacuum-desorbed solid amine system for CO2 control is not
suitable for use on Mars surface missions, because of the high
CO? partial pressure of the Mars environment (t 3.5 mm Hg). The
LiOH, Mg(OH)2, ZnO, and KOH concepts could be used on any
AEPS mission.
(3) Regarding thermal control subsystems, it was assumed that a large
AHS with an umbilical to the man would probably not be used for
surface operations due to its mass. This system is relatively
compact, however, and it would be well suited for mounting on
a small, powered surface transporter (LRV-type) or an orbital
maneuvering work platform.
The modular AHS system may be limited in orbital use because of
potential difficulty in replacing AHS modules in "zero-g". However, it may
be possible to alleviate this difficulty by storing modules at a crew
station on the vehicle exterior. For cases where the expected EVA duration
is 4 or less hours, the required fusible heat sink could easily be integrated
entirely into the backpack and/or suit thus eliminating the requirement for
heat sink module replacement during an EVA.
The refrigeration and/or radiator systems were not considered for
orbital use because of potential problems with manually maneuvering any system
that required a deployed radiator. If this system were integrated with a
maneuvering work platform, this difficulty would be avoided; there might still
be orientation problems with these systems, however.
Table 19 lists the total systems which were considered in detail,
and identifies them by a number which is used in later discussions and on
figures. The table also summarizes the AEPS EVA weight and volume for each
total system concept for design sortie durations of 4-hours and 8-hours. All
possible combinations of subsystems are not included in Table 19, or in
subsequent trade curves. Preliminary analysis indicated that some combinations
were not competitive for any number of EVA's in any application; these were
excluded from further consideration.
Figure 24 shows the total launch weight for AEPS systems suitable
for use with vehicles having a non-regenerable ARS, such as the space shuttle.
The appropriate power, heating, and cooling penalties for the shuttle were used
in the calculation of the weight of the regenerable systems. Since the basic
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TABLE 19 INTEGRATED AEPS EVA WEIGHT AND VOLUME SUMMARY
EVA EVA
SUPPORT SUPPORT TOTAL TOTAL
SYSTEM NO. AND PACK WT. PACK VOL. WEIGHT 4 VOLUME 4 EVA WEIGHT EVA VOLUME
DESCRIPTION (LBm/MAN) (IN 3 /MAN) (LBm/2MEN) (IN 3 /2 MEN) (LBm/2 MEN) (IN 3 /2 MEN)
1 - IMPROVED 120 2650 0 0 240 5,300
PLSS (100)1 (2210) (0) (0) (200) (4,420)
2- AMINE/AHSWITH 150 4940 294 7020 594 16,900
UMBILICAL TO (150)2 (4940) (175) (4175) (475) (14,055)
LARGE AHS
3- Mg (OH) 2 /AHS WITH 144 3900 294 7020 582 14,820
UMBILICAL TO (128)2 (3470) (175) (4175) (431) (11,115)
LARGE AHS
4- AM I N E/AHS/ 150 4940 131 4370 431 14,250
REFRIGERATOR (150)2 (4940) (131) (4370) (431) (14,250)
"TOP-OFF"
5- Mg (OH) 2 /AHS 134 3600 203 4750 471 11,950
(158) (4125) (0)2 (0) (316) (8,250)
6- Mg (OH) 2 /AHS 144 3900 131 4370 419 12,170
REFRIGERATOR (128)2 (3470) (131) (4370) (387) (11,310)
"TOP-O F F"
7- LiOH/AHS 106 2500 203 4750 212 9,750
(144) (3360) (0) (0) (288) (6,720)
8- LiOH/AHS/ 117 2820 76 2990 310 8,630
RADIATOR "TOP-OFF" (113)2 (2725) (76) (2990) (302) (8,440)
9- Mg (OH) 2 /AHS/ 144 3900 76 2990 364 10,790
RADIATOR "TOP-OFF" (128)2 (3470) (76) (2990) (332) (9,910)
10- ZnO/AHS 161 3420 203 4750 525 11,590
(171) (3860) (0) (0) (342) (7,720)
11 - ZnO/AHS/ 171 3800 131 4370 473 11,970
REFRIGERATOR (157)2 (3570) (131) (4370) (445) (11,510)
"TOP-OFF"
12- ZnO/AHS/ 171 3800 76 2990 418 10,590
RADIATOR "TOP-OFF" (157) (3570) (76) (2990) (390) (10,130)
13- "ALSA TYPE" 108 - _- 216 
UMBILICAL SYSTEM (108)3
14- ZnO/EVAPORATIVE 173 3550 0 0 346 7,100
HEAT SINK (127) (2710) (0) (0) (254) (5,420)
O DATA FOR 4 HOUR EVA SYSTEM GIVEN IN BRACKETS
00
AHS INTEGRATED INTO BACK PACK
INCLUDES UMBILICAL WEIGHT
(D NOT INCLUDING ITEMS COMMON TO ALL SYSTEMS SUCH AS THE EVA STATION
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shuttle does not include equipment to regenerate 02 from C02; All regenerable
C02 control subsystems, for shuttle use,vent the C02 produced during the EVA.
This venting can occur during the EVA or during regeneration of the sorbent in
the shuttle. Figures 25 and 26 show similar curves calculated for long duration
base penalties with a total AEPS heat load of 1200 BTU/hr and 2000 BTU/hr
respectively.
These total system heat loads correspond to metabolic rates of
1000 BTU/hr and 1700 BTU/hr, respectively, with no heat leak; or higher
metabolic rates with negative heat leak, etc. The total system heat load
is used as a parameter rather than metabolic rate since this is the factor
that determines the heat rejection expendables. The total heat load includes
waste metabolic heat, CO2 control heat release, equipment waste heat, and
environmental heat load. The use of total heat load allows these curves to
be independent of the environment so long as the total heat load equals the
assumed values.
In Figures 24-26, the completely regenerable systems show a weight
increase with total EVA time because of suit gas leakage. Also, the closed
heat rejection systems which require an umbilical may show a further increase
in weight with total EVA time because of the arbitrary assumption that only
70% of each EVA would be spent on the umbilical; the remaining 30% would be spent
on a supplemental, or "top-off" heat rejection system which may require some
expendables.
The ordinate intercept of these curves, which is identified as the total
system weight, includes all base equipment and penalties unique to each concept,
plus EVA packs and spares, etc.; but excludes EVA expendables and common equip-
ment such as the EVA station. The slope of each curve gives the system expendable
weight in lbm per 2 man EVA.
The system weights were based on 2 man EVA events because of the ground
rule that safety requirements would dictate that at least two men be involved
in each EVA event. Increasing the number of men participating in an EVA event
reduces the amount of support equipment needed for regenerable portable life
support equipment on a per man basis. Thus planned one-man EVA's would be some-
what more costly, while those EVA's planned for more than three men would cost
somewhat less per man.
Although the cross-over points are not the same for regenerable and non-
regenerable ARS's at the base, the general trend shown by the figures is that
the expendable Apollo PLSS type system is lightest for less than about 3 EVA's
(involving 2 men). Between approximately 3 and 20 EVA's an expendable or
partially regenerable C02 control system, with a closed or semi-closed heat re-
jection system is superior, while a closed C02 system is advantageous for more
than 20 EVA's.
The remaining systems must now be compared on a more detailed basis.
Table 19 gave some of the required parameters for each of the systems. Mg(OH)
and ZnO were chosen for final system integration over KOH because of uncertainty
about the technical feasibility of the KOH concept. The KOH concept has a
potential advantage in pack weight and volume so it could ultimately prove
to be the superior concept.
Some of the candidate subsystems have specific mission applications
and total system combinations employing them are not applicable to all AEPS missions.
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TOTAL HEAT LOAD - 1200 BTU/HR
NUMBER OF TWO MAN EVA'S
(16 MAN-HOURS PER EVA)
FIGURE 25 LONG DURATION BASE AEPS TOTAL SYSTEM LAUNCH WEIGHT VS. NUMBER
OF EVA'S - 1200 BTU/HR HEAT LOAD
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NUMBER OF TWO MAN EVA'S
(16 MAN-HOURS PER EVA)
FIGURE 26 AEPS TOTAL SYSTEM LAUNCH WEIGHT VS. NUMBER OF EVA'S -
2000 BTU/HR HEAT LOAD
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An Apollo PLSS-type system with improved LiOH utilization and re-
usability is suitable for all potential AEPS missions. However, this system
is only competitive for less than about 5 EVA's so that it would not be used
for longterm lunar or Mars missions involving many EVA's. The large AHS/umbilical
support system could be used on any mission. It was assumed that it would not
be used for surface EVA due to its large mass but if a powered transporter was
assumed, it would be an attractive system due to its compact size.
Systems 2 and 4 are the least desirable of the remaining systems, due
to the large pack weight and volume required for the amine system. This method
of CO2 control has inherent reliability problems when applied to an AEPS size
unit. These problems are sufficient to make this system undesirable unless it
can be shown that considerable advantage can be taken of the development effort
already expended on solid amine systems for space station use.
Table 19 and Figures 24 - 26 illustrate that a decrease in total
system weight, by reducing expendables, can only be accomplished by an increase
in the EVA mass and volume. It is possible to integrate non-expendable life
support systems within the weight and volume constraints of a backpack, with
the exception of the heat rejection system if a nominal 8 hour EVA duration
is required.
The two methods of using a small transporter for AEPS support, i.e.,
modular or umbilical approach, were discussed earlier. It was found, that the
modular AHS system is heavier than the refrigerator, umbilical system, 203 lb
per 2 men vs 131 lbm per 2 men and that EVA time is required to change modules.
However, the system is more compact, since no radiator is required, and therefore,
it may be easier to transport. In addition, no mobility is sacrificed by
requiring an umbilical and the system has the capability to operate for the full
EVA duration, without support, by employing the expendable mode of operation.
The refrigeration system has an EVA weight of 131 lb per 2 men and the only
base requirement is a battery charger and the recharge power penalty.
A heat exchanger is included between the LCG loop and the umbilical
fluid to preclude the possibility of an umbilical failure causing a loss of all
cooling. This system is probably best suited for applications where a powered
transporter is assumed. The refrigerator/radiator could be easily integrated
with the transporter and it could be used while riding on the transporter and
for operations in its immediate vicinity. The inclusion of a fusible AHS heat
sink into the pack allows 1-2 hours operation, without the umbilical, with no
water consumption. If more nonumbilical time is required, the EVA can be con-
tinued with no loss in capability simply by switching the AHS to the expendable
mode.
Several conceptual backpack designs were produced to demonstrate that
the regenerable thermal control and C02 control subsystems could be integrated
with the other AEPS subsystems into a practical pack system.
Figure 27 illustrates a system using a metallic oxide/hydroxide
canister for CO2 control with a modular AHS carried in a chest pack. This
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chest pack also contains the backpack controls, quantity indicators, and warning
lights similar to the PLSS Remote Control Unit (RCU). The chest mounting of the
modular AHS was chosen because it facilitates module replacement. The large
volume of the Mg(OH)2 canister is primarily responsible for the large bulk of
the backpack. However, the total weight of the system is only about 25 lbm
greater than the -7 PLSS. This system has the capability to operate for 1-2
hours without requiring any expendables or replacement modules and a full 8
hours by utilizing the AHS evaporation mode.
System No. 6 is shown in Figure 28; it is similar to system No. 5
described above, but includes a heat exchanger and an umbilical to connect to
a refrigeration system. An AHS chest pack is also included to allow 1-2 hours
of non-expendable operation without the umbilical. Since the AHS is not replaced
during the EVA with this system, it could be integrated into the backpack.
This pack weighs more than the modular AHS pack because of the requirements for
a heat exchanger and umbilical quick-disconnects.
Figure 29 presents System No. 7, which utilizes expendable LiOH for CO2
control with a fusible/evaporative AHS for thermal control. Since this system
is designed for a 4 hour maximum EVA duration the AHS is integrated entirely
within the backpack. No separate EVA support equipment is required.
Figure 30 summarizes the weight requirements for the most promising
AEPS total systems for use with a long duration orbital or surface base. The
improved Apollo PLSS (System No. 1) is shown to have the smallest total launch
weight and volume for less than about 20 EVA's (involving 2 men each). Com-
pletely regenerable systems show large weight savings beyond this point.
Figure 31 presents similar results consistent with the space shuttle
energy penalties and life support system outlined in Table 3. This figure shows
that an ALSA system (System No. 13) is never competitive on a weight basis re-
gardless of the number of EVA hours. An expendable closed loop system shows a
slight weight advantage over most of the range. The greater weight of the fusible
heat sink systems may be more than offset by their operational advantage of not
venting water vapor during the EVA. The AHS also includes the capability to
operate as an evaporative heat sink so that this mode could be used on EVA's
which had no venting constraints in order to save the power required for freezing.
Figure 32 shows the EVA weight for the above systems plus the Amine/
AHS/Refrigerator System (No. 4) as a function of EVA duration. The weight carried
by the man is shown in the upper plot, while the lower plot shows the total EVA
weight. This weight includes frozen AHS modules with their storage container
or a refrigeration system along with the pack weight. This figure shows that
the pack weight is relatively independent of the EVA duration while the total
EVA weight of a system using AHS thermal control changes considerably since
about 10 lbm of ice are required per EVA hour.
These figures illustrate the conclusion that a large saving in total
system weight by utilizing regenerable subsystem is possible only by increasing
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the weight of the EVA system. In order to minimize the EVA transportation
difficulties, a large part of this weight is separate from the man and he is
supported by means of a cooling umbilical or with replaceable AHS modules.
Thus, the weight of the pack that the man must carry is only slightly increased
over the weight of an expendable "PLSS-type" system. This is considered to be
the most promising approach to providing a fully regenerable EVA life support
system with minimum encumbrance.
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6.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Lithium Hydroxide (LiOH) for carbon dioxide control is best for
missions involving up to about 200 hours each of EVA time for two crewman.
Beyond this point the thermally regenerable metallic oxide/hydroxides are
favored. The trade point is significantly influenced by the base power
penalty since slightly over 50% of the Mg(OH)2 total launch weight is Dower
penalty for reducing the carbon dioxide which is produced during the EVA to
recover the oxygen; 25% is for energy penalty associated with regeneration of
the Mg(OH)2; and only the remaining 25% is actual hardware weight.
The water evaporator expendable thermal control concept is the best
choice for missions involving up to 20 hours of EVA time each for two crewman.
Beyond this point the regenerable thermal control systems are superior from a
total launch system standpoint; although they do involve the use of a transporter
to support the AEPS design mission. The most favorable concept is the AHS
in some form; it has simplicity and low total launch weight. For planetary
and surface missions a transporter to supply additional AHS modules is re-
quired for the AEPS design mission. The crewman has complete freedom of
movement, since he is not tied to the transporter by an umbilical but some
useful EVA time is sacrificed in replacement of AHS modules. It is not
mandatory that the crewman remain near the transporter, or that he replace
AHS modules, since he can use the AHS in the water evaporator mode, in which
case there is an ample supply of expendable water to accomplish the AEPS
design mission. For use in orbital operations the design mission duration
will probably be less than the AEPS design mission duration of 8 hours,
thus a single, large fusible heat sink device may be attractive. It is also
possible that the design metabolic rate used for planetary missions will be
less than the 1600 BTU/hr used for the AEPS design EVA, and this will
make the AHS more attractive since less frequent replacement of AHS modules
would be required, and fewer AHS modules would be carried.
The thermal control concept of the refrigeration machine with an
AHS for "top-off" is attractive for lunar surface operations. It has the dis-
advantages of a requirement for a coolant umbilical, and relatively high
subsystem complexity. For Mars surface operation the refrigeration machine
could be replaced by a simple space radiator subsystem. In orbital operations
or on Mars the space radiator mounted on the transporter could be replaced by
an integral suit radiator, with a "top-off" system to provide the additional
heat rejection capacity necessary during periods with higher-than-normal heat
loads.
The emergency or backup system has a mandatory requirement for a
"blow-down" oxygen supply capability; this is the only effective approach for
maintaining suit pressurization in the event of suit failure. Rapid decompression
is the most lethal of the more probable types of AEPS failures or contingency
conditions, so some protection against it is required. The emergency "blow-down"
oxygen supply inherently provides ventilation and thermal control. This makes
the use of redundant components in the primary subsystems less attractive; except
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for the emergency oxygen supply itself, which may be in a separate container.
It could also be in an enlarged primary oxygen supply tank with redundant
pressure regulators. Under the constraints set in this study, the amount of
oxygen which can be carried for use in the blow-down system is limited to about
20 minutes of high flow. Therefore, an additional form of protection is needed
to handle high suit leakage rates on planetary EVA's which involve travel to
points as much as two hours from the parent vehicle; the Lightweight Emergency
Shelter (LES) will satisfy this need. For failures of the ventilation sub-
system at a considerable distance from the parent vehicle, a CTS-type of
"blow-down" technique which uses a low flowrate can easily be used. Thermal
control is marginal in this circumstance, so an additional means of thermal
control may be required; the "buddy umbilical" system is the most attractive
in this application.
The impact of the emergency back-up system on the selection of
regenerable primary subsystems is minimal. This is primarily a consequence
of the expendable nature of the "blow-down" emergency system. The "buddy
umbilical" technique for thermal control will require each AEPS system to
have more heat rejection capacity. This has little impact on heat rejection
subsystem selection, but does favor the AHS slightly, since it has an in-
herent excess water boiling capacity.
Based on the relatively small number of EVA hours which seem likely
to occur on the shuttle, purely expendable AEPS subsystems are favored. If
it is assumed that a larger number of EVA events will be accomplished from
the shuttle, then the AHS heat rejection subsystem becomes attractive,
although it is probable that an ample amount of water will be generated by
the shuttle fuel cells to support EVA requirements. However, there is a
strong possibility that many missions will prohibit the venting of fluids
into space in the vicinity of the vehicle. Thus the most favorable shuttle
AEPS heat rejection is the fusible AHS, which also has an evaporation mode.
The following general conclusions were reached in this study:
(1) Regenerable Portable Life Support Systems for use in EVA are
feasible.
(2) The most promising approach to regenerable portable life
support subsystems involves regeneration at the primary
base or shelter.
(3) Regenerable portable life support subsystem concepts offer
large total launch weight savings at the expense of EVA
weight and volume.
(4) Inclusion of an emergency back-up system in the AEPS has only
a minimal impact on regenerable life support subsystems, and
does not alter any of the subsystem selections.
(5) There is likely to be no advantage for an AEPS regenerable carbon
dioxide control subsystem on the space shuttle; there may be an
advantage for a fusible heat sink thermal control subsystem,
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based on fluid dumping restrictions rather than on weight
savings considerations alone.
Recommendations for future study and development are given in Table 28
for both primary and secondary efforts. The highest priority subsystem concept
recommendations are:
(1) Develop the AHS concept to provide a regenerable thermal control
subsystem which will be beneficial on missions involving more
than 20 hours of EVA time or for EVA's which are restricted to
no vapor venting.
(2) Develop the thermally regenerable metallic oxide/hydroxide carbon
dioxide control system, which will be beneficial on missions
involving more than 200 hours of EVA time.
The following recommendations for future work, while not relating
to regenerable life support systems, results from the study and are thought
to warrant identification:
(1) Develop the Lightweight Emergency System for use in contingency
situations involving rapid suit decompression.
(2) Investigate the concept of seals in the wrist and neck regions
which preclude extremely rapid decompressions in the bulk suit
and helmet regions, respectively, in the event of suit failure.
(3) Perform a study to determine the optimum means of executing
EVA from a vehicle with a 14.7 psia, two-gas atmosphere.
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TABLE 28 RECOMMENDED AEPS DEVELOPMENT ITEMS
PRIMARY ITEMS
(1) ASTRONAUT HEAT SINK (AHS)
(2) ZnO AND Mg (OH)2 CO2 CONTROL
SYSTEM
(3) LiOH CO2 CONTROL SYSTEM
(4) KOH CO2 CONTROL SYSTEM
(5) PORTABLE REFRIGERATION SYSTEM
RECOMMENDATION
DEMONSTRATE FEASIBILITY OF THE AHS CONCEPT AND
DETERMINE OPTIMUM METHOD OF INTEGRATION WITH AEPS
DEMONSTRATE FEASIBILITY OF AEPS DESIGN AND BASE
REGENERATION FACILITY
IMPROVE UTILIZATION EFFICIENCY
INVESTIGATE THE CONCEPT FEASIBILITY
DEVELOP HARDWARE FOR PORTABLE LUNAR REFRIGERATION
SYSTEM
SECONDARY ITEMS
(a) LES
(b) WRIST AND COLLAR SEAL
(c) EMERGENCY THERMAL CONTROL
REQUIREMENTS
(d) LCG DESIGN
(e) HEAT SINK SUIT
(f) IMPROVED PLSS
(9) PORTABLE RADIATOR SYSTEM
(h) UMBILICAL DESIGN
(i) VACUUM QUICK-DISCONNECTS
(i) HIGH PRESSURE 02 COMPRESSOR
(k) EVA THERMAL CONTROL OVERCOAT
(I) BIOLOGICAL CLEANING
PERFORM DETAILED DESIGN AND TESTING
PERFORM DETAILED DESIGN AND TESTING AND INVESTI-
GATE PHYSIOLOGICAL RESPONSE OF CREWMAN
DETERMINE CREWMAN RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY THERMAL
STRESS
DEVELOP MORE EFFECTIVE AND COMFORTABLE LCG
INVESTIGATE POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND DESIGN FOR
ORBITAL EVA
INCREASED REUSABILITY, RELIABILITY, AND EVA DURATION
DEVELOP HARDWARE FOR PORTABLE MARS RADIATOR
SYSTEM
INVESTIGATE DESIGN OF LIGHTWEIGHT FLEXIBLE
COOLING UMBILICALS AND DETERMINE MOBILITY
RESTRICTIONS
DEVELOP HARDWARE FOR RELIABLE VACUUM QUICK-
DISCONNECTS
DEVELOP LIGHT-WEIGHT COMPRESSOR FOR REFILLING
EVA 02 TANKS AT BASE
INVESTIGATE FEASIBILITY AND POTENTIAL WEIGHT
SAVINGS FOR LUNAR EVA
INVESTIGATE METHODS OF STERILIZATION AND CLEANING
OF EVA EQUIPMENT FOR LONG TERM, REPEATED USE
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APPENDIX A
SPACE SHUTTLE EVA
This appendix discusses the shuttle orbiter life support system, current
shuttle baseline EVA equipment, and the rationale behind the Shuttle AEPS
specification given in Table 2 of the main body of this report.
1.0 SHUTTLE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL/LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM
1.1 CABIN ENVIRONMENT
The Space Shuttle Orbiter is intended to have a nominal mission duration
of 7 days (References [1]* and [2] and [3]). The mission duration may be as
short as 2 days or as long as 30 days (Reference [3]). There is basically
a 4 man crew, although as many as 14 men and women as passengers and crew are
considered for study purposes (Reference [3]). The significant requirements for
the orbiter cabin are given in Table A-1 (from References [4] and [5]). Table
A-2 gives the techniques chosen for the various life support functions by the
shuttle study contractors. Food is nominally of the canned or dehydrated
variety, although a food freezer may be used to provide whole food on the longer
missions (Reference [2]). Some potable water is carried on the shuttle, but
the primary source of potable water is the hydrogen-oxygen fuel cells which
produce water as a by-product. The electrical requirements are high, and so
water production exceeds demand by a significant amount. The excess water is
either stored for transfer to another space vehicle such as a space station or
is dumped overboard (References [2] and [3]). Human waste products are not
processed to recover water, but are simply stored for return to earth.
1.2 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL/LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM (EC/LSS) RELIABILITY
The baseline EC/LSS Reliability requirements are that the failure
sequence will be fail operational, fail safe. That is, the system must be
capable of continued operation with no degradation in performance, or impact
on mission goals, after a single failure, and it must be capable of operating
in an adequate fashion to allow a safe return to earth after a second failure.
The specified emergency operation period is 48 hours (Reference [3]).
1.3 EVA CAPABILITY
Regarding EVA, the space shuttle orbiter must not be designed so as to
preclude EVA (Reference [3]). This requires that an airlock be provided for
egress purposes. The airlock must be large enough to accommodate two men
plus EVA equipment; this means that the volume must be at least 210 cu.ft.
(Reference [8]) and the baseline nominal volume is 337 cu.ft. The vehicle life
support system must be capable of replenishing the atmosphere lost during egress,
and it may be advantageous for the vehicle to contain a pumping system to
recover the atmosphere in the airlock prior to egress. The current shuttle
baseline calls for all EVA equipment except the airlock to be charged to the
payload.
Reference numbers refer to the reference list at the end of this appendix.
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TABLE A-1
BASIC SHUTTLE EC/LSS CABIN
DESIGN CRITERIA (REFERENCE [4])
Parameter
Total Pressure (psia)
Oxygen Partial Pressure (psia)
Minimum
10
3.15 @ 10
3.00 @ 14.7
Atmosphere Diluent
CO2 (mm Hg)
Cabin Temperature (°F)
Cabin Temperature
Control Range (°F)
Cabin Dew Point (°F)
Cabin Wall Temperature (°F)
Cabin Volume (Ft3)
Airlock (Ft3 )
Tunnel Volume Retracted (Ft3)
Tunnel Volume Extended (Ft3)
Pressurized Compartment
Leakage (Lb/Day)
Repressurizations
Gravitational Force (g)
(Any Direction)
Cabin Ventilation (fpm)
Cabin AirborBe Bacteria
(Microbes/Ft )
0
70
Maximum
14.7
3.35 0 10
3.25 @ 14.7
Nitrogen
7.6
75
Nominal
3.15 @ 10
3.10 9 14.7
5.0
72
+2
47
65
0
0
0
15
57
80
50
72
526
337
74
121
3.5
I
3
40
TBD
25
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SUMMARY OF SHUTTLE LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS
Selected Concept
Life Support
Grumman( l )
CO2 Control LiOH
MDAC(2)
LiOH
NAR (3)
LiOH
Humidity Control
Trace Contaminants
Primary 02 Storage
Emergency 02
Storage
Condensing
Heat Exchanger
Activated
Charcoal
1200-350 psi
Gas From
Attitude Control
Storage Tank
High Pressure
Gas
Condensing
Heat Exchanger
Activated
Charcoal
Liquid Oxygen(4 )
from Orbital
Maneuvering
System Storage
Tank
3000 psi Gas
Condensing
Heat Exchanger
Activated
Charcoal
3000 psi Gas
900 psi Gas
Primary N2
Storage
Thermal Control
Power Supply
3000 psi Gas
Optical Solar
Reflector
Radiators
Fuel Cells
3000 psi Gas
Radiators With
Expendable
"Top-Off"
Fuel Cells
3000 psi Gas
Radiators With
Expendable
"Top-Off"
Fuel Cells
(1) Reference [6]
(2) Reference [4]
(3) Reference [7]
(4) Cryogens have been removed from Orbiter since Phase B reports
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Function
TABLE A-2
2.0 SHUTTLE LIFE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT BASELINE
Phase B shuttle studies have been conducted by McDonnell-Douqlas Corp.
and North American Rockwell, Corp. for NASA. Both of these studies have
considered the use of EVA equipment with the shuttle, as required in the Shuttle
Study Guidelines. In addition, NASA has funded work on IVA pressure suits for
use in the shuttle program.
2.1 EVA/IVA EQUIPMENT
North American Rockwell (Reference [9]) and McDonnell-Douglas (Reference [5])
have baselined Apollo PLSS technology for use in the Shuttle Orbiter. Soft
suits similar to the Apollo A7L suit are baselined with an atmosphere of pure
oxygen at a pressure level of 3.75 psia. According to Reference [9] the crew-
men pre-breathe pure oxygen at 14.8 psia for denitrogenation purposes prior
to an EVA event. (The adequacy of a 4 hour pre-oxygenation period prior to
a reduction in pressure from 14.7 psia to 3.75 psia might be questioned;
Reference [5] indicates that there would be some risk in this procedure).
The equipment baselined for use in the shuttle is identified below:
(1) Pre-Breathing Apparatus
(2) Suits
(3) PLSS
(4) Consumables storage (or interconnects to orbiter gas storage)
(5) Airlock
Additional equipment which might be carried includes:
(6) Scavenging pumps (to recover atmosphere from the airlocks
prior to depressurization.)
(7) Open-loop operation support equipment
(8) Umbilicals (for use in open-loop operation)
The EVA mission definition is:
(1) The number of EVA/IVA events per flight varies with mission;
however, EVA is the backup for the manipulator system; therefore,
a capability for two 4-hour EVA events is provided for each flight.
(2) Two crewmen will participate in each specific EVA mission.
(3) Airlock pressurization time and depressurization time are 10
minutes each.
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(4) EVA/IVA duration is an average of 4 hours.
2.2 FLIGHT TEST PRESSURE SUIT
McDonnell-Douglas has proposed to provide an emergency pressure suit
for use in the Shuttle Orbiter Flight Test Program (Reference [5]). The
shirtsleeve atmosphere in the cabin is used; however, the crewmen are suited
with Apollo A7L suits and breathe pure oxygen through a face mask. If the
total cabin pressure drops below 8 psia, the crewmen don helmets and the suits
are pressurized by a mini-suit circuit. The suit pressure level is 3.7 psia.
The Apollo liquid-cooled garment (LCG) is used to provide cooling to the crew-
men. The mini-suit circuit is essentially an Apollo PLSS which has been re-
packaged to fit under the crewman's seat.
2.3 LIGHTWEIGHT, CONSTANT WEAR PRESSURE SUIT
Hays has recommended that a lightweight, constant wear pressure suit,
weighing less than 12 lbs., be developed for use in the shuttle to replace
the Flight Test Pressure Suit discussed above (Reference [10]). NASA has
contracts underway with International Latex Corporation (References [11]
and [12]) and Space-Age Controls to produce concepts and prototypes of this
suit. This suit is to be worn at all times and so needs to have greater
comfort, and to be more aesthetically pleasing. The suit is intended only
for intravehicular use, and so has no meteroid or thermal protection. This
allows greater flexibility in design to reduce bulk without sacrificing
mobility. There is greater flexibility in selection of materials and fabric
textures than was available with Apollo because the cabin atmosphere is air
rather than pure oxygen. The unit has a soft helmet which is stowed within
the suit so that it can be quickly activated in an emergency. The suits are
currently designed for operation at a pressure level of 5 psia, so a period
of pre-oxygenation would be required prior to use in a depressurization
emergency in the shuttle (with its 14.7 psia two-gas atmosphere). There will
be an attempt to raise the suit's operating level to 8 psia, to eliminate the
necessity for pre-oxygenation. There may be difficulty in obtaining adequate
mobility at a pressure level of 8 psia with a suit with no joints. The ILC
suit weighs 9-1/2 lbs. (Reference [12]).
3.0 SPECIFICATION
The rationale used in establishing the quantities given in the shuttle
EVA specification in Table II of the main body of this report is discussed
below.
3.1 EVA DURATION
EVA performed in an orbital environment should involve much less trans-
lation time than is usually involved in planetary EVA, thus reducing total
sortie duration. In orbital EVA the crewmen will spend most of the time in
the immediate vicinity of the parent vehicle. References [1], [5], [7],
and [13] all indicate that the orbital EVA duration should be about 4 hours
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at the most.
3.2 FREQUENCY OF SORTIES
It is assumed that all EVA's will involve two crewmen, although in some
instances only one crewman will actually be involved in the EVA, while another
crewman is suited and is prepared to go to the assistance of the crewman who
is involved in the EVA if required. The maximum frequency of EVA is specified
at 3 events per 24 hours. This is predicated on 2 planned EVA events plus one
emergency EVA event.
3.3 ORBITER MISSION LENGTH
It has been assumed that an orbiter mission length of 30 days might be
involved in a "shuttle sortie" mission.
3.4 MOBILITY
The EVA equipment should allow the crewman freedom-of-movement sufficient
to allow easy accomplishment of all required tasks. This primarily relates
to manipulator backup and emergency situations since planned EVA events would
be based on actual system capability. The use of an umbilical seems questionable
in the backup and emergency situations, and also in situations involving crew
translation across distances of more than 50 feet.
3.5 CENTER OF GRAVITY
The center of gravity (CG) shift of + 3 inches was adopted from the
original AEPS specification without any investigation or evaluation.
3.6 SUIT GAS
The specification calls for an 8 psia pure oxygen atmosphere in the
pressure suit. This eliminates the need for pre-oxygenation when transferring
from the shuttle orbiter with a 14.7 psia atmosphere comprised of 3.2 psia
oxygen plus diluent nitrogen to the pressure suit. This also assumes that
a suitable high pressure suit with adequate mobility and manual dexterity
is available. The high pressure suit system was baselined because (1) there
would be no time for pre-oxygenation in emergency situations, (2) the cost
of pre-oxygenation in manpower, equipment, and expendables is significant,
and (3) a satisfactory high pressure suit is within the current state of suit
technology.
3.7 VENTILATION
The nominal suit gas flow rate is 5 acfm with a suit inlet temperature
of 50 to 70°F. In emergency situations with a loss of liquid cooling flow, a
gas flow rate of 9 acfm with a 50°F inlet temperature would be desirable.
3.8 HUMIDITY CONTROL
In normal operation the LCG will provide adequate cooling to the crewmen;
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however, it is desirable to maintain humidity in a moderate range to insure
crewman comfort. It is specified that the inlet gas dewpoint temperature be
about 5°F colder than the inlet gas dry bulb temperature. This then makes
the dewpoint temperature range 45-50°F.
3.9 CONTAMINATION CONTROL
The nominal CO2 partial pressure level was established as 4 mm Hg at
the inlet to the helmet, while the maximum level was set at 7.5 mm Hg for
high metabolic load conditions. The CO2 partial pressure level for the space
shuttle orbiter is specified as 5 mm Hg (Reference [5 ]), while for the space
station it is 3.0 mm Hg (Reference [14]). The maximum CO2 partial pressure
of 7.5 mm Hg during high metabolic loads seems reasonable due to the relatively
short duration of this type of exposure. The short duration of the EVA event
coupled with the relatively large leakage rate of the system compared to the
suit volume make a trace contaminant control system unnecessary. Strong
odors may have an adverse or disconcerting effect on the crewman, and these
should be eliminated.
3.10 METABOLIC LOAD
Crewman metabolic loads during the performance of EVA events are subject
to considerable debate, particularly for zero-g events. It is difficult to
establish the metabolic rate of an individual under laboratory conditions, and
it is more difficult to determine accurate metabolic rates under actual EVA
conditions. In addition, it is difficult to extrapolate laboratory experience
to actual flight conditions. For this study the average metabolic rate for the
4 hour mission has been specified at 1500 BTU/hr. This gives a total energy
expenditure of 6000 BTU/hr over the EVA event, the same value as recommended
in Reference [15]. The maximum metabolic rate to be sustained for a long period
of time, such as one hour, is specified as 3500 BTU/hr. This is the maximum
heat removal rate required for the system. Higher metabolic rates may be ex-
perienced for shorter periods of time; it is assumed that the excess heat above
the 3500 BTU/hr will be absorbed by the crewman temporarily. The minimum
metabolic rate is 280 BTU/hr; it is assumed that this low rate would not be
sustained for periods longer than one hour so that a peak heat leak from the
system of larger than 280 BTU/hr could be accepted.
3.11 LIQUID TRANSPORT LOOP
It is specified that liquid cooling will be used as the primary means
for transporting heat away from the crewman. The flow rate is nominally
specified as 4 lb/min of water. It is assumed that the LCG used by the crewman
has a higher heat exchanger effectiveness than the Apollo LCG, so an inlet
temperature of 60°F is adequate to reject the maximum metabolic load plus
equipment heat load. The inlet coolant temperature is required to be no
more than 60°F.
3.12 OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
This system is intended for use only in a zero-gravity vacuum environment.
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This has impact on the system design in that EVA equipment volume and
envelope are more significant than weight per se. The orbital environment,
or possibly a free space environment, allows reliance on the rejection of heat
from the system by thermal radiation which cannot be counted on in planetary
surface environments (which have a substantial amount of incident infared
thermal radiation at times). At times the system may have to operate without
venting large quantities of water vapor overboard, such as when in the vicinity
of astronomy or earth observation experiments. Also, there may sometimes be
a need to reject heat inside a pressurized compartment where cooling by water
evaporation is not feasible.
3.13 DONNING, DOFFING, AND CHECKOUT
Time required for the crewman to don and checkout, or to doff the EVA
equipment should be minimal. The donning time for the suit should be 5
minutes or less, and the time for donning and checking out the portable life
support equipment should be 5 minutes or less. In addition, the manhours
needed for servicing and maintaining the equipment should be minimized.
3.14 SAFETY
The EVA system should be designed in a fail-safe manner. That is, the
EVA event will be aborted after any system failure, and the system will provide
an adequate "get home" capability. The safety system is discussed in detail
in Appendix B.
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APPENDIX B
AEPS EMERGENCY CONSIDERATIONS
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1.0O INTRODUCTION
The backup EVA life support systems used on Gemini and early Apollo
missions were designed to provide breathing gas and some measure of convective
cooling for a very short period. This was considered to be adequate since the
EVA's were conducted in the vicinity of the spacecraft and the crewman was
never far from shelter. However, on later Apollo flights and many anticipated
AEPS missions, the EVA's will take the astronaut far from the primary base and
considerable time may be required to return in case of a failure. Therefore,
the AEPS system must provide all life support requirements for the time required
for the astronaut to return to the base in case of a failure in the primary
system.
Primary spacecraft life support systems are generally designed to a
"fail operational - - fail safe" requirement. This means that the normal
mission can be continued with any single component failure, since the secondary
system will provide all required functions without any degradation of performance.
Thus, the system is said to have "failed operational". An emergency capability
is provided so that a second failure of the same subsystem would not be catastrophic,
but it would require termination of the mission. The AEPS primary life support
subsystems will be assumed to be designed "fail safe" since including a "fail
operational" capability imposes an unnecessary penalty on a portable system.
Therefore, a single failure of any primary component would not be catastrophic,
but it would require activation of an emergency system and termination of the
EVA. It will be assumed that AEPS structural elements, gas storage bottles,
heat exchangers, and flow loop "hard" lines and fittings will be designed with
a sufficient safety margin that catastrophic failures will not occur. Dynamic
components such as pumps, fans, and valves; flexible seals between joints; and
all removeable components such as umbilicals, suit zippers and seals, etc., are
subject to failure. It is impossible to accurately, quantitatively assess
component reliability for systems in the advanced concept stage. However,
it is possible to qualitatively predict possible failure modes that must be
satisfied by the emergency system.
The allowable limits for parameters such as CO2 and trace contaminant
partial pressures, total suit pressure, and crewman thermal comfort can be
quite different for the AEPS primary and emergency systems. The time required
for the crewman to reach a pressurized shelter following an EVA emergency
is expected to be short compared to the nominal EVA duration. The basic
physiological reactions of the crewman to variations in these parameters were
briefly investigated to attempt to determine reasonable tolerance levels.
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2.0 PHYSIOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The physiological effects of most interest are: the effects of total
gas pressure and decompression rate in the case of a gas leak, effects of
CO2 and contaminant level on crewman mental and physical performance, and
the effects of thermal stress due to cooling system failure.
If a puncture occurs suddenly in the AEPS pressure shell, pressure will
decay rapidly as the atmosphere exits through the vent. The time required
for the pressure to decay depends on the initial pressure, the configuration
of the vent area, and to a lesser degree, on the atmosphere composition and
the initial atmosphere temperature. Rapid decompressions will occur
adiabatically, while slow decompressions will tend to be isothermal. Figure
B-1 presents generalized curves (from Reference B-l) which may be used for
calculating the time required for decompression from one pressure level to
another.
The physiological effect of rapid decompression on human beings most
commonly known is in relation to deep sea diving accidents where divers rise
to the surface too rapidly, and suffer from spontaneous pneumothorax, dysbarism,
or decompression sickness; "the bends". In the case of divers, the pressure
change may be from several atmospheres down to one atmosphere. The same
phenomena can occur when the pressure level is reduced from near one atmosphere
to a fraction of an atmosphere.
Spontaneous pneumothorax is caused by the trapping of gases in body
cavities such as the sinuses and the chest. If this gas is not removed as
the ambient pressure is reduced, it will expand and it can rupture internal
organs if the pressure differential is large. The cause of the bends is inert
gases, primarily nitrogen, which are dissolved in body fluids and fat, and
which come out of solution when the pressure level is reduced. They are re-
leased as bubbles in the blood, body tissue, and fat. Oxygen, water vapor,
and carbon dioxide diffuse rapidly into the bubbles causing them to grow. When
the bubbles form in tissue, they may produce pain, particularly around the
joints. The bubbles may rupture the fat cells, causing fat to enter the blood-
stream. In addition, the bubbles in the bloodstream may lodge in the terminal
vessels of the lungs or the brain, thus cutting off the blood supply to some
tissue in those regions. Gases formed in the stomach and intestines cause
severe abdominal distress. Aeroembolism frequently produces severe pulmonary
distress, a condition which is often called "the chokes".
It is very difficult to predict the onset of the symptoms of dysbarism,
or the severity of the symptoms. "Many factors, among them temperature,
muscular work, age, body build, etc., influence susceptibility to decompression
sickness." (Reference B-2).
The change in pressure level without encountering aeroembolism symptoms
is uncertain but it is generally accepted that the majority of healthy people
can withstand a pressure decrease from 14.7 psi air to 7.3 psi air without being
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subject to symptoms (Reference B-2). Actually, this is a rule of thumb that
should be used with caution due to the many uncertainties associated with
decompression sickness.
There is also considerable uncertainty associated with the time required
for onset of symptoms. Reference B-2 indicates a range in time until on-set
of symptoms of from 5 minutes to 40 minutes associated with a pressure decrease
from 14.7 psia to 3 psia.
Protection from the bends may be obtained by washing the inert gases
out of the system by prebreathing pure oxygen. Five hours is usually sufficient
for pressure reductions of from 14.7 psia air to 3.5 psia oxygen, and as little
as 3 hours may be sufficient for many people. This time may vary from one
event to another for a given individual. Also, it appears that susceptibility
to decompression sickness may increase rather than decrease with repeated
decompressions.
In a space flight situation which involves rapid decompression, it
would appear that the crew would have a significant amount of time to react
prior to onset of decompression sickness symptoms. Symptoms may generally
be relieved by repressurization to the original pressure and breathing pure
oxygen. The problems associated with decompression sickness are applicable
to EVA events operating from a spacecraft with two-gas atmosphere at a pressure
of 14.7 in contrast to vehicles, such as Apollo, with a low-pressure pure oxygen
atmosphere: virtually the same atmosphere that is used in the space suit during EVP
If decompression takes place in a time on the order of 0.01 seconds, the
crew may be subject to mechanical damage. This occurs when the suit pressure
falls faster than the gas pressure in the lungs and airways of the body. A
transthoracic pressure difference of 1.5 to 2.0 psia could result in lung
rupture, depending upon where in the breathing cycle the subject is when the
decompression occurs (Reference B-2). Smaller pressure differentials can cause
severe ear pains.
The partial pressure of the oxygen and carbon dioxide is reduced along
with the total pressure. However, the mixed venous blood entering the lungs
will contain the same amount of oxygen and carbon dioxide as immediately
prior to the decompression. This gives rise to a situation where the oxygen
diffuses out of the lungs into the air. Exposure to a near vacuum pressure
for longer than 6 to 7 seconds will result in unconsciousness even if the
pressure is then increased; however, the subject will have 10-15 seconds
before he actually becomes unconscious. This time becomes shorter if the
subject is exercising (Reference B-2). There is some question as to how much
time he would have to take corrective action or signal for help if the
decompression took place over a period of several seconds because he might
not recognize the problem. Experiments have exposed primates to a vacuum for
as long as 180 seconds without sustaining permanent injury, although they
remained unconscious for 2-30 minutes after recompression (Reference B-2).
Denitrogenation increases the survival time, apparently because it permits
the vital brain tissues and fluids to be saturated with oxygen prior to de-
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compression. It also reduces the possibility that evolved nitrogen bubbles
might disrupt the vital neural pathways in the central nervous system.
Mild hypoxia can also occur, resulting from a drop in the oxygen partial
pressure to less than 1.9 psia. This can result in mild confusion and loss
of visual acuity.
An additional effect of reduced ambient pressure is the fact that blood
reaches its boiling point at a temperature of 37°C at a pressure of 47 mm Hg.
It does not vaporize in the body when the body is exposed to a pressure of
47 mmHg because there are hydrostatic and tensile forces in blood vessels and
tissues which retard vaporization (Reference B-2). Experiments with animals
decompressed to less than 30 mm Hg have shown that blood circulation comes
to a standstill in 10-15 seconds due to "vapor lock" resulting from blockage
of capillaries with bubbles (Reference B-2). This time may be longer in humans;
however, it appears that ebullism would not be a factor in exposure to vacuum
since the subject would already be unconscious due to hypoxia prior to circu-
latory arrest. However, ebullism may retard the subjects recovery after re-
compression because, while water vapor may disappear rapidly on repressurization
due to condensation, gases such as 02, CO2, and N2 which have diffused into the
vapor bubbles will not be absorbed immediately, and may persist for some time
(Reference B-2).
Reference B-3 presents data on an unprotected human hand exposed to low
pressures. This data suggests that pressures on the order of 5 to 10 mm Hg
are required to produce swelling (indicating ebullism) within a few minutes.
Reference B-2 suggests that a survival time of 90 seconds under vacuum con-
ditions should be possible provided that other Droblems such as the bends
and explosive decompression can be avoided. Thus an emergency repressurization
system must act within this time to assure survival of the crewman.
A loss of gas circulation or CO2 removal capability in the AEPS will cause
the partial pressure of CO2 in the helmet to increase rapidly. The body's
initial reaction is to increase both the respiratory rate and volume in an
attempt to decrease the CO2 partial pressure in the lungs. The heart rate is
also increased somewhat (Reference B-2). However, since the respiratory system
volume is comparable to the free volume in the helmet and suit, the CO2 level
will increase at a rate of about 40 mm Hg/min. At this rate, most crewmen
will become unconscious in 3 to 5 minutes. Gas circulation must be restored
within this time for the crewman to remain conscious and save himself without
assistance.
As previously discussed, the AEPS suit will be insulated to protect the
crewman from environmental extremes but this also has the effect of trapping
the crewman generated metabolic heat.
In contrast to emergencies involving the gas circulation and suit
pressurization systems, the allowable time before crewman collapse and un-
consciousness following a cooling system failure is much greater.
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Data presented in References B-2 and B-4 can be used to estimate the
crewman's useful survival time following such a failure. These data, which
were compiled from various sources, are in fairly good agreement although
it should be noted that individual tolerance to heat stress may vary widely.
Crewman failure occurs due to the raising of body temperature that results
from a metabolic heat production rate that is greater than the total heat re-
moval rate. The excess heat is stored in the body producing the same basic
effects as a fever due to sickness. The data indicate that a maximum body core
temperature of about 105°F can be tolerated without permanent damage. This
implies a heat storage of about 750 to 1000 BTU depending on body weight. This
is in agreement with other data (Reference B-4) indicating incipient collapse
after 30-40 minutes of exercise at 1500-2000 BTU/hr in an insulated environment.
Thus it appears reasonable to assume a heat storage of 750 BTU without
significant performance degradation under emergency conditions. This value
can be used to determine the endurance time for a crewman when his metabolic
heat production exceeds the emergency cooling system capacity. Environmental
thermal exchange (Section 3.5) can prolong or shorten this time depending on
the average environmental sink temperature. Figure B-2 shows the expected
useful crewman survival time following a cooling system failure. The time
shown is that during which the crewman's performance is relatively unimpaired
and he can perform useful action to return to shelter without assistance.
The emergency durations specified for the various AEPS missions are
also shown along with the time to collapse following a gas circulation failure
and suit depressurization.
These data showing the expected crewman physiological response to
different types of emergencies can now be used along with data on expected
failures and failure rates to determine the required types of emergency systems.
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3.0 POTENTIAL FAILURE MODES
There are many possible equipment failures or accidents that could
endanger the life of an EVA crewman. The AEPS emergency system will be designed
to specifically accommodate the most credible failures and it will be assumed
that this will also be sufficient to handle other, less likely, contingencies.
The most credible failure modes are shown in Table B-1 along with the
emergency system requirements for each type of failure, and possible
approaches that would meet these requirements. Running out of oxygen or other
TABLE B-1 FAILURE MODES
B-9
REQUIREMENTS
FAILURE CAUSE REACTION TIME TO PROVIDE
Excessive Gas Seal Short Pressurization
Leakage Umbilical
Suit Rip
Regulator
Pressure Relief Valve
Ventilation Fan/Motor A Few Minutes Atmosphere Cir-
Umbilical culation &
C02 Bed Purification
Line Blockage
Heat Rejection Sublimator Several Minutes Cooling
Umbilical
LCG Leak
LCG Line Blockage
Temp. Control Valve
Pump
Power Battery A Few Minutes All Life Support
Fuse Functions
Terminal Board
Short
Expendables High Metabolic Rate Long All Life Support
Depleted Functions As
Prematurely Required
consumables before the end of the EVA and a leaking suit are probably the
most likely types of EVA emergency. The consumables problem can be solved
by providing a reserve capacity that is manually activated. Stopping a leak
is more difficult since the leak could be anything from a leaking zipper to a
torn suit. Small leaks could be handled by the primary oxygen system and would
merely require the EVA duration to be reduced due to the increased gas usage
rate. Large leaks are potentially catastrophic since no practical system could
keep the suit pressurized for long if a large rip occurred. Therefore, it is
necessary to arbitrarily specify a maximum leakage rate and duration that the
emergency system can accommodate.
The Apollo command module has a specified emergency flow rate of 40 lbm/hr,
which is sufficient to maintain 4.5 psia cabin pressure for a minimum of 5
minutes with a 0.50 inch hole. This is intended to provide
sufficient time for the crew to don their suits and activate the ECS suit
loop. Such a specification must be assigned for the AEPS emergency pressuriza-
tion system in order to define the quantity of emergency pressurization gas
that must be carried. Figure B-3 shows the effect of suit pressure and vent
area on the quantity of gas required to maintain suit pressure for a given time.
Table B-2 indicates the actual leakage area and volume/leak area ratio (V/A)
expected for different types of failures of the AEPS pressure garment. Reference
B-2 indicates that no lung or other damage is expected from rapid decompression
when V/A > 15m. When V/A is in the range from 3 to 15m some mechanical damage
is expected and potential fatalities can occur. This indicates that failure
of the neck seal or any leak on the order of 10 in or greater will probably be
fatal regardless of the emergency system.
A similar credible failure mode would be a failure in the AEPS gas
plumbing loop. This could be caused by mechanical damage to the gas circulation
lines, fittings, or gas umbilicals between the suit and AEPS pack. The result
of this failure would also be system depressurization, but in this case, the
suit would retain pressure integrity. Therefore, EVA operations could be
continued for a considerable time if a means is provided to isolate the suit
from the AEPS pack and maintain gas circulation through the helmet by an
auxiliary method.
A failure of the gas circulation fan would cause a loss of CO , trace
contaminant, and humidity control unless another means of gas circulation
was provided. This could be accomplished by a redundant fan, a "blow-down"
system, or a hybrid "blow-down" system that incorporates a gas ejector to
provide gas circulation.
Failures in the primary cooling system, which is specified to be a
water circulation loop consisting of a pump, a heat sink, and a Liquid
Cooling Garment (LCG) are less serious than most gas system failures since
the EVA crewman can survive for some time without active cooling while system
depressurization would be fatal within minutes.
Loss of electrical power could occur for many reasons and could cause
a ls of both gas and water circulation since the pumps are electrically powered.
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Secondary methods of providing these functions have been discussed, but a
loss of electrical power would also cause a loss of communication which might
be vital in an emergency. Therefore, a redundant power supply should be
provided. The simplest means of providing auxiliary power is with a non-
rechargeable, primary battery.
The last credible EVA failure mode is for the crewman to run out of
consumables during the EVA. This can occur because of a longer than planned
EVA, excess 02 use due to leakage, or high average metabolic rate, excess water
expended due to hot environment, etc. This contingency can be accommodated
by using a reserve capability built into the system.
TABLE B-2 CHARACTERISTICS OF EXPLOSIVE DECOMPRESSION
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RESIDUAL SUIT ORIFICE V/A
VOLUME AREA RATIO
SOFT SUITS (IN 3 ) (IN 2 ) (METERS)
NECK SEAL (PLSS) 1585 26.. 0.88
WRIST SEAL (PLSS) 1710 9.3 4.67
CHAMBER UMBILICAL HOSE 1555 1.2 32.3
PLSS UMBILICAL HOSE 1710 0.4 100.
FINGERS (PLSS) 1710 0.2 233.
HARD SUITS
WAIST SEAL (PLSS) 2150 125. 0.435
NECK SEAL (PLSS) 4310 87. 1.25
THIGH (PLSS) 3910 27. 3.6
ANKLE (PLSS) 4580 26. 4.46
WRIST SEAL (PLSS) 4580 8.4 13,9
CHAMBER UMBILICAL HOSE 4330 1.2 89.8
PLSS UMBILICAL HOSE 4580 0.4 268.
FINGERS (PLSS) 4580 0.2 620.
4.0 IMPACT OF EMERGENCY REQUIREMENTS ON PRIMARY SYSTEMS
It is expected that the AEPS emergency system will only be operated
occasionally so that the criteria for system suitability are different than
those used to select the AEPS primary subsystems. This infrequent operation
allows the use of a completely expendable system since the number of expected
uses, even on a long duration mission, is insufficient to justify a regenerable
capability. The most important factors are long shelf life with no service
required and minimum weight and volume. The emergency system must be capable
of being carried on many EVA's and subjected to a rugged environment with no
service required between EVA's and still be ready for use when required.
Since an emergency may occur when the crewman is alone and at a distance from
a pressurized shelter, it is necessary to carry an emergency system at all
times and therefore, the weight and volume must be as small as possible.
It was found that high pressure gaseous storage of oxygen is the most
practical method of storing elemental oxygen for the primary EVA system
because of system simplicity and the fact that other methods such as cryogenic
storage have difficulty supplying gas at high flow rates. Since a high flow rate
is specified for the emergency system, this is also the only practical elemental
02 storage method for the back-up 02 supply. Chemical 02 storage methods
such as potassium superoxide can provide simultaneous CO2 control and oxygen
supply and these would at first appear to be attractive for an emergency system.
However, these were found to have no weight or volume advantage over gaseous
oxygen storage combined with a separate CO2 control system. In addition, they
cannot easily supply oxygen at the high flow rate required for an emergency
repressurization system so that a high pressure 02 bottle would still be required.
A simple high pressure bottle is the only practical method of supplying gas
for breathing and suit pressurization for both primary and emergency systems.
CO2 control subsystems generally fall into one of two categories: passive
chemical sorbent beds through which the ventilation gas is continuously circu-
lated or systems such as molecular sieves or solid amine beds where dynamic
components are required. The dynamic systems have an obvious reliability
problem when compared to passive systems, but it might be possible to include
a redundant capability in a primary dynamic system; for example, by including
a third amine bed in a solid amine system. However, this approach is deemed un-
attractive since the diverter valves and timers in this system are probably
more prone to fail than the bed itself. In addition, the weight and volume of
a two bed solid amine system are sufficiently large that the addition of re-
dundant components is impractical. The reliability of any dynamic CO2 sub-
system can be increased by including redundancy for critical components, but
the overall reliability of the AEPS is increased more by providing a completely
separate emergency CO2 control method. This can be provided by an open-loop
system where exhaled CO2 is vented overboard or by an expendable LiOH cartridge
since LiOH was shown to be the most compact CO2 control method available. If
gas umbilicals that link two EVA crewman following a gas system failure, are
used, then the CO2 capacity of the primary system may require an increase to
handle the CO2 produced by two men during such an emergency.
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The fusible Astronaut Heat Sink (AHS) concept discussed earlier has
an evaporative contingency mode which enhances the applicability of the
concept. No other candidate thermal control system has any inherent advantage
when emergency requirements are considered. However, the evaporative
capability of the AHS would only be useful for contingency situations where it
is not possible to replace a melted AHS module. A failure of the primary AHS
could still leave the crewman without cooling so that a secondary cooling
method must be provided in case of failure during installation of an AHS or to
provide cooling in case of failure of any type of primary heat sink (cracked
sublimator plates, refrigerator failure, etc.). Water evaporation devices
were shown to be the lightest weight heat sinks available and therefore, they
are attractive as an emergency system. Convective cooling by a gas blow-down
system could also be used but this method is not practically capable of removing
the required maximum heat load and is therefore not suitable for cooling in an
extended emergency situation.
The optimum AEPS power supply was shown to be a secondary (rechargeable)
battery. However, as previously stated, there is no requirement that the
emergency system be regenerable and therefore, a primary (non-rechargeable)
battery will be assumed for a redundant AEPS power supply since non-rechargeable
batteries have an advantage in power density.
The various concepts for AEPS emergency systems will be discussed in the
following section. It should again be noted that all concepts are assumed to
be "fail safe" so that a failure in a primary AEPS subsystem and subsequent
activation of the emergency system will cause the EVA to be terminated as soon
as possible. Some of the concepts have an inherent "fail operational - fail
safe" capability for certain types of emergencies thus providing an extra
safety margin.
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5.0 EMERGENCY SUBSYSTEM APPROACHES
Table B-3 shows some of the emergency systems or emergency provisions
that have been included in EVA life support systems used, or designed for
use, in the past. In general, it appears that most of these systems were
designed without the benefit of a careful study of the actual emergency
situations and the response of the human body to emergency conditions. The
fundamental requirement for the emergency system is to guarantee the survival
of the crewman for the specified emergency duration. Crewman comfort is a
secondary consideration provided that any discomfort does not interfere
with the crewman's performance. The emergency system must satisfy all of
the EVA failure modes shown in Table B-1.
A blow-down high pressure system, similar to the OPS, is shown in
Figure B-4. This system is basically the same as the OPS, with the addition
of the mode select and suit isolation valves. These valves allow the suit to
be isolated from the rest of the AEPS 02 system with a direct gas feed from the
emergency gas storage bottle. This could be used in case of failure of an
umbilical or seal in the gas plumbing system while a simple gas circulation
failure would not use the isolation valves and the emergency gas flow would
augment the normal makeup gas. The flow is taken directly to the helmet
area by an independent gas umbilical. Crewman survival time would be increased
if a collar seal was provided to isolate the helmet from the suit. This
would allow 1.5-2.0 psia helmet pressure to be maintained for some time even
with a totally depressurized suit. Preliminary data indicate that the crewman
could survive in this mode although lung and other tissue damage might result.
If useful consciousness could be maintained for 5-10 minutes by this method,
it would provide time for the crewman to actuate an emergency pressurized
shelter system.
Some degree of convective cooling would be provided by the gas flow and
this along with thermal storage by the crewman should satisfy cooling system
failures. The mode select valve is used to divert the flow through an ejector,
which would maintain gas circulation in case of a fan failure. The flow rate
in the system would be reduced in this case because an ejector could not easily
produce as much flow through the system as the fan. This mode could also be
used to supply make-up oxygen in case of simple expendables depletion.
The collar seal concept shown in Figure B-4 could also be used at the
wrists to partially maintain suit pressure integrity in case of failure of a
wrist seal or loss of a glove. The effect of such a seal is to reduce the
leakage area and conserve the emergency gas supply. The parts of the body
that are exposed to vacuum might suffer painful swelling and hemorrhaging,
but the alternative is certain death in most cases; since, as shown on Figure
B-3, the quantity of gas required to maintain suit pressure for any significant
length of time with a large leak, is impractically large.
The figure shows a separate emergency 02 bottle,but the emergency 02
supply could also be stored in the primary bottle if its size was increased
and a redundant regulator provided. Increasing the size of the primary bottle
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would result in a somewhat lighter system but a separate emergency supply could
provide a higher emergency flow rate if a leak occurred near the end of an
EVA when the primary bottle pressure was reduced.
The contingency transfer system (CTS), (Reference B-5), is a modification
to the simple "blow-down" system. The CTS uses a breathing bag and face mask
to supply fresh oxygen on demand and thus reduce the required gas flow rate.
The CTS includes a breathing bag bypass valve to increase the flow rate for
emergency suit pressurization and a sublimator for cooling. The system capacity
and size are given in Table B-3. A schematic is shown in Figure B-5.
An umbilical system, somewhat similar to the one used on the later Apollo
flights, can be used to interconnect two AEPS packs so that one pack could
support two astronauts. The primary AEPS subsystems were sized for a maximum
metabolic rate of 3500 BTU/hr but the average rate experienced on lunar EVA's
to date has been on the order of 1000 BTU/hr (Table 6, p. 20). Therefore, a single
AEPS primary system has more than enough capacity to support two men under
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ordinary conditions.
The Apollo emergency umbilical system allows two EVA astronauts to share
the cooling capability of a single PLSS. The gas system is not shared so
that the OPS must be actuated for failures in this system. The umbilical system
concept for the AEPS would allow both the gas and water subsystems to be
shared. An OPS type blow-down system would also be required to supply breathing
gas in the interval between the time of the emergency and the connection of the
umbilical. A schematic of this system is shown in Figure B-6.
The gas and water umbilicals can be used separately so that either or
both subsystems can be shared independently. Check and selector valves are
included to allow the failed backpack to be completely bypassed. Since
this system uses the primary AEPS consumables (except for the emergency 02
supply), the length of time it can be used during an emergency will depend
on the EVA elapsed time when the emergency occurs. If the emergency occurred
near the end of the EVA, when the consumables were nearly depleted, the
functional pack could only supply both men for a short time. However, the
emergency 02 supply from both packs would still be available and the crewman
would probably already be returning to the base so that the system should be
adequate for any condition. The primary life support system incorporates
redundant components for critical components that may be prone to fail. Such
a system is shown in Figure B-7.
This system includes redundant paths for both the 02 and water loops
and a separate, emergency 02 supply. The umbilicals between the AEPS pack
and the suit are shared by 6oth primary and secondary systems so that an
umbilical failure would eliminate both systems. This type of failure is
unlikely; but if it occurred; the secondary oxygen supply, which has a separate
umbilical, can be activated. A redundant power supply, not shown in the figure,
is also included.
The system is designed to be "fail-safe" so that redundancy is only in-
cluded for those functions that are required for survival. Thus, redundant
trace contaminant and humidity control are not provided since these functions
are not required for a minimum, survival system. The redundant gas system by-
passes the primary trace contaminant and humidity control subsystems so that
leaks in these components can be isolated. However, a detailed reliability
analysis of the actual hardware might show that the probability of failure
of these components is sufficiently low that they need not be bypassed.
The selector valve could then be placed downstream of the trace contaminant
subsystem with the return line upstream of the humidity control subsystem.
This would be the preferred location since, if it is feasible from a component
reliability standpoint, it would retain humidity and trace contaminant control
for the emergency system. Similarly, flow from the secondary heat sink should
be routed through the humidity control system if possible.
The secondary CO control subsystem is assumed to use expendable LiOH
since this is the lightest, most compact CO2 control method available. The
secondary heat sink is assumed to be a self-contained water boiler similar
to the AHS concept. This consists of a sealed water container with an internal
fin and tube network to allow the secondary transport loop to be circulated
directly through the heat sink as shown in Figure B-8.
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The water can be exposed to vacuum by opening a valve, thus allowing
the water to boil by absorbing heat from the transport loop. This device
would be sealed until use so that no routine service would be required. It
has a weight and volume advantage over conventional systems, e.g., sublimator,
wick water boiler, flash evaporator, etc., since the water storage and
evaporation functions are integrated.
This redundant approach would satisfy all the emergency requirements in
Table B-l, but the capabilities of the system would be further enhanced if the
umbilical sharing capability shown in Figure B-6 were added. This would
give the emergency system greater flexibility if two astronauts were present
because it would allow a "fail-operational, fail-safe" capability. That is,
a failure and consequent secondary system activation in either of the primary
AEPS packs would not require termination of the EVA if another crewman was
in the vicinity, because the secondary 02 supply and umbilicals would still
be available if required.
The SLSS, which was considered for use on Apollo flights as a replacement
for the OPS, used a somewhat similar approach. This emergency system was
essentially a completely separate, short duration portable life support system.
This approach is also applicable to AEPS, however, in the case of AEPS it may
be advantageous for the secondary system to use expendable systems such as
LiOH for C02 control, and an evaporative heat sink for thermal control. This
is because the secondary system is rarely used so there is little penalty
associated with the use of expendables. However, it is always carried, so
fixed weight and volume are very significant.
A schematic of the Apollo SLSS is shown in Figure B-9. It provides all
life support requirements for up to 2 hours with a metabolic load of 1600 BTU/hr.
The maximum emergency gas flow rate is specified as 2.65 lbm/hr and this is
sufficient to maintain suit pressure for two minutes with the suit pressure
relief valve failed open. The maximum C02 level is 15 mm HgA. The system
baselined a sublimator for thermal control and expendable LiOH as a CO2.
Additionally, 0.886 lbm of oxygen is stored in a high pressure, 7500 psi, bottle.
Another method of satisfying the AEPS emergency requirements is to
provide a completely separate, spare backpack that could be installed during
the EVA in place of a failed unit. Apollo EVA experience has shown the de-
sirability of utilizing an auxiliary transporter, either powered or unpowered,
to help carry tools and equipment needed during an EVA and this transporter
could be used to carry an additional backpack. The umbilicals between the
pack and suit would require vacuum quick-disconnect fittings so that the spare
pack could be installed during the EVA if required. A separate OPS type system
would be needed to supply breathing gas during the change over.
This approach has several inherent difficulties, in addition to the
large weight which makesit unattractive for most missions. The requirement
for operating quick-disconnects in a vacuum introduces further reliability
problems since a failure of a disconnect fitting could prevent the crewman
from installing the spare pack and could also cause a serious leak that would
rapidly deplete his emergency oxygen supply. In addition, the primary AEPS
system will probably be designed to accept some fixed EVA weight and/or volume
B-23
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penalties in the interest of reducing expendables. Thus, this approach would
be inefficient when used as a back-up system since the emergency system will
be used infrequently, and therefore can profitably use expendables for some
functions in the interest of reducing EVA weight and volume. The primary
AEPS pack would probably also not be designed for long-term, charged, but
inactive, use and therefore it would require some checkout and servicing prior
to each EVA even when carried as a spare.
The spare AEPS approach is therefore considered to be an inefficient
method of providing an emergency capability.
The possibility of a massive suit rip is probably remote; but, it if
occurred, it would almost certainly be fatal, since no practical man-carried
system can supply the large volume of gas required to maintain suit pressure
for more than 5-10 minutes. For this contingency, a concept designated the
Lightweight Emergency Shelter (LES) could be used as an emergency shelter
to protect the crewman until he could be returned to the primary base. The
LES, shown in Figure 23 (p. 71 of the main text), is simply a closed, balloon
like cylinder made of flexible plastic with a sealed zipper on one side. It
can be folded into a small package for transporting during a normal EVA. If
the LES is required, it is removed from the storage bag and the crewman with
the torn suit zips it over him. The balloon will be inflated by the gas
leaking from the suit and the crewman can continue to breath from his normal
AEPS oxygen supply. The LES can be prevented from overpressurization by leak-
age through the zipper or by providing a simple pressure relief valve. The
device acts simply as an easily transportable, last resort pressurized shelter
to protect a crewman with a badly ripped suit. The collar and wrist seals
could keep the crewman conscious long enough to erect the LES.
The concept, as shown in Figure 23 (p.71), would not allow the crewman to
walk so that he must depend on outside help with a powered vehicle or "MET-
type" transporter to return him to the primary base. This is assumed to be
an acceptable approach since there seems to be no other practical solution to
protect a crewman in this contingency situation. There is also a high pro-
bability that a crewman involved in an accident severe enough to rip his suit,
will also be injured and thus, may be physically incapable of getting to shelter
without assistance. The crewman might also be provided with patches, that
could be applied to the pressure suit while inside the LES, to effect a tem-
porary suit repair. The LES could then be deflated and the crewman could walk
to the base without assistance.
The LES is a simple, compact solution to an unlikely, but probably fatal,
contingency and it could easily be carried in addition to any other AEPS
emergency system. One LES unit for each EVA excursion party of 2-3 men should
be sufficient, since the probability of more than one man being involved in
the type of accident that would require LES activation on a single EVA, is
assumed to be extremely low.
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6.0 EMERGENCY SUBSYSTEM WEIGHT AND VOLUME ANALYSIS
The weight and volume estimates for the candidate concepts were based
largely on analogy with similar equipment and components.
The effect of leakage area and suit pressure on emergency oxygen re-
quirements was shown in Figure B-3. It was arbitrarily assumed that the
blow down system must maintain a suit pressure of 3.7 psia for 5 minutes
following the loss of a finger from the glove. This should be sufficient
time to allow the crewman to erect the LES portable shelter without assistance.
The use of the collar and wrist seals could increase this time considerably.
The weight of this system is summarized in Table B-4.
TABLE B-4
AEPS EMERGENCY BLOW-DOWN SYSTEM COMPONENT ANALYSIS
Component Weight (lbm)
Oxygen 3.7
Oxygen Tank 10.35
R egulator 3.7
Actuator 0.8
Mode Select Valve 0.25
Ejector
Total 3
Volume = 935 in
by analogy with
OPS
0.25
Oxygen Hose
Frame and Misc.
Collar Seal
TOTAL
The total weight and volume of
to the Apollo OPS currently in use.
to the OPS, with the addition of the
this system concept is very similar
The system operation, is also similar
mode select valve, ejector, and collar
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1.25
12.0
1.5
33.8
seal. This system should have good long term shelf life with no service
required unless the unit has been activated.
The only service that should be required after the unit has been used,is replenishment of the oxygen supply. There are two methods of accomplishing
this requirement. The tank could be refilled from the base oxygen supply by
using a compressor to pump the gas from the base storage pressure to the
10,000 psi required, or the empty tank could be replaced with a pre-charged
tank that was filled on Earth before the mission. A base weight of 30 lbm
was calculated for the compressor and power penalty required to compress
oxygen from 50 to 30,000 psi for a similar size tank. Thus, a compressor
that was supplied only to recharge emergency 02 bottles would have a weight
approximately equivalent to 3 spare tanks. The optimum recharge method would
probably be to have the primary and emergency oxygen supply bottles designed
so that they could be filled from the same compressor. However, it is expected
that the emergency system would be used so seldom that supplying several spare,
charged tanks would not present a large penalty. The weight penalty for any
one of the recharge methods is small and it is not possible to define the
optimum method at this time.
The SLSS weight breakdown is given in Table B-5. This system is con-
TABLE B-5
SLSS DESIGN FLIGHT WEIGHTS (REFERENCE B-6)
NAME FLIGHT WT
Canister/Reservoir 10.40
Sublimator 6.50
02 Bottle 4.99
Regulator Assy. 2.40
Power Supply 3.90
Control Unit 2.88
Fan Motor Assy. 2.72
02 Umbilical 2.56
Thermal Cover 1.93
H20 Umbilical 1.38
Pump Motor Assy. 1.35
Terminal Box .34
02 Stowage Plates 
.73
H20 Separator .55
Pressure X'Ducer .32
Antenna Assy. .25
Oxygen 1.30
Water 6.00
Structure and Cover 6.20
Msg. Packaging 4.30
61.00
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siderably more complicated than the simple blow-down system and therefore
some servicing and checkout would probably be required before each use even
though the system had not been activated on the previous EVA. If the emergency
system had been used, then servicing would include recharging the oxygen bottle,
replacement of the contaminant control cartridge CLiOH and charcoal), filling
of the feedwater reservoir, and recharging or replacement of the battery.
Table B-5 shows the weight to be greater than 60 lbm and based on an
assumed gensity of 40 lbm/ft , the volume is projected to be approximately
1-1/2 ft .
The emergency umbilical system is similar to the Apollo B-SLSS umbilical
currently in use, with the addition of gas flow passages. The weight of the
B-SLSS water umbilical is given as 10.65 lbm (Reference B-7), including storage
bag and contained water. The dry weight is 9.62 lbm. It was found that 1.0 lbm
per foot is a reasonable weight for an umbilical containing two oxygen lines
(supply and return) and this is in good agreement with the weight of the
umbilical designed for Skylab. The Skylab umbilical contains cooling water feed
and return lines, a gas feed line, electrical cable, a tether and insulation;
while the anticipated AEPS emergency umbilical would not have the electrical
cable but it would include a gas return line. Therefore, a representative
weight of 1.0 lbm/foot, including connectors, was assumed for the AEPS emergency
umbilical system.
The mobility requirements, etc., for this system are assumed to be
similar to these for the B-SLSS system and therefore the length of the umbilicals
was also assumed to be similar. A length of 6 ft. was assumed so that the
dry weight is 6.0 lbm. The storage bag weight, again by analogy with the
B-SLSS bag at 2.57 lbm, is assumed to weigh 4.0 lbm. The umbilical water in-
ventory is about 1.0 lbm so that the total weight of the system is approximately
11.0 lbm. The weights and volumes are summarized in Table B-6.
COMPONENT WEIGHT (lbm) VOLUME (IN3 )
umbilical 6.0 256 (coiled volume)
storage bag 4.0 -
contained water 1.0 28
TOTAL 11.0 284
plus blow-down system at 33.8 lbm and 935 in3 per man
TABLE B-6
AEPS Emergency Umbilical System Component Analysis
This system requires no routine servicing between EVA's unless it has
been used. The B-SLSS umbilical is stored "wet", i.e., full of water, but this
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would probably create a problem of corrosion and other deterioration over
a long period. Therefore, the AEPS umbilical system will be assumed to
be stored dry with the 1.0 lbm of water required to fill the umbilical
carried in the LCG loop accumulator already in the AEPS backpack. Service
after use would simply require emptying and drying the umbilical and replace-
ment in the storage bag.
A conceptual secondary heat sink was shown in Figure B-8. It is simply
a can containing water, with finned tubes, through which the transport water
is circulated. The can is sealed during normal operation, but if the heat
sink is required a vapor vent line is opened to expose the liquid to vacuum.
The pressure in the can will then drop to a value determined by the minimum
vent area and the heat load and the device will operate as a pool boiler
using the heat of vaporization as a heat sink. The device shown in the figure
is intended for operation in a gravity field and would require modification
for operation in zero-g.
There are several other redundant heat sink concepts that could alter-
natively be used. The AHS concept discussed in Section 4.4 could be modified
by increasing the number of separate ice modules and providing a redundant
clamping mechanism so that two modules could be used at once. Another approach
would be to use a light weight sublimator such as that used in the CTS
(Reference B-5 ). The weight and volume of any of these approaches is expected
to be comparable to that of the redundant heat sink as shown in Table B-7.
COMPONENT WEIGHT (lbm ) VOLUME (in3 )
m
blow-down system 33.8 935
fan 2.7 50
LiOH canister 5.0 130
pump 1.4 25
redundant heat sink 7.5 150
battery 1.0 20
misc. 5.0 200
56.1 1.510
TABLE B-7
AIRS COMPONENT ANALYSIS
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The size of the redundant LiOH C02 control canister, taken from
Reference B-7, is approximately 5 lbm and 130 in3 for a two hour life. A
complete size analysis of this AEPS emergency system concept is shown in
Table B-7. The weight estimates of components such as the pump, fan and
battery are taken from Table B-5. .
This emergency concept is shown to be only slightly lighter than the
completely redundant emergency system approach. However, the capability
of the system is greater, primarily because of the inclusion of a large
capacity, oxygen blow-down system.
In the study of primary AEPS subsystems and integrated systems it was
found that a weight of 140 lbm and a volume of 3600 in are reasonable for
several different types of backpacks that could be expected to be used on
different AEPS missions. Therefore, these values will be assumed for a spare
pack to be carried on a transporter without specifying the particular sub-
systems in the pack. It is assumed that one spare pack will be carried for
every two men since two men are unlikely to experience simultaneous failures.
An approximate weight analysis of the LES system shown in Figure 23 on
page 71 of the main text was performed by assuming the balloon was a cylindrical
tank constructed of polyethylene plastic. It can be easily shown that a
polyethylene film 0.010 inches thick can provide the required strength when
pressurized to 3 psig over-pressure. This material may not be used but the
strength is conservatively representative of a wide range of plastic film
materials that might be used.
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7.0 EMERGENCY SUBSYSTEM COMPARISON AND CONCLUSIONS
The weight and volume estimates generated earlier can now be used to
compare the candidate emergency system concepts. These results are given
on a per man basis so that, for systems such as the buddy umbilicals and the
LES, 1/2 of the total penalty will be assigned to each man. These results
are summarized in Table B-8.
Emergency System Emergency Sys. Total Man-* Total Man-*
Concept Weight (lbm/man) Vol. (ins/man) Carried Wt. Carried Vol.
~~m (ih~(bm/man) (in3 /man)
Blow-down System 33.8 935 173.8 4535
Emergency Secondary Life 62.4 2600 202.4 6200
Support System
Emergency
Umbilical 5.5 142 179.3** 4677
AIRS 56.1 1510 196.1** 5110
Spare Pack 70.0 1800 173.8** 4535
LES 3.5 75
*includes primary backpack
** includes blow-down system
*** carried on transporter
TABLE B-8
EMERGENCY SYSTEM WEIGHT SUMMARY
The simple blow-down system is seen to be the lightest weight candidate
and it is also a basic element of most of the other concepts. However, it pro-
vides a more limited capability than any of the other systems since activation
of the emergency high flow rate mode would rapidly deplete the gas supply. Thus
the crewman might be left with insufficient gas to reach the primary base,
even if the leak could be quickly repaired. Therefore, this system is only
recommended for use near a shelter or primary vehicle.
The completely redundant ESLSS concept can provide all emergency functions
for a considerable period but it requires the largest man carried weight and
volume. This system provides a completely redundant life support system, but
this is not required since many components of the primary system can be assumed
to be sufficiently reliable that redundancy is not required. Therefore, this
system is not recommended.
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The emergency umbilical is primarily a supplement to the blow-down
system and it greatly increases the emergency capabilities of that system
with only a small increase in weight and volume. This is an attractive
approach but it does have the drawback that it requires two men for operation.
Most lunar and Mars surface EVA sorties in the AEPS time frame (1978-1990)
will be conducted by a minimum of two men, but many orbital EVA's will only
require one man so that this approach is not applicable. Therefore, the
umbilical/blow-down approach is well suited for surface EVA's but not for all
orbital EVA operations. It is recommended that all primary backpacks be
provided with the fittings necessary to accept the emergency umbilicals and
that these umbilicals be provided on every EVA undertaken by two or more crew-
men. Provision of this emergency umbilical capability in the primary backpack
would also allow the primary AEPS system to be used as a backup to an umbilical-
to-base system used in the vicinity of a shuttle or space station, thus
maximizing the utility of the primary AEPS system.
The AEPS Integrated Redundant System (AIRS) concept is similar to the
ESLSS, but redundancy is provided only for those components that are most likely
to fail. The weight and volume of this system also includes a blow-down
system and no allowance was made for any reduction that could be made by
integration of the primary and blow-down system. The weight of the included
blow-down system contains a 12 lbm allowance for a separate support frame
and it seems certain that this could be reduced considerably if the primary
and emergency systems were fully integrated. Thus, the 17 lbm weight penalty
of this system over the umbilical/blow-down system might also be reduced.
However, the principal advantage of the AIRS is that it provides maximum emergency
capability without requiring assistance from another backpack. Provision of
an emergency umbilical capability to the AIRS would allow the system to be
extended to a "fail-operational" mode on any two-man mission, since a primary
system failure could be handled by the built-in redundancy while only a second
failure would require activation of the emergency umbilical and termination of
the EVA mission.
The spare pack approach requires a blow-down system to provide life
support while the failed pack is being replaced and it also requires some type
of auxiliary transporter to carry the spare pack. This approach has no
advantages over other, significantly lighter systems and is therefore not
recommended.
The LES system is intended to supplement any of the other systems and
its use is recommended on all EVA's.
The primary influence of emergency duration on system weight and volume
is on the quantity of expendable gas, water, and oxygen. The weight of hard-
ware such as redundant pumps, regulators, and umbilicals is not affected. Based
on the oxygen tankage calculations given in Section 4.2.1, an oxygen tank penalty
factor of 3 lb total per lb of oxygen was used,along with the information in
Figure B-3 and Table B-2,to estimate the size of the emergency pressurization
system. The weight of such a system,assuming the same leakage area discussed
in Section 4.7,is shown plotted as a function of emergency duration in Figure B-10.
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The figure also shows the weight of the other emergency subsystem approaches.
The influence of emergency requirements on the total AEPS system weight
is shown in Figure B-11. The C02 control system is the only one affected
and this only in the case of using buady gas umbilicals. The figure shows the
weight of expendable LiOH is increased slightly if gas umbilicals are used.
This occurs because the size of the primary C02 sorbent bed must be increased
slightly to handle the load of an additional man if the emergency occurs near
the end of the EVA. In the case of an expendable sorbent bed, this extra
weight is discarded after each EVA. The regenerable bed must also be in-
creased in size but since the extra weight is not expended the only real increase
is in the base penalty for regenerating the increased mass. The figure shows
that this increase is negligible.
The conclusions of the emergency study are presented in Table B-9.
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FIGURE B-11 IMPACT OF EMERGENCY GAS UMBILICAL ON CO2 CONTROL SYSTEMS
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A blow down gas system is required in all cases since, as shown in Figure
B-2, failures of the suit pressurization or C02 removal systems will incapacitate
and kill the crewman within minutes. Failure of the cooling system could be
tolerated for a considerable length of time, especially if the gas blowdown
system was designed to provide some measure of convective cooling.
Thus, the AEPS emergency system must provide for emergency suit
pressurization and C02 removal. Both of these functions can be provided by the
blowdown system shown in Figure B-4. The addition of redundant components such
as fans, pumps, heat sinks, and CO2 sorbent canister may be warranted if a
detailed reliability analysis of actual AEPS hardware shows that this is
desirable. A set of buddy umbilicals would provide essentially the same capability
if two crewman were assumed to be present. The LES and collar/wrist seal
concepts provide additional protection against suit leaks and seal failures.
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TABLE B-10
SUMMARY OF EMERGENCY SYSTEMS CONCLUSIONS
Concept Comments
Blow-down "OPS-type" System
Completely Redundant Emergency
Secondary Life Support System (ESLSS)
Emergency Umbilical Combined
With Blow-down System
AEPS Integrated Redundant
System (AIRS)
Complete Spare AEPS Pack
Lightweight Emergency
Shelter (LES)
Collar/Wrist Seal
insufficient capacity for some
emergency situations, provides for
most critical functions
excessive weiaht, volume, and reliability/
servicing requirements
suitable for EVA's conducted by two or
more men
suitable for all AEPS missions, may
provide more redundancy than actually
needed
excessive weight,- volume, and reliability/
servicing requirements
recommended as complement to other
systems for use in case of large suit
leak
extends survival time in case of massive
suit leak
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